Abstract
Western philosophers have generally neglected honor as a moral phenomenon worthy of serious study. Appiah’s recent work on honor in moral revolutions is an important exception, but even he is careful to separate honor from morality, regarding it as only “an ally” of morality. In this paper we take Appiah to be right about the psychological, social, and historical role honor has played in three notable moral revolutions, but wrong about the moral nature of honor. We defend two new theses: First, honor is an emotional and moral form of recognition respect that can hinder or aid moral progress. Second, honor, so conceived, can play a rational role in progressive moral change, as it did among the working class in the British abolition of slave trade, when the pressure of moral consistency moved them to protest American slavery as an affront to their honor without change in their moral belief that slavery is wrong.
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For helpful feedback thanks are owed to the audience at a Dalhousie Philosophy Department colloquium and to two anonymous referees.
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Kumar, V., Campbell, R. Honor and Moral Revolution. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 147–159 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9593-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9593-5