Abstract
Among those taking the implications of situationism seriously, some have suggested exploiting our tendency to be shaped by our environments toward desirable ends. The key insight here is that if experimental studies produce reliable, probabilistic predictions about the effects of situational variables on behavior—for example, how people react to the presence or absence of various sounds, objects, and their placement—then we should deploy those variables that promote prosocial behavior, while avoiding or limiting those that tend toward antisocial behavior. Put another way, some have suggested that we tweak situations to nudge or influence others toward good behavior. A question arises: Isn’t this manipulative? In this paper, I describe some existing proposals in the literature and consider the manipulation worry. Drawing on classical Confucian ethics, I argue that, when all is considered, it is chimerical to think we can refrain from influencing or manipulating others. We must rather accept that influence (whether intended or not) is part of social existence. Once we accept this, the only remaining question is how to influence others. I suggest that this should make us conceive ourselves in an objective fashion.
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Notes
Mengzi sometimes deviates from this pattern. See, e.g. Mengzi 2A2 (Van Norden 2008).
Alfano agrees that a proper understanding of situationism yields both that situations affect persons and that persons affect situations, yet he finds my development of this theme “leaves much to be desired.” “Though [Sarkissian] is doubtless right that ‘not only do situations affect our own behavior, but we too return the favor,’ he provides no warrant for the further, blithely optimistic, claim that ‘we influence the situations we find ourselves in as much as they influence us’ (emphasis mine). The fact that there is a two-way street running between situations and persons does not entail that the traffic is equal in both directions” (Alfano 2013b, 253). Alfano interprets the latter quotation as suggesting something very strong—namely, that the impact of persons and situations is always equivalent. Taken out of its original context, such a reading is understandable. However, this does not reflect my considered view. In that article, I emphasize the potential for the impact to be equal in both directions. This leaves it open whether, to what extent, and how often influences flow one way or the other.
Alfano claims that invoking de as capable of influencing others is question-begging because, “like any other global trait, de may not be common or even commonly acquirable. Answering the situationist challenge to virtue ethics by baldly asserting the existence of a virtue that gives one power over situations is clearly question-begging. I prefer to focus on ways in which situations can be rigged in advance, before one is called on to act in accordance with some virtue or other” (Alfano 2013b, 254). These criticisms reveal a potential misunderstanding of how the Confucians understand de. First, de is something each person has without even trying to acquire it. The way that a person characteristically impacts or influences others constitutes that person’s de. Confucians were preoccupied by the de of noble persons (or, for our purposes, moral exemplars). They noted that the noble person’s de would characteristically put others at ease. Through their appearance, countenance, demeanor—that is, through their very presence—such persons would harmonize with others. The de of a noble person stems as much from his or her scrutable self as it does from inner character. And minding one’s self-presentation is the kind of thing that can be done in advance of interacting with others through practice and habituation (DePaulo 1992). Finally, rather than “baldly asserting” the efficacy of de, I support it with experimental evidence (Sarkissian 2010, 9–10).
In the original text, Fingarette’s transliterations observe the outdated Wage-Giles system (hence he uses jen for ren). Pinyin has been used here for consistency.
Many thanks to Joseph Bendana, Jonathan Kwan, Nancy Snow, and especially to two anonymous referees for their comments on previous drafts, which led to important revisions and clarifications. Unfortunately, I was unable to incorporate all of their suggestions in the present paper.
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Sarkissian, H. Situationism, Manipulation, and Objective Self-Awareness. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 20, 489–503 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9814-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9814-1