Abstract
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan (1998) contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator of the goodness of its overall consequences. Acting based on foreseeable consequences is barely more reliably good than acting completely at random.
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Notes
I use a logarithmic scale because of the large numbers of consequences that must be surveyed to show the trend.
Versions of absolute deontology where the rules depend on how bad the consequences of an action are presumably also face the epistemic problem in cases in which the rules apply.
See Technical Appendix.
References
Kagan S (1998) Normative ethics. Westview Press, Boulder
Lenman J (2000) Consequentialism and cluelessness. Philosophy & Public Affairs 29:342–370
Smart JJC (1973) An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics. In: Smart JJ, Williams B (eds) Utilitarianism—for and against. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Shelly Kagan, Catherine Elgin and the attendees of the 2014 BSET conference for providing comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Technical Appendix
Technical Appendix
We model the choice situation as a binomial distribution and compare the various probabilities of consequences resulting from actions A and B. Situations in which the action with the best consequences are those that result from A are those in which the net utility of selecting A minus the net utility of selecting B is greater than 0.
Let n be the number of unforeseen consequences. The probability (for both actions A and B) that there will be k beneficial unforeseen consequences is determined by the following:
As the number of unforeseen consequences increases, the factorials become extremely large. One way to calculate them is with the following recursive function.
Let V a and P a represent distinct net utile values and the probability that that net utile value will occur respectively for action A. Similarly, let V b and P b represent distinct net utile values and the probability that that net utile value will occur respectively for action B. The overall probability Q that action B will have a greater utility than action A will is given by the following:
for n unforeseen consequences. Due to the difficulty in calculating binomials for n > 1000, it is useful to use a normal approximation. The results of the binomial probability and the normal approximation are given in the table below:
n | Binomial Probability | Normal Probability |
20 | 0.04035 | 0.05692 |
50 | 0.13563 | 0.15866 |
100 | 0.21838 | 0.23975 |
200 | 0.29119 | 0.30854 |
500 | 0.36399 | 0.37591 |
1000 | 0.40286 | 0.41153 |
If there are 1000 unforeseen consequence there is a greater than 40 % chance that action B has better consequences than action A does. The fact that the foreseeable consequences are such that A has 10 more utiles than B does is hardly a reliable indication that A will be better. And as the number of unforeseen consequences passes 1000, the odds that A is the best course of action decrease still further—approaching 50 %.
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Elgin, S. The Unreliability of Foreseeable Consequences: A Return to the Epistemic Objection. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 759–766 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9602-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9602-8