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Mexican cartel expansion: a quantitative examination of factors associated with territorial claims

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Abstract

Since the war on Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) began, shortly after Felipe Calderón took office as president in 2006, violence has become the norm in many parts of Mexico. Numerous cartel leaders have been killed or captured during this time, and new leaders have filled the power vacuum. Throughout this process, warring cartel factions have staged intense battles over territory. In this context, DTOs have expanded their territories and their reach. Yet there remains a gap in the collective knowledge on why certain territories are selected over others. While there is a burgeoning literature on the mobility of organized crime groups, it remains new and open to various paths of exploration and analysis. This research builds on the mobility literature, examining the territorial selection of Mexican DTOs. Using a cross-sectional design, the authors examine territorial selection via the issuance of narco-messages. Various factors in the selection of territory are explored.

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Notes

  1. Previous administrations also combatted drug trafficking, but Calderon started the current conflict with Coordinated Operation Michoacan in 2006.

  2. Initial data inspection revealed both a heavy skew in the variables as well as potential non-linear relationships that needed to be accounted for in the model.

  3. The VIFs for the combined model were calculated in the same manner as the separate logistic regressions for each individual pull factor with the exception that additional pull factors were added to the calculation if they were included in the combined model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. US Department of State, Washington, DC, USA

    Adam L. Dulin

  2. University of New Haven, West Haven, CT, USA

    Jairo Patiño

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Dulin, A.L., Patiño, J. Mexican cartel expansion: a quantitative examination of factors associated with territorial claims. Crime Law Soc Change 73, 315–336 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-019-09864-3

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