Abstract
A non-cooperative approach is employed to solve the problem of allocating the total cost of building and maintaining an airport runway among its users. More precisely, it is proposed a non-cooperative bargaining game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcome, and it is shown that the SPE outcome payoffs coincide with those prescribed by the nucleolus of the corresponding airport cooperative game.
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Notes
We write \(N\backslash i\) instead of \(N\backslash \{i\}\).
Actually in the bargaining game there is a continuum of strategy profiles that are SPE, but all of them lead to the same outcome.
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Acknowledgements
This research has been supported by Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (ECO2015-66803-P), and The Basque Country University (UPV/EHU, UFI 11/51).
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Albizuri, M.J., Echarri, J.M. & Zarzuelo, J.M. A Non-cooperative Mechanism Yielding the Nucleolus of Airport Problems. Group Decis Negot 27, 153–163 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-017-9551-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-017-9551-9