Abstract
This paper analyzes the implementation of pollution permits. It focuses on the distributional impacts linked with the stringency of output-based allocation when two sectors are covered by the market for permits and the total cap is held constant. A new type of profit increase in sectors that are not exposed to international competition, when energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) sectors are granted output-based allocations, is demonstrated theoretically. The paper also illustrates a profit increase in the electricity sector in a possible fourth phase of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, in which output-based allocation will be granted to EITE sectors, compared with the case in which all permits are auctioned.
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Notes
Full auctioning does not apply to electricity firms in the “new” EU countries.
In July 2015, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal to revise the EU emissions trading system for the fourth phase (2021–2030). It seeks “to revise the system of free allocation to focus on sectors at highest risk of relocating their production outside the EU” and to establish “more flexible rules to better align the amount of free allowances with production figures”
Requate (2006) surveys the different implications of environmental regulation in the presence of imperfect competition in the market for products.
This phenomenon cannot be observed with linear demand.
Fabra and Reguant (2014) explicitly focus on a linear demand curve.
As Requate (2005) notes, two types of abatement technologies are usually considered: end-of-pipe abatement and process-integrated technology. However, the cleaner technology is a special case of process-integrated technology.
For sector B, we calculate \(n^{BH}={[(p^{B}(1-\beta ^{B})+\beta ^{B}(c^{BF})]}/{\beta ^{B}(p-c^{BH})}\) when \(n^{BF}=1\).
By Meunier and Ponssard (2012): \(\mu _{0}^{e}(\sigma =0)=0.37\), \(\mu _{i}^{e}(\sigma =30)=0.34\), \(\mu _{0}^{s}(\sigma =0)=1.3\), \(\mu _{i}^{s}(\sigma =30)=1\), \(\mu _{0}^{c}(\sigma =0)=0.7\) and \(\mu _{i}^{c}(\sigma =30)=0.6\).
When a sector is exposed to international competition, the mark-up of domestic firms increases by less than the marginal costs. We calculate the mark-up of domestic firms in the exposed sector, and we obtain the following:
$$\begin{aligned} P^B-(c^{BH}+(\mu _i^{BH}-\omega \mu _0^{BH})\sigma )=\frac{(1-n^{BH}\beta ^B)(c^{BH}+(\mu _i^{BH}-\omega \mu _0^{BH})\sigma )}{(n^{BF}+n^{BH})\beta ^B-1} + \frac{n^{BF}(c^{BF}+\tau )}{(n^{BF}+n^{BH})\beta ^B-1} \end{aligned}$$As is evident, the mark-up of domestic firms increases by less than the marginal costs. This low mark-up stems from the exposure to international competition.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Table of Quantities, Emissions and Prices in Each Sector
In Tables 8 and 9, we present the individual and total quantities, the emissions rates and the market prices for each sector. Sector A is a non-exposed sector, and calculations in this sector are used in the illustration to reflect the electricity sector. Sector B is an exposed sector, and calculations in this sector are used in the illustration to reflect the steel and cement sectors.
Appendix 2: Condition to Ensure the Existence of Bilateral Trade
Now, we present the condition that ensures the existence of bilateral trade in sector B. We need to ensure that \(q_i^{BF}(\sigma =0)>0\). Moreover, from Eq. (11), we know the following:
Thus, the condition that ensures the existence of bilateral trade in sector B is given as follows:
From Assumption 1, \((n^{BF}+n^{BH})\beta ^B-1>0\). We thus deduce that the condition is equivalent to
The condition may be rewritten as follows:
Appendix 3: Condition to Ensure that the Optimum is a Maximum
To ensure profit maximization in sector j, we analyze the conditions in which the Hessian matrix of the maximization problem is negative.
Let us define the Hessian as follows:
Therefore, the requirement on the cost function to satisfy the second-order conditions is as follows:
Appendix 4: Impact of Output-Based Allocation on Profits in the Non-exposed Sector
The profit of firm i in sector A is given as follows:
The first-order conditions satisfy the following:
From Eq. (39), we obtain
Taking the derivative of Eq. (38) with respect to \(\sigma \), we obtain
We focus on the term \(\left( 1+\frac{({\partial ^2 P^A}/{\partial {Q^A}^2})q_i^A}{{\partial P^A}/{\partial Q^A}}\right) \).
Because \(P^A(Q^A)={\alpha ^A}^{\frac{1}{\beta ^A}}{Q^A}^{-\frac{1}{\beta ^A}}\), we calculate the following expression:
From Eq. (42), we obtain
Now, we sum the \(n^A\) first-order conditions in sector A and obtain the following:
Taking the derivative of Eq. (46) with respect to \(\sigma \), we obtain the following:
Because \(P^A(Q^A)={\alpha ^A}^{\frac{1}{\beta ^A}} {Q^A}^{-\frac{1}{\beta ^A}}\), we calculate the following expression:
The Eq. (48) may then be rewritten as follows:
Because we analyze the effect of the permit price on firm profits, we study the derivative of the function \(\pi _{i}^{A}\) with respect to \(\sigma \). From Eq. (37), we obtain
By replacing (45) and (51) in (52), we obtain
Appendix 5: Proof of Lemma 3
Let \(CS^A\) be the consumer surplus in sector A:
When \(\beta ^A>1\), the consumer surplus is given as follows:
However, when \(\beta ^A<1\), the consumer surplus is given as follows:
Recall that \(Q^A\) do not depend on \(\omega \). In the two cases, we obtain the following:
We know from Lemma 2 that \(\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }>0\). Thus, the sign of \(\left[ \frac{\partial Q^A}{\partial \sigma }\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\right] \) is given by the sign of \(\frac{\partial Q^A}{\partial \sigma }\). We now calculate \(\frac{\partial Q^A}{\partial \sigma }\) and obtain the following:
Knowing that \(Q^A(\sigma )>0\) we can deduce that
Moreover, we know that \(\mu _i^A>0\). From Eq. (14), we obtain
From Eqs. (60), (61) and (62), we can easily ascertain that \(\frac{\partial Q^A}{\partial \sigma }<0\); finally, from Eq. (59), we find that \(\frac{\partial CS^A}{\partial \omega }<0\).
Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 4
We define the consumer surplus in sector B as follows:
When \(\beta ^B>1\),
However, when \(\beta ^B<1\),
In the two cases, we obtain
Now, we focus on and calculate the term \(\frac{\partial Q^B}{\partial \omega }\).
Knowing that \(Q^B(\sigma )>0\), we can deduce the following:
Now, we focus on and calculate the term \(\frac{\partial [(\mu _i^{BH}-\omega \mu _0^{BH})\sigma ]}{\partial \omega }\).
Assuming \(\sigma >\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\), we obtain \(\mu _0^{BH}\sigma >\mu _0^{BH}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\), which implies \(\mu _0^{BH}\sigma >(1-\omega )\mu _0^{BH}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\). Moreover, we know that \(\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }>0\). We deduce the following:
From Eqs. (69), (70) and (72), we can easily ascertain that \(\frac{\partial Q^B}{\partial \omega }>0\); finally, from Eq. (68), we find that \(\frac{\partial CS^B }{\partial \omega }>0\).
Appendix 7: Proof of Lemma 5
We show that
The profit for a domestic firm i in sector B is given as follows:
Taking the derivative with respect to \(\omega \),
The mark-up is positive, and we can deduce that
Now, we focus on the term \(\frac{\partial q_i^{BH} }{\partial \omega }\).
where \(f(\sigma )\) is given by
Knowing that \(q^{BH}(\sigma )>0\), we can deduce the following:
As shown previously, we focus on and calculate the term \(\frac{\partial [(\mu _i^{BH}-\omega \mu _0^{BH})\sigma ]}{\partial \omega }\).
Assuming \(\sigma >\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\), we obtain \(\mu _0^{BH}\sigma >\mu _0^{BH}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\), which implies \(\mu _0^{BH}\sigma >(1-\omega )\mu _0^{BH}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }\). Moreover, we know that \(\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }>0\). We finally deduce the following:
From Eqs. (77), (79) and (81), we obtain
Now, we analyze \(\frac{\partial P^B}{\partial \omega }-\frac{\partial ((\mu _i^{BH}-\omega _0\mu ^{BH})\sigma )}{\partial \omega }-\frac{\sigma }{\gamma ^B}\), which we denote with \(\phi (\sigma )\).
From \(P^B= \beta ^B \frac{(n^{BH}(c^{BH}+(\mu _i^{BH}-\omega \mu _0^{BH})\sigma )+ n^{BF}(c^{BF}+\tau ))}{((n^{BF}+n^{BH})\beta ^B -1)}\), we calculate
We can rewrite \(\phi (\sigma )\) as follows:
By replacing Eq. (80) in (85), we obtain
where \(\lambda =-\frac{n^{BF}\beta ^B+1}{(n^{BH}+n^{BF})\beta ^B -1} <0\).
From previous calculations, we know that \(-\mu _0^{BH}\sigma +(1-\omega )\mu _0^{BH}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }-\frac{\sigma }{\gamma ^B}\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }<0\). From \(\frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }>0\), we can deduce that \(\frac{\sigma }{\gamma ^B}\left( \frac{\partial \sigma }{\partial \omega }+1\right) >0\). We thus deduce the following:
From Eqs. (77), (76), (82) and (87), we conclude that \(\frac{\partial \pi ^{BH}}{\partial \omega }>0\).
Appendix 8: Other Scenarios and Some Variations of the Illustration
The present section analyzes the sensitivity of our illustration according to the percentage of emissions reduction and the market size in the electricity sector.
Various percentages of emissions reductions In Fig. 3, we analyze the cases in which total domestic emissions are reduced by 10 and 20%. We then show that the higher the emissions reduction is, the higher the profit increase is.
Various market sizes in the electricity sector. We analyze the cases in which the market size in the electricity sector is equal to 1000 TWh in Table 10 and 200 TWh in Table 11. Profits in the electricity sector increase by 1.40 and 2.75% (relative to the case under which allowances are auctioned) when the market size is equal to 1000 and 200 TWh, respectively.
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Nicolaï, JP., Zamorano, J. Windfall Profits Under Pollution Permits and Output-Based Allocation. Environ Resource Econ 69, 661–691 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0096-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-016-0096-1
Keywords
- Tradable permits
- Oligopoly markets
- Output-based allocation
- European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS)