Abstract
Kuhn’s account of scientific change is characterized by an internal tension between a naturalist vein, which is compatible with the revolutionary perspective on the historical development of science, and an aprioristic or Kantian vein which wants to secure that science is not an irrational enterprise. Kuhn himself never achieved to resolve the tension or even to deal with the terms of the problem. Michael Friedman, quite recently, provided an account which aspires to reconcile the revolutionary and the aprioristic elements of the Kuhnian historiography by placing the latter in the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. In this paper, I suggest that Friedman manages to provide a convincing description of the structuration of scientific knowledge and, further, to present science as a rational enterprise. I argue that despite these virtues Friedman’s account faces a major problem with regard to the context of transcendental idealism which he is not willing to abandon. I also argue that discarding transcendental idealism in the way the philosophical perspective of John McDowell does, we can dispose of the flaws of Friedman’s account while retaining its virtues.
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08 October 2020
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00309-1
Notes
For instance, in one of first reviews of The Structure we can read: ‘Kuhn is well aware of the relativism implied by his view, and his common sense and feeling for history make him struggle mightily to soften the dismal conclusion’ (Shapere 1964, p. 392). For a more recent assessment of the accusation of relativism see Bird (2012a, §4.5).
In this passage, Lakatos refers to the title of Kuhn’s contribution (‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of research?’. But he also stresses (Ibid fn 2) that the same conception is already implicit in Structure. See also Popper’s (1970: 55–56) contribution to the volume.
Massimi (2015) detects the same tension between the ‘Kantian reading of Kuhn’ and the Quinean-naturalistic vein of his work. However, my argumentation for resolving the tension in question takes an entirely different course than hers.
See also Quine (1981b).
Note that it is not self-evident that naturalism cannot coincide with a priori. Of course, naturalism cannot coincide with some notions of a priori but not all philosophers take theses notions for granted. For a comprehensive discussion of the issue see Warenski (2009).
According to the notorious quote from The Structure, ‘the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds’ (Kuhn 1962/1990: 150).
Disciplinary matrix and lexicon are terms which stand for paradigms in Kuhn’s later work.
It is not the nature or the logical structure of the constitutive principles that makes them immune to the empirical tests; rather it is their structural position in the particular system of knowledge that provides their empirical incontestability. Friedman argues that, in another framework where those same principles have a different (non-constitutive) structural position, they can and do face the ‘tribunal of experience’ (Friedman 2001, pp. 85–92). He also provides examples from the actual history of science (Friedman 2001: 35–39; 2002: 177–180).
They are constitutive because they fulfill the conditions of possibility for the formulation and empirical application of the empirical laws, and relativised because they are subject to revision and change.
‘The present conception of scientific rationality is consistent with such “anti-realist” conceptions of scientific truth, but it is in no way committed to them. Perhaps the best way to put the point […] is that the present conception of scientific rationality does not involve a parallel conception of scientific truth—either “realist” or “anti-realist”’ (Friedman 2001, p. 68, n. 83).
In Kant’s original account these forms are space and time. I will say a few more things about this below.
This is Jonathan Lear’s term. See Haddock (2011).
See Sect. 6 below.
‘If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object C of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself’ (Kant 1781/1998, XVII, p. 110).
‘[A] priori principles cannot be falsified and new ones cannot be better able to meet the tribunal of experience’ (Richardson 2010: 283).
Note that for Allison these forms need not necessarily be space and time. My argument also does not direct against any specific a priori form of sensibility. It directs against the very idea of the a priori forms of sensibility.
One could argue that the forms of intuition could change under the influence of various psychological or sociological factors. However, this would lead straight to a version of social constructivism and thus it is not an option for Friedman.
Since the Kantian absolute conception of a priori has become obsolete by the scientific evolution and since we refer to a sort of relativized but still constitutive a priori, we should admit the plurality of phenomenal worlds. See the ‘Plurality-of-Phenomenal-Worlds Thesis’ in Hoyningen-Huene (1993: 36–42).
It would be more correct to say that this conception of empirical knowledge characterises the traditional pre-Kantian epistemological camps, either of an empiricist or of a traditional rationalist origin. Sellars attacks the empiricist because of his popularity among analytic philosophy of the twentieth century.
For a further discussion of the issue see Halbig (2006, §2.2).
‘Transcendental idealism […] is a doctrine of epistemological modesty, since it denies finite cognisers like ourselves any purchase on the God’s-eye view of things’ (Allison 2004: XVI).
‘Worldview […] would be the result of the supposed interaction between the two sides of the dualism. A scheme would be, not a worldview, but what is left when content is subtracted from a world view’ (McDowell 2009c: 119).
This limit, as I argued above, comes from the acceptance of the transcendental idealism and the following scheme-content dualism.
This is what McDowell (1996) calls ‘bald naturalism’.
For a recent defence of this kind of naturalism see Turner (2010).
At least in his seminal Epistemology Naturalized (Quine 1969).
Since the Kantian absolute conception of a priori has become obsolete by the scientific evolution and since we refer to a sort of Relativized but still constitutive a priori, we should admit the plurality of phenomenal worlds. See the “Plurality-of-Phenomenal-Worlds Thesis” in Hoyningen-Huene (1993: 36–42).
As Halbig (2006: 224) points out: ‘McDowell interprets his theory of experience in an utterly realistic way: What we take in through experience are facts […]; if we do not go wrong the content of the experience is nothing else but a fact as part of the fabric of reality’.
For this categorization see Psillos (1999: xvii).
This insight is inferred by his claim that his conception of scientific rationality is not committed to any particular realistic or anti-realistic theory of truth.
“Rational reconstruction” conceived in the Lakatosian sense. See Lakatos (1978).
Note that the notion of the expansion of the framework of possible experience includes the actual empirical corroboration of—at least a part of—expanded space. For this reason, we can talk of an empirical relief after the scientific revolution. In other words, the expansion of the empirical space of reasons satisfies the condition of acceptability described by Lakatos: ‘For the sophisticated falsificationist a theory is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’ only if it has corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor (or rival), that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts. This condition can be analysed into two clauses: that the new theory has excess empirical content (“acceptability1”) and that some of this excess content is verified (“acceptability2”)’ (Lakatos 1978: 31–32).
For a further elaboration of this issue see Dimitrakos (2016).
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Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Evgenia Mylonaki for her comments on a draft version of this paper. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful remarks.
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This research is implemented through IKY scholarships programme and co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund - ESF) and Greek national funds through the action entitled “Reinforcement of Postdoctoral Researchers”, in the framework of the Operational Programme “Human Resources Development Program, Education and Lifelong Learning” of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2014–2020
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Dimitrakos, T. Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism. Erkenn 85, 225–254 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0025-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0025-5