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Race, Romantic Attraction, and Dating

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Abstract

Here are two widely held positions on the ethics of dating: First, people are generally morally justified in excluding people they don’t find attractive from their dating pool. Second, people are not justified in maintaining a dating pool that is racially exclusive, even on grounds like attraction. In this paper, we demonstrate how these positions are consistent. To do so we differentiate our attitudes in dating and our dating behavior. Then we show how existing criticisms of racialized attitudes in dating are incomplete as practical criticisms of our behavior. Finally, we give our account of the moral reasons whites have to change their dating preferences when they exclude people of color. In doing so, we supplement existing discussions of race-based discrimination in dating.

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Notes

  1. See (Matheson 2012) for a clear example of this idea. Which is not to say this is universally accepted as unproblematic. For an argument that discrimination in romantic preferences along the lines of sexuality and gender is morally pernicious see (Ayres and Brown 2011).

  2. We use the terms ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Asian’, and ‘people of color’ to refer to groups of people who have traditionally (in the context of the United States) been categorized into various races imputed with certain biologically fixed physiological and psychological tendencies and capacities. Of course, our use of these terms is not an endorsement any particular metaphysics of race. We call these groups ‘racialized groups’ following (Blum 2010).

  3. In a study of same-sex attracted men, 70% did not identify online racial dating preferences as racist. Nonetheless, the majority “saw racism as a problem on sex and dating services” and 40% were “bothered by encountering racial exclusion online” (Callander et al. 2015).

  4. By focusing on such exclusionary bare preferences, we are addressing a set of cases beyond the scope of other accounts of wrongful discrimination in dating, e.g. (Fourie 2017). On Fourie’s account, people with such bare preferences could be doing something wrong insofar as they demean unattractive people. Though this might be correct, we will offer a supplementary explanation on which the racial element also grounds some wrongdoing.

  5. Of course, some people might have exclusionary dating preferences that are neither bare nor personal nor aesthetic – e.g. a reasonable fear for a black partner’s safety in 1920s Alabama. Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out.

  6. For a consideration of some of these issues, see (Mills 1994).

  7. For an example, see (Diamond 2003). Our thesis is only intended to cover romantic relationships given their particular importance to our social and personal lives. Sexual relationships, friendship, and admiration play different enough roles that we leave open the possibility that other ethical norms apply. A full exploration of those is beyond the scope of this paper.

  8. For breakdown of the major contributing factors to the black-white wealth gap, see (Shapiro et al. 2013).

  9. For more on the wrongness of stereotyping see (Blum 2004) and (Beeghly 2015).

  10. See (Zheng 2016).

  11. (Coleman 2011) p. 13–14.

  12. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to more clearly distinguish explanations of some wrongdoing from remedies for that wrongdoing.

  13. While we raise this tension in ethical terms of respect, it would serve our argument equally well to make the point in explicitly metaphysical terms. That is, some might think that romantic attraction necessarily aims at the qualities of the individual themselves and not the further consequences of the relationship. Someone who tried to get into a romantic relationship with someone on these grounds could not succeed. At best, they would be in a pseudo-romance with someone.

  14. Though sufficient evidence for this claim comes from our lived experience, striking support can be found in (Johansson et al. 2011).

  15. Following Murdoch (1970), we might say that we should engage in a remaking of the subjectively apprehended reality that is the necessary backdrop of our choices. Rather than choosing to date those we do not prefer, we can focus our mental activity on changing what we prefer. Even if our choice to date who we are attracted to is not immoral, refusing to work towards their change, we argue, is. In a 2018 presentation on Murdoch entitled “Visual Metaphors and the Absence of the Social in Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy”, Lawrence Blum adds the important insight that this subjectively apprehended reality is not only the consequences of our individual pathologies but primarily arises from the cultural and social values we encounter. These include the distorting influences of racist and classist ideologies. We agree with Murdoch and Blum that living morally requires resisting such misperceptions. But, in this paper, we defend a further claim. Living morally requires reshaping our preferences when they are disrespectful, even if they are not misrepresentations. We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this interesting connection.

  16. See (American Psychological Association 2012).

  17. See, for example, (Kinnish et al. 2005; Roberts et al. 2006; Diamond 2015; Mock and Eibach 2011).

  18. See (American Psychological Association 2008).

  19. See (Fisman et al. 2008; Robnett and Feliciano 2011).

  20. On some theories, such as ethical egoism and certain virtue ethics, prudence and morality do not come apart. That is, the moral thing to do just is the prudent thing as well. If any such theory is correct then so much the better for our claims here.

  21. As an anonymous reviewer right pointed out, this claim must be qualified as follows: First, only some members – like those in positions of political or economic power – develop such standards. Most of us simply obey these standards rather than develop them. For members of non-dominant social groups, this will include standards that develop outside that social group like preferences for light-skin among some black communities (which we discuss later in the paper) or double eyelids among some Asians. Moreover, non-dominant members of social groups will be subject to standards they did not develop like misogynist standards that govern women’s appearance and behavior across all social groups.

  22. See (Livingston and Brown 2017).

  23. See (Ervin and Jackson 1990). Some figures on this are available from surveys of models participating in New York Fashion Weeks. In the 2014 Fall-Winter show 78.69% of ‘looks’ (i.e. instances of a particular outfit being modeled) were modeled by whites (Dries 2014).

  24. To clarify, allowing our group’s standards to author our choices is different from authoring our choices in response to our group’s standards. For example, to use a case we raise later, whether Michelle Obama straightens her hair out of a bare aesthetic preference for straight hair – where this preference has a disrespectful social meaning – is a different case from Obama straightening her hair to avoid the potential backlash from violating this anti-black aesthetic standard.

  25. (Haslanger 2014), p. 15.

  26. (Haslanger 2016), p. 126.

  27. Ibid.

  28. (Haslanger 2017), pp. 13–15.

  29. Haslanger (2016) puts the point as follows, “Individuals participate in practices, sometimes intentionally and knowingly, sometimes not, if their behavior accords with the schemas in engaging with the resources.” p. 126.

  30. (Haslanger 2015), p. 6.

  31. (Anderson 2010), p. 48–49.

  32. (Zheng 2016), p. 411.

  33. As Zheng (2016) notes, “...although White people are much more likely to date within their race than outside it, there is no term for ‘white fever’ comparable to ‘yellow fever’, ‘jungle fever’, and so on. Choosing to date non-Whites—particularly if you are White—is a deviation that demands explanation” (p. 410).

  34. Explaining the social meaning of spatial segregation between whites and blacks in the U.S., Elizabeth Anderson (2010) writes, “In the standard case, de facto segregation would carry this meaning because it came about by systematic discrimination” (p.84). She continues, “…de facto segregation cannot carry these meanings unless its persistence can be causally traced to racially stigmatizing ideas.”

  35. For a detailed discussion of the history and import of U.S. anti-miscegenation laws, see (Pascoe 2009).

  36. See (Livingston and Brown 2017).

  37. See (Pascoe 2009).

  38. See, for example, (Largent 2008)

  39. (Jefferson 1787), Query XIV.

  40. See (Taylor 2016), p. 111. Someone might think Jefferson’s longstanding “relationship” with Sally Hemings, a woman he enslaved, complicates his role in the development of the social meaning of anti-black aesthetic standards. After all, such a relationship suggests Jefferson preferred black women. There are ways to address this apparent tension. First, one might note that, despite her being undoubtedly black, Sally Heming’s appearance was “mighty near white,” at least according to the memoirs of Isaac Jefferson (1951), p. 3. Those who express a bare preference against black racialized phenotypes do not violate those standards if they admit into their dating pool blacks who do not possess black racialized phenotypic markers (or even if they admit to finding some small number of black racialized features attractive – c.f. someone who says, “I’m not attracted to black women but Beyoncé is beautiful”). Indeed, most bare preferences will have many exceptions, given that race does not reliably track phenotype. As an anonymous reviewer helpful pointed out, were someone to exclude all members of a racialized group from their dating pool regardless of phenotype, we would have strong reason to suspect that this exclusion was grounded in something other than a bare preference. Second, and alternatively, with respect to Hemings, Taylor argues that this “relationship” reveals the ways in which white supremacy prevents the development of intimacy by denying the personhood of black partners. And with that goes true aesthetic appreciation of the other person, leaving only sexual desire in its place (2016), p. 117–8. Similarly, we might think, apart from its other failings, an admission of “jungle fever” usually connotes a sexual desire for men and women with black racialized phenotypes but not a full aesthetic appreciation of black beauty. Taylor’s analysis supports our claim that the social meaning of anti-black bare preferences is disrespectful since they are grounded in a dehumanizing view of blacks as mere sexual objects.

  41. (Taylor 2016), p. 113.

  42. Ibid., p. 119–121.

  43. (Livingston and Brown 2017).

  44. Ibid.

  45. Christian Rudder, interview by Arun Rath, All Things Considered. NPR. September 6, 2014.

  46. (Rudder 2014)

  47. (Livingston 2017)

  48. (Lamoureux 2016)

  49. As of February, 2018 the site does not appear to be functioning, nor are their social media accounts up-to-date.

  50. See (Rodriguez 2016) for screenshots of the tweet.

  51. (Dewey 2016).

  52. See Lippert-Rasmussen (2014), p. 162.

  53. See Hellman (2008), p. 7. We are also open to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s account on which wrongful discrimination consists in a kind of harm (2014), p. 154–5. To accommodate his account, we join Lippert-Rasmussen in thinking that discrimination often results in “stigmatic harms.” (2014), p. 134. Of course, such openness does not mean we are committed to allof Lippert-Rasmussen's views -- e.g. his welfarist account of harm.

  54. See (Eagly et al. 2009).

  55. See (Eastwick et al. 2011; Eastwick et al. 2014).

  56. See (Hunt et al. 2015).

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Acknowledgements

We thank Finnur Dellsén for helpful conversation at this paper’s conception, Lee McBride for his detailed comments on an early draft, Rafeeq Hasan for his detailed comments on a later draft, and two anonymous reviewers.

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  1. Duffy Academic Center 248, Stonehill College, Easton, MA, 02357, USA

    Megan Mitchell

  2. Northeastern University, Holmes Hall 314, Boston, MA, 02115, USA

    Mark Wells

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Correspondence to Megan Mitchell.

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Mitchell, M., Wells, M. Race, Romantic Attraction, and Dating. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 21, 945–961 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9936-0

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