Abstract
When a wrongdoing occurs, victims, barring special circumstance, can aptly forgive their wrongdoers, receive apologies, and be paid reparations. It is also uncontroversial, in the usual circumstances, that wronged parties can aptly blame their wrongdoer. But controversy arises when we consider blame from third-parties after the victim has forgiven. At times it seems that wronged parties can make blame inapt through forgiveness. If third parties blame anyway, it often appears the victim is justified in protesting. “But I forgave him!” In other cases, however, forgiveness seems irrelevant: B can forgive A, but it can still seem that third parties can aptly blame A for the wrong against B. This perplexity adds a dimension to ongoing discussion regarding criteria for apt blame and the related issues of standing and fittingness. This paper explores the status of third party blame after forgiveness. I argue that while post forgiveness blame is often inapt, in many other cases forgiveness is irrelevant. This difference is explained by appeal to the various relationships third parties might have to wronged parties, and how these differences affect the ways we blame and thereby blame’s aptness.
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Notes
Consider some words from Richard Swinburne, “The victim has the right, within limits, to judge when the wrongdoer’s atonement suffices. He can take an apology which sounds sincere and so indicates repentance as sufficient, or refuse forgiveness until the apology is renewed with reparation and penance….”(1989, p.88). This point of view is becoming increasingly more controversial. Many have now suggested that persons other than the victim might forgive. For more on the standing to forgive see Govier (2002), Govier and Verwoerd (2002), MacLachlan (2009), Norlock (2009), Pettigrove (2009, 2012) and Radzik (2009, 2010). Even if, however, some others besides the victim have standing to forgive, there can still be a sense in which the victim’s standing is primary.
Norlock’s account of forgiveness is a feminist one, and her book argues that forgiveness is gendered. Insofar as a feminist approach is a relationship-centered approach, we will see that it fits nicely with this paper’s arguments.
I use ‘wronged party’ and ‘victim’ interchangeably.
In Feinberg’s words, “(In Nowheresville) When traffic lights turn red…there is no determinate person who can plausibly be said to claim our stopping as his due, so that the motorist owes it to him to stop… motorists “owe” obedience to the Law, but they owe nothing to one another. When they collide, no matter who is at fault, no one is morally accountable to anyone else, and no one has any sound grievance or ‘right to complain’”(1970, p.244–5).
Note Govier argues that, “Victimhood is sometimes a complex matter: victims are many; there are primary, secondary, and tertiary victims” (2002, p.138).
While a blaming subject often lacks direct control over her internal blame, she has much greater control over external blame. When we recognize our blame is inapt, we might stop displaying it externally, even if we have less control of it internally.
In Freedom and Resentment Strawson suggests that resentment is a reaction to ‘injury or indifference’ (2008, p.15). When we are angry at our loved ones who refuse to blame our wrongdoer, we might think of this as resentment as a reaction to indifference.
Here are some words from Malala, “I do not even hate the Taliban who shot me. Even if there is a gun in my hand and he stands in front of me, I would not shoot him. This is the compassion that I have learnt from Muhammad the Prophet of Mercy, Jesus Christ and Lord Buddha…. this is the forgiveness that I have learnt from my mother and father. This is what my soul is telling me, be peaceful and love everyone.”(Nobel Peace Prize 2014). And on another occasion, “I cannot imagine it – that boy who shot me, I cannot imagine hurting him... I believe in peace. I believe in mercy...’“(Peralta, 2013).
For more on blame and minding your own business, see Radzik, 2011.
Failure of identification often occurs when third-party and victim are strangers to one another. However, it is possible for third-parties who have no personal relationship with the victim to blame on the victim’s behalf. This can happen if a compelling narrative allows the third-party to identify with victims, ‘as if’ she personally knew them. When a victim’s story, for example, is aired on television, millions of individuals might identify with a victim they do not know personally. Thanks to television and the internet, some victims might have half of the world’s population blaming on his/her behalf. Another variant is an individual’s ability to see things from the point of view of another, perhaps an ‘other’ with whom we have no relation. As Pettigrove has noted, “The person of strong compassion is distinguished from the ordinary bystander in virtue of his being more readily and more vigorously moved by the plight of others than the latter” (2012, p.26). Some persons might be especially disposed toward empathetic engagement and thus have a tendency to blame on the victim’s behalf far more often than ordinary persons.
Govier also recognizes that those who identify with the victim can feel a special kind of anger toward the wrongdoer. In her own words, “Secondary and tertiary victims are also victims. Insofar as they experience loss, grief, pain, and suffering, they may also feel moral anger and resentment of the wrongdoer…human beings are attached to families, friends, and other loved ones and living interdependently in communities, we do not function in this world as isolated and detached individuals. Through cultural and political loss and a heightened sense of insecurity and vulnerability, we can be deeply hurt by wrongs done to others.”(2002, p.93–4)
But what about Malala’s family? When Malala’s parents, for instance, blame here wrongdoer, such blame will be associate, not spectator. It would follow that Malala’s forgiveness would render the blame of her parents inapt. This might appear counterintuitive, especially because Malala’s forgiveness seems unconditional, perhaps saintly. I have two responses to this concern. First, some might argue that Malala’s forgiveness fails to meet the criteria needed for ‘genuine forgiveness’. If Malala’s forgiveness is not legitimate, then the continuation of Associate Blame remains appropriate. Second, even if Malala’s forgiveness is legitimate, Spectator Blame remains apt. Her parents’ blame then, can remain apt if it transforms from associate to spectator. The possibility of this transition is further discussed in Section 4.
“If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river” (Mill 1989, p. 96).
I should note that, while I do have the intuition that happiness for another who is not happy for herself is disrespectful, what is more important is the display of such happiness. For even if there is nothing wrong with feeling happy for another, displaying such happiness might be rude. If a friend is upset that she was fired, you might be happy, believing this firing was for her own good. Nevertheless, this paternalistic happiness is best kept to oneself.
One impediment toward third-parties aptly responding to the victim’s forgiveness is pressure from other third-parties. Social Media, for instance, seems to have created a public space especially reserved for expressing anger, indignation, and hate. Sometimes these expressions come from third-parties who are angered that a person with whom they bear a special relationship has been injured. Third-parties might communicate their collective anger toward, creating a blaming momentum which is hard to stop. In such cases the victim’s forgiveness may be powerless against the online community of blamers. Although social media makes vitriolic expressions easier and more common, it does not make them appropriate. Similarly, while it may be especially hard for third-parties to cease blaming when all their twitter friends are doing so, this does not make such blame appropriate. So regardless of whether blame has gone viral, Associate third-party blame becomes inapt once the victim has forgiven.
I mean to say nothing contentious about free will. I mean ‘freely chosen’ in a way that can fit with both a libertarian and compatibilist world view.
It is also possible for spectator blame to transition to associate blame. A situation like this can occur, for instance, if, over time, the third party develops a relationship with the victim (a relationship that did not exist at the time of the wrongdoing).
What about very serious cases of repetitive wrongdoing? For instance, suppose that a spouse repeatedly forgives her abusive partner. Let us note that in such cases forgiveness is unlikely autonomous. However, assuming that forgiveness of a serial abuser is autonomous, Associate Blame becomes inapt. Spectator Blame, however, remains apt; a transition from one type of blame to the other is in order.
Assuming A and B are both strangers to the blaming third-party.
Acknowledgements: I am incredibly grateful to two anonymous referees who provided extensive and extremely helpful comments on this draft. I am also thankful to Margaret Gilbert, Jeff Helmreich and his seminar students, and Casey Perin, who also offered helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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Priest, M. Blame After Forgiveness. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 619–633 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9669-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9669-2