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Higher Fines—Fewer Traffic Offences? A Multi-Site Observational Study

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Abstract

Assess the impact of a 100-per cent increase of fines on compliance with speed-limits (50 km/h) and parking regulations in urban areas. Norm violations were measured through standardized observations in all five major cities in Switzerland before and after fines had been raised by 100 % or more at two pre- and two post-intervention periods. The speed of 20,000 cars was measured, and 10,000 parked cars were controlled. Levels of police controls remained stable over the entire period, but enforcement activity varied considerably across cities. Violations of parking regulations decreased by 32 %. Speed-limit violations remained unaffected in the longer run by higher fines. When cities without relevant enforcement activity were excluded, a reduction by 17 % was observed. No causal inferences can be drawn given the absence of a control area. However, the data suggest that higher fines deter traffic violations, provided enforcement activity remains at relevant levels.

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Notes

  1. “Ordonnance sur les amendes d’ordre” (Ordinance on summary traffic fines) of 4 March 1996 (Systematic Inventory of Laws, 741.031). The former ordinance dated of 22 March 1972.

  2. The amounts in Swiss francs were converted into US $. Over the last decade, the exchange rate used to be fairly stable around 1.

  3. The authors are greatly indebted to all the police officers who collected the observational data during many working hours, and to their commanders who decided to devote human resources to this evaluation.

  4. This percentage (as well as all other indications of improvement in percentages) is based on the following formula: improvement = (OR-1)/OR, thus (1.19-1)/1.19 = 0.1597 or 16 %.

  5. As one reviewer mentioned, observations made over time are not necessarily statistically independent (see also Bouyer 2000, 222). In the present case, it cannot be ruled out that certain drivers were observed more than once. Given the number of drivers observed (of 1000) per day and measurement point, the number of drivers assessed more than once is most probably negligible, however, although ultimately unknown.

  6. For driving beyond 65 km/h (or actually 70 km/h, taking the margin of tolerance into account), the summary procedure (with tickets handed out by the police) is not available. This limit remained unchanged by the reform of fines. However, prosecutors had adapted their sanction scale for extreme drivers accordingly.

  7. For the present study, however, only streets with moderate traffic (where exceeding speed-limits was technically possible) have been selected. Any seasonal effects should be limited, therefore.

  8. An example are the changes of speed limits from 130 to 120 on highways, and from 100 to 80 in Switzerland that were followed by massive shifts in public opinion surveys (summarized in Killias et al. 2011).

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Correspondence to Martin Killias.

Appendix

Appendix

Table 6 Proportion of cars (in per cent) observed on selected streets in excess of the speed limit of 50 km/h, by city and by observation period (N = 1000 each in every city and at every measurement)
Table 7 Proportion of cars (in per cent) observed on selected streets in excess of the speed limit of 50 km/h, by category of seriousness, by city and by observation period (N = 1000 each in every city and at every measurement)
Table 8 Number of cars observed on selected streets in excess of the speed limit of 50 km/h, by observation period and for all five cities combined
Table 9 Proportion of cars (in per cent) observed on selected parking lots whose pre-paid parking time had elapsed, by city and observation period
Table 10 Number of cars observed on selected parking lots whose pre-paid parking time had elapsed, by observation periods and for all five cities combined

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Killias, M., Villettaz, P. & Nunweiler-Hardegger, S. Higher Fines—Fewer Traffic Offences? A Multi-Site Observational Study. Eur J Crim Policy Res 22, 619–634 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-016-9301-6

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