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Pleasure is Goodness; Morality is Universal

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Abstract

This paper presents the Universality Argument that pleasure is goodness. It proceeds from a moral sense theory that analyzes moral concepts as concerned with what all should hope for, feel guilty about, and admire. This requires rejecting the view that moral judgment concerns empirically inaccessible norms governing action. The first premise defines goodness as what should please all. The second premise reduces should to perceptual accuracy. The third premise invokes a standard of universal accuracy: qualitative identity. Since the pleasure of all is accurate solely about pleasure, pleasure is goodness, or universal moral value.

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Notes

  1. Bengson (2015).

  2. Veluwenkamp (2017), Mintz-Woo (2018).

  3. Chappell (2012).

  4. Kagan (1998), Smuts (2011), Bramble (2013).

  5. Ventham (forthcoming).

  6. Feldman (2004), Schroeder (2004), Heathwood (2007).

  7. Sobel (2001), Schroeder (2007).

  8. Finlay (2014), Ridge (2014), Case & Lutz (forthcoming).

  9. Foot (2001).

  10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQSNhk5ICTI&ab_channel=Yosemitebear62.

  11. Chuang (2015).

  12. Woodard (2019).

  13. Colebrook (2018), Laskowski (2020).

  14. Jackson (1998).

  15. Driver (2009).

  16. Grice and Strawson (1956).

  17. Boyd (1988), Sayre-McCord (1988).

  18. Railton (1989).

  19. Sinhababu (2018).

  20. Skipper (forthcoming).

  21. Díaz-León (2017), Whitlow & Laskowski (forthcoming).

  22. Sinhababu (2017).

  23. Deonna and Teroni (2012), Kauppinen (2013), Tappolet (2016), Werner (2016).

  24. Schnall et al. (2008).

  25. Laham et al. (2009).

  26. Haidt (2001).

  27. May (2018).

  28. Slavov (2020).

  29. Legg (2008).

  30. Johnson (2018).

  31. Locke (1689).

  32. Boyd (1988), Dowell (2016).

  33. Rubin (2008), Sinhababu (2019).

  34. MacAskill (2022).

  35. Jeremias Koh was a very helpful early co-author, and shifted to become the driving force of Koh & Sinhababu (forthcoming) when my ideas took over this paper. Matthew Adelstein, Zach Barnett, Spencer Case, Nick Laskowski, Adrienne Martin, Tyler Paytas, Abelard Podgorski, Qu Hsueh Ming, Mattias Skipper, and Moonyoung Song gave helpful comments. The NUS Philosophy Reading Group provided useful feedback, as did audiences at University of Zagreb, Arctic University of Norway, the Bled Ethics Workshop, and the Asian Metaethics Workshop.

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  1. National University of Singapore, 3 Arts Link, 117570, NUS Philosophy, Singapore

    Neil Sinhababu

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Sinhababu, N. Pleasure is Goodness; Morality is Universal. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10331-7

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