Three decades ago, Freeman (1994) challenged what he argued to be the prevailing view in business literature and research that “business” concerns and “ethical” concerns are distinct and separable. However, the nature and implications of overcoming this “separation thesis” continue to stir debate, in particular as realising an integration of empirical and normative research poses significant challenges (e.g. Alzola, 2011; Harris & Freeman, 2008; Kim & Donaldson, 2016; Sandberg, 2008; Weaver & Treviño, 1994). Most existing proposals for integration suggest a mutual exchange between the two, with empirical studies providing “facts” that inform the application of normative theory, which in turn may guide further empirical research.

It is argued that the tradition of philosophical pragmatism can bridge this divide by way of a methodological integration. With its focus on human practices as inherently normative and value-laden, pragmatism forms a central starting point of Freeman’s critique of the separation thesis, which he developed with reference to a number of pragmatist philosophers and figures closely associated with the pragmatist tradition (Freeman, 1994, 412; Harris & Freeman 2008, 542; Martin & Freeman, 2004, 361). In particular, Freeman drew from both Putnam’s (2002) criticism of the fact/value dichotomy and Richard Rorty’s (1979; 1998) notion of justification among peers to propose developing new narratives of how human beings create and exchange value (Harris & Freeman 2008, 543). However, as argued in the following section, Freeman’s proposal stops short of closing the gap between normative and empirical inquiry. The potential of a pragmatist turn that would bridge that divide is examined in the third section in the light of pragmatist criticism of the distinctions between theoretical and practical reason due to Aristotle and Kant. The classic figures in the pragmatist tradition—Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey in particular—attempted to extend the empirical, even experimental methodologies of scientific inquiry to ethical questions in a manner that nevertheless ensured the distinctiveness of ethical issues. While this possibility has emerged in the discussion concerning the separation thesis (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 2000), the debate continues to be framed in terms of an opposition between normative and empirical inquiry. Indeed, it is argued, it does not fully emerge in recent proposals for “pragmatist” approaches to business ethics (e.g. Abela and Shea, 2014; Singer, 2010; York, 2009).

This oversight is not surprising. Achieving integration beyond the mere exchange between normative and empirical lines of inquiry has been viewed as insurmountable. This assumption is underwritten by what is here referred to as the standard objection against the pragmatist proposal, maintaining that norms and values cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed based on observation (see Donaldson, 1994; Alzola, 2011). The fourth section critically examines this objection and its roots, arguing that it is largely based on conceptions of science associated with positivism and logical empiricism, which pragmatism effectively challenges. The final section then considers the consequences of adopting a pragmatist perspective in business ethics. It is proposed that pragmatism can enhance both theoretical and empirical research by expanding empirical studies to encompass observations about the desirability of the ethical norms of business and accounts of the responsibilities of corporations to stakeholders. Furthermore, provided a comprehensive understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of these norms and accounts, observations can help determine which ethical theories best accommodate empirical findings, thereby identifying the limitations of various theoretical perspectives. Additionally, pragmatism introduces a mode of social inquiry that can examine the role of business in society, suggesting the potential for businesses to actively engage in democratic processes of inquiry into value.

The Separation Thesis

Freeman’s (1994) criticism of the “separation thesis”, which he maintained was dominant in business research and education, initiated a longstanding debate around the role of ethics in business. Freeman argued that differentiating “business” concerns from “ethical” values is not just unproductive but impossible (Harris & Freeman 2008). The precise content of the separation thesis has spurred significant discussion. Sandberg (2008) offered—and Harris and Freeman (2008) agreed upon—an account of the separation thesis as the view that there exists a clear distinction between business matters and ethical issues, particularly as there is a discernible difference between descriptive and normative matters (Sandberg, 2008, 227). However, the exact import of overcoming the separation thesis—for both business and (its) ethics—is still subject to various interpretations. One potential interpretation is that business operations and practices, strategies and leadership must conform with a sound moral framework. However, this suggests a relatively traditional approach with the aim of formulating ethical principles and guidelines for business conduct, drawing on established ethical theories or perspectives—including deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethics—and insights from various philosophical approaches (e.g. Audi, 2012; Micewski & Troy, 2007), as well as the study of ethical decision-making and the ethical culture of organisations (e.g. Roy et al. 2003).

A second understanding of the criticism of the separation thesis is as a criticism primarily of (then) dominant views of the purpose of business. Under this interpretation, the separation thesis maintains that business research should provide a reliable framework to understand and solve economic problems, isolating ethics in both the development and teaching of management and business (see Alzola, 2011). Challenging this view, Freeman maintains that separating economic and ethical considerations is impossible: any attempts to do so serve to obscure a particular set of values that lurk beneath (Harris & Freeman 2008, 542–543). Indeed, Freeman’s critique of the separation thesis emerged within the development of stakeholder theory. This theory contests the idea that businesses’ sole responsibility is to maximise shareholder value, advocating instead for their responsibilities towards stakeholders and society more broadly (Freeman, 1994, 1999; Purnell & Freeman, 2012). This understanding of overcoming the separation thesis encourages the study of these responsibilities, providing for the burgeoning fields of stakeholder theory (Harrison & Wicks, 2019) and corporate social responsibility (O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 2013).

Thirdly, the separation thesis has been interpreted to aim at a more profound shift in the research in and about business and its ethics. Freeman’s later work favours articulating the separation thesis as a general dichotomy between “is” and “ought”, facts and values, or descriptive and normative statements, that needs to be overcome by an integration that would bridge the traditional divide between normative and empirical inquiry in business research (e.g. Purnell & Freeman, 2012). Yet actualising this vision of a profound shift remains a challenging endeavour, as evidenced by proposals of how such integration might take place. Dating to the time that Freeman presented his criticism of the separation thesis, (Weaver and Treviño 1994; Treviño & Weaver 1994) suggested three different ways in which normative and empirical approaches to the study of business might interlace. First, normative and empirical research operate in parallel, sharing only their concern with certain types of business conduct. Second, integration takes the form of a symbiotic relationship in which the normative and empirical approaches associate for mutual benefit: empirical inquiry may be used in the application of specific moral theories, and normative inquiry may help guide the focus of empirical study. Finally, a deeper level which Weaver and Treviño call “theoretical hybridisation” would merge the normative and empirical approaches in a manner that would create a truly new breed of theory.

As recent proposals and discussions on the potential of integration show, however, the potential and import of the third alternative remain elusive. For instance, while Alzola (2011) critiques the separation thesis, pointing out several problems plaguing a strict divide between normative and empirical research, he proposes a dialogue between the two approaches rather than a full hybridisation (Alzola, 2011, 28–32). As another example, Kim and Donaldson (2016) advocate for the role of moral objectivity in guiding business practices, arguing that this role is to provide clues for formulating empirical hypotheses and to add prescriptive power to empirical theories. Indeed, while maintaining that business and ethics cannot be meaningfully separated, Harris and Freeman (2008) themselves concede the impracticality of expecting “every piece of research that is primarily focused on the economic mechanisms of business to give a full account of related ethical considerations, and vice versa” (2008, 545). These proposals align with Weaver and Treviño’s notion of a symbiotic relationship, with normative and empirical inquiry informing one another.

What would a deeper integration of normative and empirical research entail? Weaver and Treviño (1994, 137–138) list three varieties of what they call hybridisation. The first, conceptual importation, involves empirical research invoking normative categorisations, and vice versa, in their theoretical framework. The second, theoretical reciprocity, entails the interdependence of normative and empirical theories in an overall explanatory framework. Even parallel empirical and normative research in business ethics, Weaver and Treviño maintain, at least implicitly entails the first variety, theoretical interdependence; it may be inferred that the second, theoretical reciprocity may already be an element of the symbiotic relationship between the two lines of research. However, it is only the third variety of integration, theoretical unity, that rejects the distinction between normative and descriptive research in business ethics, viewing it as untenable.

Weaver and Treviño (1994) associate such theoretical unity with accounts that reduce the normative to the descriptive as well as (contrasting) interpretive or constructive accounts that hold that the facts studied by (social) sciences are interpretive and inevitably value-laden. However, neither account is sufficient to close the gap between normative and empirical inquiry, at least in the manner suggested by the criticism of the separation thesis. While some philosophers have proposed reductive accounts of ethical statements, properties and “facts”, such attempts confront significant counterarguments. Moreover, rather than an integration, these accounts imply a reduction of normative questions to empirical ones. The second alternative, in turn, merely points to the normative foundations of any kind of research, including empirical study, without any substantial proposal towards integration. Moreover, while it is reasonable to acknowledge that any inquiry has its normative underpinnings, this alternative can easily be seen as carrying the implication that all inquiries are merely subjectively and culturally laden (e.g. Werhane, 1994).

Over the years, Freeman has critiqued the separation thesis with reference to pragmatism and to a number of pragmatist philosophers such as John Dewey, William James, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, as well as figures closely associated with the pragmatist tradition, such as W. V. O. Quine and Nelson Goodman (Freeman, 1994, 412; Martin & Freeman, 2004, 361; Harris & Freeman 2008, 542; Purnell & Freeman, 2012, 112; Wick & Freeman 1998, 126–130). Drawing from Putnam’s (2002) criticism of the fact-value dichotomy, Harris and Freeman (2008, 542) argue that our actual practices embody both facts and values—“business “ considerations and “ethical” considerations—and, hence, business research is to provide discourse that is both descriptive and normative. Arguing that human practices are laden with norms of conduct and serve various purposes and values, pragmatism provides a backdrop for Freeman’s criticism of the separation thesis. Yet this pragmatic turn does not yet achieve an overcoming of the divide between normative and empirical inquiry, as evidenced by subsequent work by Freeman and others. However, as it is presently argued, a full-fledged pragmatist turn—one drawing upon the tradition of philosophical pragmatism—provides for a methodological integration of normative and empirical inquiry.

Pragmatism and Practical Reason

To explore and examine the pragmatist alternative, it is instructive to trace its development in terms of overcoming a distinction between theoretical and practical reason (or reasoning) which begins as early as Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book VI: vii). Theoretical wisdom is concerned with knowledge and understanding for its own sake, focusing on discovering universal truths and principles as exemplified in scientific and philosophical inquiry. Practical wisdom, by contrast, is about action and decision-making in the realm of human affairs, including ethical conduct and the pursuit of a good life based on virtue and moral deliberation.

Aristotle’s theoretical/practical division was refashioned by Kant, whom Charles S. Peirce—the founder of pragmatism—at times listed as one of pragmatism’s forebears. In the first introduction to his Critique of Judgement, Kant maintains that the difference between practical and theoretical propositions is not one of content but of presentation: the pragmatic use of reason is theoretical reason under a different guise (Kant 1790, 196; Rydenfelt 2019a). This contention was further developed by Peirce into a principled test of the meaning (and meaningfulness) of theoretical judgements. In its early formulation (although without the pragmatist label), Peirce (1878) presented a maxim for the clarification of the meaning of terms and sentences. In order to clarify the meanings of theoretical notions, we are to consider their conceivable effects in conduct. As Peirce later formulated his pragmatism, the meaning of any theoretical judgement expressible in the indicative mood is to be examined in terms of the practical maxims that the acceptance of that sentence enforces (CP 5.18, 1903). Advocating for holism concerning meaning, Peirce and the other pragmatists maintained that the practical consequences of our beliefs are to be traced in the wider context of our other commitments.

Because of the connection pragmatism forges between the theoretical and practical, there is a longstanding misapprehension of pragmatism as a crude instrumentalism and the quest for usefulness—for “what works” or “cash value”—as opposed to the theoretical quest for the truth and the right. Indeed, already in 1990, it was argued that this vernacular notion resulted in the crude vision of a “business pragmatist”, whose attitude “toward ethics is simply that ethics has no place in business” (Frederick & Petry, 1990, 57). This is a mistake, however, as surpassing the division between theoretical and practical reasoning does not imply discarding the former in favour of the latter; instead, it involves re-establishing a connection between the two. Peirce, James, and Dewey promoted an empiricist approach to truth, knowledge and inquiry. Despite their debts to Kant, they rejected the notion of an a priori foundation for science. In contrast to a quest for certainties, in their view, empirical inquiry is characterised by fallibilism, the tenet that anyone’s views may be mistaken (Rydenfelt 2021, 2023a).

The Aristotelian view entails that ethical considerations and deliberation fall within the scope of practical reason, separate from the theoretical considerations of scientific research (e.g. Hartman, 2011). Overcoming this division can be seen as undergirding Freeman’s pragmatic criticism of the separation thesis: research is always addressing the “practical” issue of what is to be done—including in a normative vein. However, Freeman draws upon a particular line of development in pragmatist thought largely due to Quine and Rorty.

While advocating a scientific and naturalist point of view, Quine (1951) challenged logical positivism and empiricism, in particular on the basis of what would later be termed holism, arguing that our claims (including scientific hypotheses) do not imply experiential consequences in isolation from theoretical presuppositions. In Quine’s view, the central feature of scientific statements is prediction of experiential consequences; for him, this defines the language game of science as opposed to “other good language games” (Quine, 1992, 20).Footnote 1 Rorty (1979) developed these criticisms of positivism into an overall argument against the epistemological “project” of showing that science holds a privilege in representing “reality”. Instead, both the norms within our linguistic practices and the selection from different vocabularies are matters of social practice. Accordingly, Rorty (1998) argued for a shift of focus from seeking truth to achieving justification among an expanding group of peers. Ethical theory, Rorty (2006) maintained, largely encapsulates the socially shared moral stances of a particular time and place; the best we can do is to extend the sphere of those whose needs we take into account by way of exercises in imaginative sympathy with the aid of historical and fictional narratives (Rorty, 2006; see Rydenfelt 2013; Werhane, 2006).

This “new” pragmatism influenced Freeman’s perspective on the role of business ethicists in reinventing businesses and reinterpreting the individuals working within them (Freeman, 1994, 418; Wick & Freeman 1998, 126–130). Freeman suggests focusing less on “what is true” and more on “how should we live” or “how does this narrative allow us to live” than on the “story” or “narrative” about how human beings “create and exchange value” (Harris & Freeman 2008, 543; Wick & Freeman 1998, 134; Purnell & Freeman, 2012). Indeed, in Jensen and Sandström’s (2012) rendering, Freeman—following Rorty among others—is shifting away from the pursuit of truth towards a “fuzzyist” approach that blurs traditional boundaries and dualisms and reduces the demand for consistency in theoretical development (Jensen & Sandström, 2012, 226). However, this pragmatist trajectory departs from the views of the tradition’s classics.

The classical pragmatists diverged from Kant’s views in another crucial aspect. While Kant held that the difference between theoretical statements and practical maxims lies in presentation, not content, he made an exception for practical laws, or those practical maxims that “consider freedom under laws” (Kant 2000, 196). Kant associated practical reasoning proper with the a priori moral law as an unconditional demand of reason. In contrast, the pragmatists advocated an empirical approach to normative inquiry, resisting both the a priori approach to ethics and the reduction of normativity to merely descriptive issues of social sciences, psychology or similar fields. They argued that, although normative and descriptive inquiries address distinct questions, both are amenable to a single scientific methodology. Peirce (1903) proposed examining normative issues within a triad of normative sciences: logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Dewey, particularly in his writings of the 1920s and 1930s on ethics, logic, epistemology and the philosophy of science, provided the most comprehensive exposition of an empirical and experimental approach to ethics. He proposed that values can be revised, and ethical norms can be subjected to empirical confirmation, based on their observable consequences. In line with scientific inquiry in general, such empirical inquiry into value is to take place by and within a community (Putnam 1992; 1994; Rydenfelt 2011; 2019b; 2019c).

Embracing pragmatism, then, could achieve a methodological integration of normative and empirical inquiry. Indeed, already Rosenthal and Buchholz (2000) proposed that pragmatism provides for a unified methodology for normative and empirical business research while retaining the distinct focuses, goals and contextual interests of these lines of inquiry. This alternative, however, has been nearly invisible in the discussion; instead, the debate on the separation thesis has been framed in terms of an opposition between normative and empirical inquiry, as in Weaver and Treviño’s (1994) discussion (see Frederick, 1994; Rosenthal & Buchholz, 2000).

Moreover, the potential for such methodological integration is largely overlooked in recent proposals for “pragmatist” approaches to business ethics. For instance, despite advocating for a “pragmatic” integration of ethics and strategy, Singer (2010) retains the divide between normative and empirical inquiry, maintaining that “ethics is still prima facie normative […] whilst strategy as a field of inquiry remains substantially empirical” (Singer, 2010, 486).Footnote 2 While acknowledging the experimental nature of the pragmatist approach to ethics, Jeffrey York (2009) puts forth the concept of “pragmatic environmentalism”, which expands the range of value considerations for businesses to encompass environmental factors or goods. Promoting pragmatism as a way of integrating ethics into entrepreneurial decision-making and leadership in order to foster legitimacy and growth, Surie and Ashley (2007) argue that this integration takes place through practical contexts of problem-solving, in line with their view of pragmatism as “rejecting epistemological assumptions about the nature of truth, objectivity and rationality, and emphasizing practice over theory” (Surie & Ashley, 2007, 238). Despite their various merits, these proposals fall short of fully realising the potential of pragmatism; at worst, they may suggest a notion of pragmatism as a crude form of utilitarianism or instrumentalism, merely seeking efficiency in attaining preconceived “value”.Footnote 3

Indeed, this issue emerges clearly in a recent proposal of an empirical approach to business ethics dubbed “pragmatic” by Abela and Shea (2014). Agreeing with Freeman and Putnam’s criticism of the fact/value dichotomy, Abela and Shea argue for an integration of normative and positive research.Footnote 4 They propose to achieve this by interpreting norms as hypotheses amenable to observation in the sense of hypothetical imperatives such as “if you treat others as you would like to be treated, then you will be more likely to be happy” (Abela & Shea 2014, 37). However, such norms count as empirical hypotheses only in the sense that inquiry may determine whether a predefined outcome (the consequent of the hypothetical imperative) follows from acting in accordance with a norm (the antecedent). In order for such a proposal to amount to more than an instrumentalism over achieving antecedently given ends, an account of the outcomes that ought to be achieved is required.

Indeed, to provide such an account that would involve an observational element, Abela and Shea introduce what they call a virtue-theoretical complement which claims that “if we observe things as they grow and evolve over time, until they become self-sufficient, we will come to understand what they ought to be” (2015, 35).Yet this approach is vulnerable to familiar issues and objections. Whose observations and views of “flourishing” should we follow—how are we to decide which human developments constitute flourishing? Moreover, the focus on “positive observations about human flourishing” (Abela & Shea 2014, 35) limits the scope of relevant considerations to human beings, and does not address the issue of the flourishing of other beings vis-à-vis humans. An even more central objection maintains that, even if certain developments in human beings are typically observed, it does not follow that they constitute human flourishing (at least in the normative sense that this approach requires). According to this objection—one that Abela and Shea (2014, 36) note but leave unaddressed—actual observations of the evolution of human beings fail to provide an understanding of what human beings ought to be like. As we will now turn to see, it is precisely the assumptions underlying this objection that full-fledged pragmatism may counter.

Pragmatism and Ethical Inquiry

In business ethics—as in and other fields of research—the pragmatist notion of normative-yet-empirical inquiry has been either largely overlooked or interpreted less radically than classical pragmatism suggests. This is only to be expected: making good on the pragmatist turn is undeniably a challenging endeavour. An example is given by Rosenthal and Buchholz (2000), who argue that the criterion for truth lies in the consequences: “Does the theory effectively guide us through experiences as anticipated by its claims?” (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 2000, 402). Expanding on this account to cover ethical truth, they argue that transitioning to “ought” statements in inquiry is a move towards a claim about “how to integrate originally conflicting data of problematic situations in ways that will enhance further value-relevant qualitative experiences within nature” (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 2000, 404; see Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2005, 312–313). However, the import of experience to the scientific scrutiny of normative statements remains vague.

Indeed, the pragmatist turn runs counter to a prevailing contention that observations cannot confirm nor disconfirm norms and valuations. This could be called the standard objection to the pragmatist proposal. It emerges in the literature on the separation thesis, where it is frequently noted that observations have no direct relevance to normative matters (e.g. Cugueró-Escofet & Fortin 2013, 441), that there is no empirical evidence available for ethical theories (e.g. Alzola, 2011, 30) and that normative theory cannot be inferred from empirical findings, escaping Hume’s guillotine to infer an “ought” from an “is” (e.g. Donaldson, 1994). The standard objection can be critically scrutinised by examining pragmatist responses to such lines of argument.

Observations do not Prompt the Revision of Values

The standard objection is often based on a general scepticism concerning the relevance of observation with respect to ethical opinion. Are values even amenable to observation? In his theory of valuation, Dewey (1939) argued that valuation is observable and behavioural, intimately linked to desires and interests. When desires and interests are present, individuals are inclined (other things being equal) to take actions towards achieving a specific end. Dewey proposed that values can be subjected to revision through observations of the consequences they yield: “[o]bservation of results obtained, of actual consequences in their agreement with and difference from ends anticipated or held in view, […] provides the conditions by which desires and interests (and hence valuations) are matured and tested” (Dewey, 1939, 218). In the pragmatist vision, observations not only serve as evidence for whether the anticipated ends were achieved but also prompt the revision of those ends, or values, themselves.

Revising Values Requires more Final Values

Even if the role of observation in revising values and ends is granted, the standard objection is certain to persist. Does not such revision either require or inherently presuppose some deeper ethical commitments or value? The revision of ethical opinion, it is objected, cannot stem from observation or non-normative data alone. However, Dewey argued that observations on the consequences of our actions can influence our values without the support of some underlying ethical value. Dewey found such influence evident, maintaining that “[n]othing more contrary to common sense can be imagined than the notion that we are incapable of changing our desires and interests by means of learning what the consequences of acting upon them are, or, as it is sometimes put, of indulging them” (Dewey, 1939, 218). Observations can lead to the development of new valuations and revaluations, revealing that the ends sought for were not ultimately desirable, or that they were not worth the means.Footnote 5

Ethical Norms Cannot be Confirmed by Observations

The previous strains of the standard objection contest the idea that observations can prompt the revision of values at an informal and everyday level. However, pragmatism suggests that this empirical revision can be transformed into a deliberate process of experimental inquiry, with ethical norms treated as hypotheses subject to empirical confirmation (Dewey 1922; Rydenfelt 2019b, 2023b). The standard objection inevitably persists in terms of an additional concern. The nature of empirical confirmation remains an entrenched philosophical issue. Nevertheless, even if observations can lead to the revision of normative commitments, can observations serve as evidence that confirms or disconfirms normative hypotheses? As already noted, pragmatism proposes the tracing of the consequences of our conceptions in practice; in Dewey’s view, it is reflection upon the consequences disclosed that enables a better judgement over value (Dewey, 1922, 27). Such tracing is inevitably a holistic affair. Our non-normative or “descriptive” hypotheses cannot be translated into directly observable consequences without drawing from other theoretical methodological commitments. The same applies to ethical norms as hypotheses: it is only within the context of the theories and methodologies of ethical inquiry—for the moment placed beyond doubt—that such consequences can be inferred and observed.Footnote 6

Confirmation Requires Underlying Normative Commitments

The standard objection doubtless persists by noting the reemergence of an issue that the pragmatist purportedly addressed. To take some observation to confirm or disconfirm an ethical hypothesis presupposes a normative commitment: what is counted as evidence is a normative issue. Does this not imply that an ethical premise is still required for the observed consequences to confirm and disconfirm norms and valuations? The pragmatist may concede the starting point of this objection, acknowledging that observations count as evidence only within a framework of normative commitments. However, as the pragmatist will point out, these considerations pertain to the confirmation of scientific theories in general. Indeed, the objection conflates two forms of normativity: the norms of ethics and the “logical” norms of inquiry. As with other branches of inquiry, the normative element involved in our notion of evidence for ethical hypotheses and theories need not be due to an ethical commitment.

Observation is Culturally and Ethically Laden

The standard objection is sure to endure. It is a deeply ingrained notion within Western culture that the ethically relevant dimensions of observations are due to cultural biases and the ethical perspectives we have adopted. Rather than enabling us to draw normative conclusions, do not observations reflect subjective projections of values onto normatively neutral “facts”? Once again, the pragmatist may acknowledge the starting point of the objection while rejecting the conclusion. While observations are influenced by our ethical perspectives, it does not follow that their normative dimensions are mere projections of subjective stances.Footnote 7 Similar issues also affect inquiries into descriptive questions, including in physical sciences. It is widely recognised that observation in any scientific discipline is “theory-laden”, or influenced by theoretical presuppositions (Hanson 1958; see Quine, 1951). However, this does not imply that observations pertinent to physical science merely reflect the projection of theoretical suppositions onto “physics-free” facts. The progress of physical sciences demonstrates that it is possible to derive objective, albeit fallible, theories from observations that are subjectively and culturally influenced.

Overall, the standard objection relies on assumptions rooted in conceptions of (good) science that are associated with positivism and logical empiricism. However, as later developments in the philosophy of science have emphasised, the revision and confirmation of hypotheses and theories cannot be reduced to mere observations without drawing upon other theoretical commitments; moreover, the experimental testing of theories requires methodological—including normative—commitments concerning confirmation and evidence. The pragmatists, writing largely prior to the emergence of 20th-century positivism, did not operate on such assumptions. Instead, they formed a central strand of their understanding of science. However, such presuppositions of inquiry do not imply that the scientific project is inherently subjective or merely a rehearsal of cultural presuppositions.

Practical Consequences: Towards Empirical Business Ethics

The shift advocated by Freeman and others seeks to transcend the divide between normative and empirical inquiries. However, this “pragmatic” turn falls short of providing the advances required for integration that moves beyond a mutual dialogue between empirical and normative research. The pragmatist turn proposes to bridge the divide by a methodological shift that develops business ethics into the direction of an empirical inquiry into the norms and values in business and society. Indeed, from the perspective of pragmatism, the separation thesis stands as a block on the way of empirical inquiry into such normative questions and issues. As the methodology of ethical inquiry cannot be determined a priori, pragmatists should resist providing detailed accounts of the theoretical and methodological commitments that characterise—let alone define—this pursuit. However, some central practical bearings of the pragmatist turn can be examined in terms of the two approaches to the intersection of ethics and business already distinguished. The first involves ethicists and theorists offering ethical principles to guide businesses—including business leadership and strategy—while the second consists of the development of accounts of the responsibilities and purpose of business, often in connection with stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility and so on. Pragmatism introduces a novel approach to pursuing both of these avenues, yet can be incorporated into existing theoretical and empirical research.

Regarding the first avenue, in the pragmatist view, inquiry begins with actual and observed issues that result, in Dewey’s terms, in a problematic situation (see Hildebrand 2013, 68–70; Rydenfelt 2023b). Pragmatism does not regard business ethics as the mere application of ethical theories and perspectives to address such situations. Instead, concrete policies and practices are formulated with the aim of resolving actual issues (or, in Dewey’s terms, turning the situation into a determinate one). Recognising the need to start from current theoretical and practical understanding, pragmatism does not reject existing ethical theories and perspectives as well as extant moral principles. Instead, these theories and principles can serve as background assumptions when developing concrete norms and practices to meet problems actually encountered.Footnote 8 However, formulating a norm or policy based on theory represents just one stage in the process of inquiry. Ethical inquiry extends beyond this initial step, encompassing empirical study to trace the consequences of proposed norms and policies put in practice as hypotheses. Observations serve not only as evidence of whether some intended outcomes were achieved but also as indicators of the desirability of those outcomes and the worthiness of the means employed. Furthermore, this experimental testing extends to revising our background assumptions, including the ethical theories and perspectives utilised.

For instance, consider the development of business practices and policies emphasising inclusion. As the pragmatic shift advanced by Freeman and others already underscores, existing business practices are laden with ethical assumptions, including concerning diversity and inclusion. However, rather than applying norms devised by ethicists and theorists on business practices, the pragmatist vision of inquiring value suggests beginning with actual issues and experiences of problematic situations that are characterised by a lack of diversity incurring issues associated with the imbalances in (representation in) organisational decision-making, concerns over the psychological well-being of individuals with different needs and so on.Footnote 9 In order to devise new practices and policies to address such problematic situations, ethicists and theorists can act as experts guiding organisational decision-making. Existing ethical theories and perspectives as well as moral principles serve as background hypotheses and assumptions, providing different diagnoses of the underlying ethical issues as a starting point for the development of concrete norms and practices. For example, deontological considerations may point to inequalities in rights and freedoms (including of participation) as a potential source for the problems encountered, consequentialist views serve to highlight the psychological and social benefits of inclusion, and perspectives from virtue ethics can underscore the moral virtues associated with promoting tolerance and diversity as well as the intellectual virtues of diverse groups. Based on particular issues and actual practices as well as these theoretical starting points, a wide variety of new policies might be proposed to address particular problematic situations. Moreover, once proposed policies are put to practice, the pragmatist approach suggests expanding empirical studies to encompass observations concerning the desirability of their consequences, as well as emerging problematic situations, in an ongoing process of inquiry. With a clear understanding of the theoretical perspectives underpinning these policies, these observations can indicate which ethical theories can best accommodate the findings, revealing the potential limitations of different theories and perspectives of ethics.

Regarding the second avenue, which addresses the ethical responsibilities of businesses, the pragmatist perspective similarly offers a novel outlook. Much of the management literature on this topic is rooted in stakeholder theory that suggests that firms create value when their relationships with stakeholders adhere to ethical principles such as integrity, respect, fairness, generosity and inclusiveness (see Harrison & Wicks, 2019). The extensive literature on corporate social responsibility includes numerous conceptualisations of the responsibilities of businesses and methods for assessing the achievement of responsibility-related goals (O’Riordan & Fairbrass, 2013). Additionally, empirical studies have investigated the impact of businesses on stakeholders, for example in terms of corporate social performance (Mattingly, 2015). Once again, pragmatism suggests starting with existing (accounts of) problematic situations and ways of conceptualising the responsibilities of businesses towards stakeholders. However, from a pragmatist perspective, measurements of the consequences of introducing such responsibilities can be enriched by evaluating the desirability of outcomes based on observations, including experiences of new problematic situations that may emerge. The results of such inquiry would not solely inform whether particular goals with respect to stakeholders are achieved, but also would address the desirability of responsibility-related goals, prompting adjustments to existing practices concerning both means and ends. In this way, research in business ethics can uncover new values worth pursuing and reveal unforeseen undesirable consequences based on experience.

Moreover, pragmatism not only enhances existing avenues of business ethics research but introduces a mode of inquiry that involves a shift from the perspective of managers and organisations to the scrutiny of the overall role of business in society. Dewey was particularly concerned with the development of social policy in an era where inquiry in social management and administration often pursued unexamined predetermined goals, while social sciences tended to eschew evaluations, leading to purely descriptive results (Dewey, 1938, 487–489). He advocated for the transformation of the change and revision of social and societal practices into deliberate social inquiry, conducted within and through a community. This type of inquiry involves systematic empirical investigation into policies and practices, engaging the public as a source of information and data on problems, potential solutions and the observed consequences of new policies (Rydenfelt 2019b, 2023b, c; Dewey 1927). Dewey’s concept of social inquiry is deeply intertwined with his ideal of democracy as an inquiring public as well as his view that empirical inquiry could be extended to the processes of legislation and legal reasoning.

This ideal of democracy suggested by pragmatism has already made a debut in research on business ethics. Visser (2019) argues that both pragmatism and critical theory can critically assess the extent to which capitalism and profit maximisation might compromise human self-realisation, cooperative inquiry and problem-solving. Yet the notion of democracy as social inquiry extends much further several ways, two of which are of particular note. Firstly, the ideal of a society-wide inquiry conducted by a democratic community opens up possibilities for redefining the overall role and responsibility of business in society based on empirical evidence that is not fixated upon preconceived notions of its purpose. Although such inquiry may draw from stakeholder-oriented accounts of the responsibility of business, it may also extend far beyond them to address the purpose of business with respect to a broader account of society and societal change. Such inquiry is conducted within and by the public rather than from the perspective of managers or “within” businesses. However, secondly, this shift also suggests a potential role for organisations and their leadership. Social inquiry may be conducted with the participation of businesses as parts of democratic society. Businesses and their management may engage in inquiry that extends to questions and issues of value by evaluating the outcomes of their policies and practices. Moreover, corporations can also contribute to society-wide social inquiry by identifying ethical issues, proposing and implementing solutions and helping to collect empirical data on the outcomes.

Conclusion

The exact import of overcoming the separation thesis and its rejection—for both business and (its) ethics—has remained open to different interpretations, and actualising a vision of an integration of normative and empirical inquiry remains a challenging, even impossible-seeming endeavour. Indeed, most proposals of integration stop with some variety of the notion of a mutual exchange where empirical study may provide the “facts “ required for the application of normative theory, which in turn provides guidance for empirical research. As argued, Freeman’s own “pragmatic” turn, along with several other pragmatist proposals, fall into this category. They do not fully embrace extending empirical and experimental methodologies of scientific inquiry to ethical questions and issues, as envisioned by the classical pragmatists, in a non-reductive manner that ensures that the distinctiveness of ethical issues is retained—a full-fledged pragmatist turn.

This condition should come as no surprise because of the formidable appeal of the standard objection that observations cannot confirm or disconfirm ethical norms or values. Indeed, it is only to be expected that the pragmatist responses presently presented to this objection do not completely dispel doubts about the feasibility of empirical inquiry in ethics, in particular if—as the pragmatist maintains—the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of such inquiry cannot be decided in advance. However, expecting conclusive proof that empirical inquiry in ethics can discover what should be done is an excessively high standard, analogous to the demand that we should somehow be able to establish, based on a priori reasoning alone, that natural science is capable of discerning what there is or would be. Rather, the pragmatist arguments presented are intended to show that there is no principled barrier preventing the development of ethics into an empirical inquiry. To show the viability of this proposal, we are to turn to the actual pursuit of such inquiry, judging its potential by its consequences.