Abstract
Scientific discovery is an important moment in scientific pursuit, but only a few philosophers of science appreciate this moment as a logical issue. Starting from his understanding that all thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in focal content of thinking, Michael Polanyi puts out his thesis that scientific discovery cannot be justified by a series of strictly explicit operations but by merely invoking deeper forms of commitment in sighting the problem and the vision of reality. This article will delve into Polanyi’s notion of scientific discovery in three sections: the first section is dealing with Polanyi’s concept of heuristic philosophy which tones that discovery of problem is the primary requisite of a good scientist to vision reality, the second discusses the role of intellectual passions in scientific justification, and the third focuses on the ontological implication of scientific discovery that it guides us to comprehension of something real both tangible and intangible. The article concludes that since scientific discovery involves the creative and imaginative appeal to reality, its rationality must be counted on by its logical structure and personal experiences in scientific community.
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Dua, M. Scientific Discovery and Its Rationality: Michael Polanyi’s Epistemological Exposition. Found Sci 25, 507–518 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09621-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-019-09621-8