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House arrest with electronic monitoring: the Rio de Janeiro experience

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Abstract

This article outlines the House Curfew with Electronic Monitoring (HCEM) experience in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Recently implemented in this Brazilian jurisdiction, HCEM has already achieved positive outcomes in terms of post-trial de-incarceration, as it reduced the open prison population by 35% from 2009 to 2014. In addition to describing and critically discussing these changes in the Rio de Janeiro criminal justice system, the study also reports offenders’ perceptions regarding this new crime control method in Rio de Janeiro. This perspective provides interesting feedback regarding HCEM in terms of safety, its punitive character, technological problems, constraints, and stigmatisation.

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Notes

  1. National Penitentiary Department, Ministry of Justice. Integrated System of Penitentiary Information - INFOPEN. Annual Report. Available at https://www.justica.gov.br/noticias/mj-divulgara-novo-relatorio-do-infopen-nesta-terca-feira/relatorio-depen-versao-web.pdf.

  2. In the Brazilian penal system, a custodial sentence should be executed in stages (downgrading incarceration conditions), moving from the highest grade of imprisonment (closed facility) to the lowest (semi-open conditions and open prison) in order to gradually reintegrate convicts into society. In closed facilities, convicts are not allowed to leave jail for external activities. In a minimum security facility (semi-open conditions), offenders can apply for authorisation to work, study, or visit family. The open regime is served in a state establishment called a casa de albergado, which is similar to a halfway house, where offenders sleep and participate in activities.

  3. National Penitentiary Department, Ministry of Justice. Integrated System of Penitentiary Information - INFOPEN. Annual Report. Available at http://portal.mj.gov.br/main.asp?View=%7BD574E9CE-3C7D-437A-A5B6-22166AD2E896%7D&Team=&params=itemID=%7BC37B2AE9-4C68-4006-8B16-24D28407509C%7D;&UIPartUID = %7B2868BA3C-1C72-4347-BE11-A26F70F4CB26%7D.

  4. Pursuant to the Federal Constitution of Brazil, the Public Defender’s Office is the state agency that provides full and free legal assistance to people who cannot afford legal services. Currently, the Public Defender’s Office is responsible for representing most of the prison population in Rio de Janeiro.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Federal Fluminense University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Juliana Moreira Mendonça

  2. International Centre for Comparative Criminology (ICCC), Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada

    Carlo Morselli

  3. IBMEC, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Luciana Pignataro

Authors
  1. Juliana Moreira Mendonça
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  2. Carlo Morselli
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  3. Luciana Pignataro
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Juliana Moreira Mendonça.

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Mendonça, J.M., Morselli, C. & Pignataro, L. House arrest with electronic monitoring: the Rio de Janeiro experience. Crime Law Soc Change 70, 489–502 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-018-9778-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-018-9778-7

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