Abstract
In thinking about global poverty, the question of moral motivation is of central importance: Why should the average person in the West feel morally compelled to do anything to help the poor? Various answers to this question have been constructed—and yet poverty persists. In this paper I will argue that, among other difficulties, the current approaches to the problem of poverty (from Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge) overlook a critical element: that poverty not only harms the poor, it harms every human being. Its existence forces us to live in a world where we are compelled by a pervasive ideology to eviscerate our own humanity and neglect our human impulses. Drawing on Karl Marx’s Aristotelian-influenced notion of our human essence as “species-being,” I will construct an account of moral motivation in the face of poverty that stems from a selfish desire to avoid these harms. Thus our moral impetus for acting to help the poor comes not from feelings of guilt about how poverty harms them, but rather from recognizing that poverty is harming all of us. By fighting against global poverty, we seek to make the world a better place for ourselves and the poor alike.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Throughout this paper my working definition of “poverty” is a state wherein one does not have secure access to the goods necessary to meet the basic human needs for adequate nutrition, clean water, shelter, and/or health care.
Singer 1972, 230.
While this movement towards a “fair-share” version of the argument may be more palatable for the average person, note that his reasoning for doing so is also utilitarian: Since consequences would be worse if he only stuck with his original (utilitarian) argument, he opts for a different approach. This, I think, leads him into something of a paradox, offering a utilitarian argument, but then muzzling it and its moral force for other utilitarian reasons. See here Singer 2006, 2009.
Cf. Narveson 2003.
Pogge 2005b, 79.
Young 2006, 124.
Pogge 2008, 220.
Havel 1985, 37. While Havel’s concern is explaining the layers of passive, internal resistance to the Soviet “post-Totalitarian” system (as he calls it) and the “power” that this resistance begets, his understanding of ideology is both prescient and useful here.
Ibid., 28.
Marx 1994b, 52. Although Marx uses the term “language,” he is describing our relations to others within our current economic system in precisely the same way as Havel talks about ideology: we accept it insofar as it is the only way in which we relate to one another.
See here Marx 1994a, 62–64.
Ibid., 62.
Aristotle 1995, Politics 1253a3–4.
Martha Nussbaum, in developing and advocating the capabilities approach to human development, corroborates Marx’s account of our nature as based in an Aristotelian concern for human flourishing; in order for individual human beings to flourish, they need to be able to develop particular aspects of their humanity. With explicit reference to Marx’s account of human nature as species-being, Nussbaum argues that if our human facets and senses are not cultivated in a “fully human way – by which I think he [Marx] means a way infused by practical reasoning and sociability,” then we are not flourishing in terms of being human. She goes on: “The core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed around by the world.” Thus by nature we develop ourselves not only through our own individual actions, but in relationships and cooperation with other members of our species. Nussbaum 2002, 72.
Young 2007, 46–47.
There is particular empirical evidence that supports my analysis of the phenomenological response in these instances. Philosopher and cognitive psychologist J.D. Trout, in his book Why Empathy Matters: The Science and Psychology of Better Judgment, cites psychological experiments that purport to show how people are more likely to react with “disgust” to the homeless than they are to other socially stigmatized groups. Although one might think that we would “pity” the homeless, this is far from what appears to happen at a cognitive level. Furthermore, using an MRI study, researchers showed participants pictures of different people and found that the study participants did not even cognitively categorize the homeless persons as fully human. “When study participants were presented with pictures of members from each social and ethnic group, the medial prefrontal cortex – the site that registers the potential for an object’s social action – popped for all but one group: the homeless. The homeless may be seen as human, but not fully so.” Trout 2009, 30.
Marx 1993, 156–157. It is important to note that Marx’s major concern is not money as a medium of exchange, but rather the alienating results of money exchange under capitalism (within the context of wage-labor).
Marx’s distinction between natural and human needs runs in many ways parallel to John Stuart Mill’s delineation of higher and lower pleasures. Lower pleasures for human beings are physical pleasures fulfilled through food, drink, etc. On the other hand, higher pleasures are those we seek that take us beyond mere survival and promote a higher quality of life. Mill identifies pursuits such as art, music, and literature as examples of these higher pleasures. This analogy with Mill provides a clear link to our unique nature as species-being: fulfillment of natural needs provides the baseline for survival, whereas fulfillment of human needs involves going beyond survival to the quality of our existence. See here Mill 1991, 138.
By “us,” I refer to both author and reader, anyone who has the wherewithal to help a poor person that approaches.
Sartre 1977, 88.
Ibid., 89.
This desire for “distance” between us and the poor manifests itself not just by our wanting to pass them by as quickly as possible, but sometimes by our not even seeing them at all. William Vollman’s interviews with poor people around the world discuss how “invisible” the poor become to us in many contexts, seen either not at all, or merely as a part of the surrounding environment, rather than as other human persons. See here Vollman 2007, esp. 103–122.
This “right reason” for Kant is simply the fulfillment of our moral duties, which rational beings should simply do with a “cheerful disposition” because it is the right thing to do. For Kant, our actions are moral only insofar as we are following our rational duties dictated by the Categorical Imperative.
In discussing these issues with students and colleagues, I have frequently encountered the response (most often to Singer’s argument) that people want to feel they gave money to the poor by choice, rather than out of regard for some externally imposed duty. Rather than feeling their money was given as a “tax,” so to speak, these individuals regard themselves and others more highly if there was a genuine choice or desire to aid. Thus my approach here seeks to take these sentiments into account.
There may even be a more pragmatic self-interested desire here to avoid other more manifest harms. As Pablo Gilabert argues, “Citizens in wealthy societies have much to fear from poverty in distant countries, as the latter contributes to the generation of massive illegal immigration, the spread of lethal diseases, and international terrorism.” While this is not the sole benefit that one can garner by acting to aid those in poverty, it is a benefit that cannot as well be ignored. See here Gilabert 2012, 143.
See here Aristotle 1999, Nicomachean Ethics 1168a28-1169a17.
Aristotle 1995, Politics 1253a28–29.
Held posits this social connection as prior to a concept of rights, as we have to feel a connection to others first in order to then feel the pull to care about and protect their rights. See here Held 2006, 125.
Robinson 1999, 157.
Although neither Held nor Robinson discuss this lack of concern for one’s own well-being, other care ethicists such as Michael Slote do. Outside of the more widespread concern about the inappropriate nature of selfishness that I referenced earlier with respect to Kant, Slote follows a Humean moral sentimentalist tradition to claim that self-interested motivations are external to morality, founded instead in the realm of rationality. See here Slote 2007, 116–118.
Luke 10: 29–37.
King, Jr. 1968. This is the famous speech King gave the night before he was assassinated.
Havel 1985, 40.
There are some philosophers who challenge the efficacy of Pogge’s approach. David Schweickart argues that even if Pogge’s institutional alterations happen, poverty will still persist due the structural imperatives of global capitalism. Only by superseding global capitalism will poverty be able to be eradicated. Another who raises such concerns is Paul Gomberg. While he does not critique Pogge directly (and in fact is focused on disputing Singer’s argument), he does conclude that power structures within capitalism are the root cause of continued poverty, and thus these must be addressed. Again, I am not taking a stand on whether or not I agree with any of these claims, but such critiques are important to note. See here Schweickart 2008 and Gomberg 2002.
A practical example here: New York City police officer Louis DePrimo, who bought a pair of boots for Jeffrey Hillman, whom he saw lying on a curb without shoes in the cold of November. Certainly his actions only benefitted that one man at one specific instance, in one way. He did not “solve” that man’s poverty, or global poverty in general. But what he did do was bring the issue to the attention of thousands, perhaps millions. One person sharing a picture online of the officer’s act garnered comments from tens of thousands of people talking about how they felt inspired to do the same in their community.
A caveat/follow-up to the story here: In the days following the publicity of Officer DePrimo’s actions, people reported seeing the man without the shoes. Upon being asked, Hillman said he hid them because their being an expensive pair of boots (worth $100) was a danger to him. Cynics among us quickly pointed to this as a reason why the man did not deserve the boots, or that the officer’s actions did no good at all. Since he took the boots off, it was stupid and useless to give him boots.
At the same time, the awareness raised is nothing at which to scoff. Again, the officer’s actions did not solve global poverty, but it brought “the truth” to light (as Havel would have it), and that truth spread from the officer to all of those exposed to the story. This “truth movement” is the project of eradicating global poverty; how it can occur, and how we can participate. Cf. Goodman 2012 and Santora and Vadukul 2012.
Havel 1985, 52.
References
Aristotle (1995) “Politics.” In Aristotle: selections, translated by Terence Irwin and Gail Fine. Hackett, Indianapolis, pp 450–516
Aristotle (1999) In: Ostwald M (ed) Nicomachean ethics. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River
Gilabert P (2012) From global poverty to global equality. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Gomberg P (2002) The fallacy of philanthropy. Can J Philos 32(1):29–65
Goodman JD (2012) Photo of officer giving boots to barefoot man warms hearts online. New York Times
Havel V (1985) In: Keane J (ed) The power of the powerless. M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk
Held V (2006) The ethics of care: personal, political, and global. Oxford University Press, New York
Kant I (1999a) Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. In: Gregor M (ed) Practical philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 37–108
Kant I (1999b) The metaphysics of morals. In: Gregor M (ed) Practical philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 353–604
King Jr ML (1968) I’ve Been to the Mountaintop. Speech delivered April 3, 1968, Mason Temple (Church of God in Christ Headquarters), Memphis, Tennessee. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkivebeentothemountaintop.htm
Marx K (1993) Grundrisse. Translated by Martin Nicolaus. Penguin, New York
Marx K (1994a) Alienated labor. In: Simon L (ed) Selected writings. Hackett, Indianapolis, pp 62–64
Marx K (1994b) Free human production. In: Simon L (ed) Selected writings. Hackett, Indianapolis, pp 50–53
Mill JS (1991) Utilitarianism. In: Gray J (ed) On liberty and other essays. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 131–204
Narveson J (2003) We don’t owe them a thing! A tough-minded but soft-hearted view of aid to the faraway needy. Monist 86(3):419–433
Nussbaum M (2002) Women and human development. Cambridge University Press, New York
Pogge T (2005a) Real world justice. J Ethics 9:29–53
Pogge T (2005b) Reply to critics: severe poverty as a violation of negative duties. Ethics Int Aff 19(1):1–83
Pogge T (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd edn. Polity Press, Maldon
Pogge T (2010) Politics as usual. Polity Press, Malden
Robinson F (1999) Globalizing care. Westview Press, Colorado
Santora M, Vadukul A (2012) Homeless man is grateful for officer’s gift of boots, but again he is barefoot. New York Times
Sartre J-P (1977) Being and nothingness. Washington Square Press, New York
Schweickart D (2008) Global poverty: alternative perspectives on what we should do–and why. J Soc Philos 2008:471–491
Singer P (1972) Famine, affluence, and morality. Philos Publ Aff 1(3):229–243
Singer P (2006) What should a billionaire give – and what should you? The New York Times Magazine
Singer P (2009) The life you can save. Random House, New York
Slote M (2007) The ethics of care and empathy. Routledge, New York
Trout JD (2009) Why empathy matters. Penguin, New York
Vollman W (2007) Poor people. Harper Perennial, San Francisco
Young IM (2006) Responsibility and global justice. Soc Philos Policy 23:102–130
Young IM (2007) Global challenges. Polity Press, Malden
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weidel, T. Ideology and the Harms of Self-Deception: Why We Should Act to End Poverty. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 945–960 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9685-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9685-x