Abstract
Philosophers disagree about what precisely makes an act paternalistic, and about whether, when, and why paternalistic acts are morally objectionable. Despite these disagreements, it might seem uncontroversial to think that it is permissible to paternalize children. When paternalism seems morally objectionable, that is usually because an adult has been treated in a way that seems appropriate only for children. But, we might think, there can be nothing morally objectionable about treating children as children. In this paper, however, I argue that there are limits to how we may permissibly paternalize children. I begin in Section 1 by describing and endorsing Jonathan Quong’s account of paternalism, which defines paternalistic acts as those that involve particular kinds of judgments that the paternalizer makes about the capacities of the paternalizee. In Section 2, I identify a distinction between two kinds of paternalism: ‘compensatory’ paternalism, and ‘non-compensatory’ paternalism. In Section 3, I argue that compensatory paternalism is usually permissible in the case of children. In section 4, I argue that non-compensatory paternalism is much harder to justify than compensatory paternalism, and because of this, it is sometimes impermissible even when directed at children.
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Notes
For a helpful overview of these disagreements, see Gerald Dworkin (2014) ‘Paternalism.’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
It seems likely to me that the arguments in this paper will also have implications for how we treat other groups of people whom we normally think it is permissible to paternalize (such as adults with severe intellectual disabilities, for example). For the purposes of clarity and brevity, I limit my focus in this paper to children in particular.
See also Gert and Culver (1976) pp. 45–57
Some philosophers distinguish between different kinds of liberty-limiting actions. For example, Joel Feinberg (1986, p.24) has argued that there is a distinction between paternalist policies that are backed by the threat of criminal sanctions (often referred to as ‘legal paternalism’), and those that involve other, less significant, forms of coercion. See also Arneson (2005). Peter de Marneffe (2006, p.68) distinguishes between policies that threaten symbolically important and/or fundamental liberties (such as a person’s freedom to marry), and those that do not (such as laws requiring people to wear seatbelts). In this article, however, I am concerned with paternalism in general, including, but not restricted to, legal paternalism, and ‘less significant’ liberties.
See also Donald VanDeVeer Donald, (1986) p.22.
Joseph Raz (1986, p.161) notes that paternalism may sometimes involve “encouraging or facilitating action of the desired kind, or discouraging undesired modes of behaviour”, and offers the examples of “[c]onferring honours on creative and performing artists, giving grants or loans to people who start community centres, taxing one kind of leisure activity (e.g. hunting)” and so on. See also Joseph Chan (2000) pp.14–15.
It is worth noting that such an act may sometimes include an attempt at rational persuasion, rather than manipulation or deception. George Tsai argues that such attempts “may express, and be guided by, the motive of distrust in the other’s capacity to gather or weigh evidence, and may intrude on the other’s deliberative activities in ways that conflict with respecting her agency.” See George Tsai (2014) p.79.
For a distinct objection to Quong’s normative account, see Enoch (2016).
It should be emphasised, however, that this assumption must be sensitive to the fact that some children, especially in later stages of development, may not lack the relevant adult capacities in all decision-making contexts.
For an extensive list of similar examples, see VanDeVeer (1986, p.13–15).
The aim with this sort of deception need not be to spare people from harm – children who are taught that Santa Claus is real, for example, receive benefits as a result of the deception, but it would be implausible to think that they would otherwise be harmed.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
This latter assumption presupposes what Matthew Clayton (2006, ch.3) calls an “end state” view of autonomy, which requires that children be able to lead sufficiently autonomous lives upon reaching adulthood.
Let us assume that the consequences I describe in Charlie’s case were entirely foreseeable by his parents, and that they could have chosen to raise Charlie in a way that would have prepared him for adulthood, without any significant cost to themselves.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Chris Mills, Jonathan Flynn, Joe Horton, Nici Mulkeen, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
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Carey, B. Children and the Limits of Paternalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 20, 581–595 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9804-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9804-3