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Surveillance as casework: supervising domestic violence defendants with GPS technology

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Abstract

Academic discussion about surveillance tends to emphasize its proliferation, ubiquity, and impact on society, while neglecting to consider the continued relevance of traditional approaches to human supervision, an oversight insofar as surveillance is organized through practices embedded in justice system-based casework. Drawing from a multi-site study of pretrial personnel utilizing global positioning system (GPS) technology for domestic violence cases in the U.S., a comparative analysis is offered to illustrate how the handling of a “problem population” varies across community corrections agencies as they implement surveillance regimes. In particular, the study finds that surveillance styles reflect whether an agency is directed toward crime control and risk management, providing treatment and assistance, or observing due process. These programmatic thrusts are expressed in how officers interact with offenders as cases, both directly and remotely. In contrast to the ambient monitoring of environments and populations through data-banking technologies, the interactive surveillance styles described in the present study highlight the role of casework in surveillance.

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Notes

  1. These data banks need not be remotely located; for example, “smart phones” provide veritable troves of banked data (cf. [69]).

  2. Ambient surveillance emerges from the rise of ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence (cf. [83]), which essentially document in digitized form an increasing range of human traces (“footprints”) and actions (current location, vehicular movements, economic transactions, interpersonal contacts, online behavior, etc.) (cf. [70, 81]). Ambient surveillance is distinguished from mass surveillance in that the latter is directed by the state, whereas the former encompasses both state- and market-based forms of surveillance.

  3. Surveillance has become democratized as people increasingly have their lives and routine activities recorded, documented, tracked, and rendered into searchable databases, including socially powerful individuals who historically could use their status to shield themselves from bureaucratic organizations that might seek to monitor them (see [36], p. 618).

  4. Because it works “silently,” ambient surveillance can be ignored, forgotten, and taken-for-granted, or become the subject of folklore, rumor, and speculation, and hence the object of collective action, such as when users of a smart phone application organize to protest changes in a social media company’s “privacy” policies [43]. By contrast, interactive surveillance is difficult to mobilize against politically insofar as those subject to it feel restricted in expressing their rights (e.g., to liberty, privacy), are unaware of their status as a case, or are deemed unsympathetic figures to “rally around.” Nevertheless, on an individual level, it is evident that resistance and sabotage may be practiced by those subjected to electronic surveillance.

  5. There has also been extensive work examining how offenders experience the condition of being electronically monitored (e.g., [67, 38, 41, 23]).

  6. These pretrial supervision programs emerged out of the “second generation” bail reform movements of the 1970s and 1980s ([34], p. 1556-8).

  7. Glaser defines surveillance “as any act involving direct or indirect observation of the parolees’ activities to ascertain that they conform to supervision rules” ([31], p. 432).

  8. Approximately ten states use private probation (for-profit and non-profit) to supplement state-run probation services, including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, Tennessee, and Utah. These agencies are entrusted with supervising misdemeanants and low-risk offenders [74]. Stillman [78] offers an in-depth journalistic account of the private probation industry in the U.S.

  9. See the article by Nellis (this issue) [61] for a historical account of the relationship between EM and probation in England and Wales.

  10. Hucklesby’s sample of privately-contracted FMOs (N = 20) had worked in retail, office, and factory settings, in the security industry, as cable television installers, or served in the armed forces ([39], p. 63). Paterson’s [65] sample includes a mix of privately contracted FMOs, as well as staff employed in state-based agencies (e.g., probation officers), but systematic comparisons between the two groups’ supervision practices are not made.

  11. Information about curfew compliance is forwarded to a central monitoring service, “where it is acted upon,” but it is not clear by whom or how ([45], p. 582).

  12. Such tracking of the FMO’s working practices implies that FMOs are surveilled as much as they surveil, a point that Paterson [65] explores in some depth.

  13. Hucklesby describes officers who skirt threats in the field by avoiding assigned areas ([39], p. 69), misrepresenting the auspices of their home visits, minimizing their authority to offenders, aborting visits prematurely, and sidestepping confrontation ([39], p. 70). The company's policy—stating that “if monitoring officers felt unsafe before or during a visit they were not required to complete it and simply had to inform managers of their decision” ([39], p. 69)—presumably encouraged such an orientation.

  14. Inductees were prohibited from communicating with the victim and approaching the victim’s residence, and faced a number of probation-like constraints and obligations.

  15. From the perspective of the risk horizon, a risk assessment score is but one seemingly static albeit validated data point among the many information streams that a community corrections officer can consider. Risk assessment generally pertains to placement and programming, and scores do not incorporate emergent information; the risk a client poses is constructed as being more or less “static.” Constraints on defendants are based on a prediction about what they are “likely” to do (e.g., abscond, reoffend, violate court orders), and result in the offender being placed into a (a) program designed to receive “high” (or “low”) risk clients [37], (b) risk-graded version of a program [72], or (c) judge-customized regime ([82], p. 11). See Lynch [48] and Bullock [7] for an examination of the role of risk classification in the work of parole and probation officers, respectively.

  16. For example, “Clients who seem inclined to ‘test’ rules, or who seem prepared to challenge the PO's [probation officer’s] right to enforce them, stand out and are easily discerned by the PO in interaction, both because of their non-deferential manner as well as their gripes about various program elements” ([40], p. 40). The officer will tend to think that the defendant “is up to something,” and subject them to “surprise” home visits.

  17. The approach echoes the strategy described as “environmental corrections” [16].

  18. Although some of the offenders are also under the supervision of a probation officer, there is no indication of how data streams that emerge from monitoring affect the practice of probation supervision; indeed, as Mair and Nellis [53] note, in England and Wales, both policy and practice on probation and EM run on “parallel tracks” and rarely inform each other.

  19. Making a parallel point in his discussion of probation’s shift from a rehabilitation-centered practice to one focused on risk management, Garland (as quoted in [71], p. 17) argues that, now, when probation officers aim to rehabilitate, it is because it is deemed “necessary for the protection of the public[,]” as “It is future victims who are now ‘rescued’ by rehabilitative work, rather than the offenders themselves.” Thus, for Garland, rehabilitation is “represented as an instrument of risk-management,” rather than being cast as “an end in itself.”

  20. Confidentiality was extended to defendants, victims, and professionals at participating agencies, and hence “Midwest, South, and West” are pseudonyms.

  21. The interviews are drawn from the qualitative prong of a multi-method study [22]. Overall, six agencies participated in the study: three “impact” sites (Midwest, West, South) and three “supplemental” sites; the former are sites where the bulk of data collection was conducted, including over three quarters of the interviews (for a complete discussion of the study’s methodology, see [22], p. 15–28). The three supplemental sites have small programs; one had only recently been launched at the time of data collection and hence had not yet acquired a distinctive identity or sense of mission. The framework used to distinguish approaches to “working” GPS for DV cases was developed through a consideration of all six sites. For a discussion of the three supplemental sites and their approaches to supervision, see ([22], p. 58–61).

  22. An inclusion zone is an area within which an inductee must remain, such as a county or residence.

  23. Those enrolled in Midwest’s GPS for DV program over a 3-year period (N = 531) tended to have a relatively high number of prior arrests (mean = 13.3) ([22], p. 64).

  24. A compliant defendant described the nature and impact of the home visits as follows: “If [the officer] comes in and he searches, he searches my cabinets. He opens my refrigerator; he goes in the bathroom, opens the cabinets. He goes through my house. And you get caught with anything, you’re going to jail. If he comes over and my brother’s there, and my brother’s breath smells like beer, I’m going to jail. So, I don’t have nobody at my house… It’s really, really strict. You have to really be careful and, like, really stay decent.”

  25. Clients who appear to be in circumstances where the case for their culpability is weak (e.g., because the victim comes across as bellicose in her dealings with the officer, or makes statements indicating she is unafraid of the defendant) are also likelier to be treated in a gentler and more flexible fashion should the need arise, but such treatment is based on impressions formed over time.

  26. Those enrolled in the GPS for DV program in South over a 9-year period (N = 177) tended to have a relatively low number of prior arrests (mean = 3.8) ([22], p. 83).

  27. Such transparency is consistent with the theme of “helping the client succeed,” as well as the general idea that GPS tracking is concerned with the management of offenders’ spatial and temporal locations irrespective of the “discourse” underlying that management [58].

  28. Strap tampers, drained batteries, and transmitter out-of-range readings trigger alerts that are also investigated immediately.

  29. Those enrolled in the GPS for DV program in West over a 6-year period (N = 639) tended to have a relatively low number of prior arrests (mean = 4.6) ([22], p. 76).

  30. The high number of GPS defendants who are of Hispanic or Latino descent—almost half the caseload—is important to note in this regard, as many were sending remittances to their ancestral countries, making the per diem an especially difficult burden on their familial responsibilities. In Midwest, burdens stem entirely from extensive restrictions and heightened transparency, rather than from fees: there are no GPS program fees that participating defendants are required to pay.

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Acknowledgments

The authors benefited from the advice and assistance of the following individuals: Peggy Conway, the late editor of the Journal of Offender Monitoring, who helped us make contact with participating agencies; Dan Lawrence, Laurel Mazar, and Amanda Vasquez, who transcribed interviews; Alana Gunn, who helped code the data; the anonymous peer reviewers, who were instructive in their feedback; and the participants at the various agencies involved with the present study, who gave invaluable input, support and guidance, and without whom this article would not have been possible. This project was supported by Grant No. 2007-IJ-CX-0016 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

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  1. Department of Criminology, Law, and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1007 W. Harrison St., BSB 4022 (M/C 141), Chicago, IL, 60607, USA

    Peter R. Ibarra, Oren M. Gur & Edna Erez

  2. Department of Criminal Justice, Pennsylvania State University, Abington College, Abington, PA 19001, USA

    Oren M. Gur

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Ibarra, P.R., Gur, O.M. & Erez, E. Surveillance as casework: supervising domestic violence defendants with GPS technology. Crime Law Soc Change 62, 417–444 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-014-9536-4

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