Abstract
Recent research suggests that committing to corporate social responsibility (CSR) can induce moral licensing among employees, resulting in unethical behaviors. We extend this line of research and develop a theoretical framework to study how CSR influences managerial decision-making in crisis management. We test this theory in the context of product recall remediation. We examine under what circumstances CSR induces morally consistent or morally dubious recall remedial decisions and factors moderating this effect. We focus on two product recall remedial decisions that differ in ambiguity—full versus partial compensation and proactive versus passive recall. We predict and show that a company’s strong prior CSR performance increases the likelihood of full compensation but decreases the likelihood of a proactive recall. This finding suggests that CSR can induce moral licensing behavior at the highest corporate level when a decision is morally difficult to diagnose. Further analysis reveals that consumer harm and institutional ownership moderate the relationship between CSR and these two remediation strategies. Together, our findings provide important insights into when CSR leads to moral licensing in crisis remediation and how the link can be mitigated, and thus shed light on when CSR yields consistent and meaningful ethical business decisions.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Prior product recall research suggests that responsiveness and recovery (or remedy) are crucial to the outcomes of the recall management process (e.g., Liu et al., 2017).
The literature defines a behavior’s ambiguity based on how difficult it is to diagnose what the behavior reveals about the person performing it (Mullen & Monin, 2016). In our discussions, we also describe a more diagnosable behavior as less ambiguous. Strong prior CSR leads to moral licensing when the target action (i.e., remedial strategy in recalls in our setting) is ambiguous in terms of its moral attribution (how difficult to diagnose whether the action is a moral transgression or not), and leads to moral consistency when the target action is diagnosable. The relevance of action ambiguity is discussed by Mullen and Monin (2016) regarding why and when past good deeds can induce either moral licensing or moral consistency. We apply and test it regarding CSR in recalls based on whether a remedial strategy can be easily assessed or diagnosed by outsiders.
Such benefits include improved corporate image (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), enhanced purchase intentions (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), increased sales (Brown & Dacin, 1997), and heightened customer satisfaction (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). CSR can also improve a firm’s profitability and, therefore, shareholder value (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006) while reducing idiosyncratic risk (Peloza, 2006). CSR has also been shown to improve employee morale (Turban & Greening, 1997) and to attract more and better job applicants (Hedblom et al., 2019). Superior CSR performance also enables firms to signal better product quality (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013), adopt an improved differentiation strategy (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007), and gain easier access to financial resources (Cheng et al., 2014). Given this line of research, it is not surprising to see companies with diverse backgrounds, including many Fortune 500 companies, engage in and promote CSR initiatives (Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995; Peloza, 2006), often at highly strategic levels (e.g., improving labor practices, reducing carbon footprints).
Our study differs from List & Momeni (2021) in terms of theoretical development (we model moral licensing and consistency simultaneously and incorporate the attributes of the target decisions/actions), research design (decision-making in our setting is not in an anonymized field experiment), and implications (decision makers in our setting are executives instead of workers). We show that CSR can induce either moral consistency or moral licensing, and posit and test the boundary condition that leads different outcomes.
Because Cleeren et al. (2017) provide an excellent review of research on product-harm crises in the marketing literature, we refer interested readers to their paper for a detailed and comprehensive list. We focus our review on the recall literature most relevant to our research.
This line of research examines the impact of recall on consumer demand (e.g., Cleeren et al., 2013; Liu & Shankar, 2015; Marsh et al., 2004; Rubel et al., 2011; Van Heerde et al., 2007; Zhao et al., 2011), consumer perception (e.g., Cleeren et al., 2008; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Germann et al., 2014; Klein & Dawar, 2004; Whelan & Dawar, 2016), future product reliability (e.g., Haunschild & Rhee, 2004; Kalaignanam et al., 2013), firm financial value (e.g., Chen & Nguyen, 2013; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; Liu et al., 2017; Pruitt & Peterson, 1986; Thirumalai & Sinha, 2011), and competitor performance (Liu & Varki 2021).
For example, Cleeren et al. (2008) show that consumer characteristics and brand advertising both influence consumers’ purchase decisions following a product-harm crisis. Liu et al. (2016) find that, besides financial cost and product hazard, the CEO’s personal interests play an important role in determining what type of remedy a recall firm will provide to consumers as compensation for defective products.
Welbourne Eleazar (2022) examines how characteristics of moral issues such as consumer harm affect ethical decision-making. Our positioning of consumer harm is different in that we focus on how, in response to such moral issues, characteristics of moral decisions/actions like ambiguity affect ethical decision-making and how the effect varies conditional on characteristics of moral issues such as consumer harm.
We started to collect the data in 2015, so the data ends in 2014. We also want to use recalls in the 2000s to reflect more recent trends and to avoid any complication that might resulted from using older data.
The CPSC regulates the manufacture and sale of a wide variety of consumer products (more than 15,000 products), which is similar to the jurisdiction of other federal agencies such as food and drugs by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), automobile products by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and firearms by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATFE).
In general, there are four types of financial remedies for the CPSC recalls, besides full remedy which includes both a full refund or a free replacement for the recalled product, there are free repair, free repair kit, and discount on a future purchase (See Liu et al., 2016 for details). The difference between full and partial remedy is fundamental and conceptually important, whereas the differences among the different partial remedies are “more of varying degree” (Liu et al., 2016). Full refund or replacement is the most responsive remedy actions and are also the most expensive ones. In contrast, “partial” remedies such as free repair, consumer self-repair, and discounts for future purchase are less costly to the company and compensate consumers to a lesser extent.
The most admired survey from Fortune asks executives, directors, and security analysts to rate the largest companies in their own industry. Then an overall reputation score is assigned to each company. We use the standardized reputation score of the corresponding industry for each firm (Chen et al., 2009; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Liu et al., 2016) and use the industry average for companies that were not included in the survey.
We examine the additional diagnostics to further address the concern about multicollinearity. We check the variance inflation factor (VIF) in regressions. The VIF values for all variables, including main effects and interaction effects, are well below the conventional cutoff value of 10, suggesting that our results are unlikely subject to multicollinearity.
References
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion. Princeton University Press.
Arnett, D. B., German, S. D., & Hunt, S. D. (2003). The identity salience model of relationship marketing success: The case of nonprofit marketing. Journal of Marketing, 67(2), 89–105.
Barber, B. M., & Darrough, M. N. (1996). Product reliability and firm value: The experience of American and Japanese automakers, 1973–1992. Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1084–1099.
Beersma, B., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2011). How the grapevine keeps you in line: Gossip increases contributions to the group. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2(6), 642–649.
Brown, R. P., Tamborski, M., Wang, X., Barnes, C. D., Mumford, M. D., Connelly, S., & Devenport, L. D. (2011). Moral credentialing and the rationalization of misconduct. Ethics & Behavior, 21(1), 1–12.
Brown, T. J., & Dacin, P. A. (1997). The company and the product: Corporate associations and consumer product responses. Journal of Marketing, 61(1), 68–84.
Bundy, J., Pfarrer, M. D., Short, C. E., & Coombs, W. T. (2017). Crises and crisis management: Integration, interpretation, and research development. Journal of Management, 43(6), 1661–1692.
Burbano, V. C., & Chiles, B. (2018). Social responsibility and unethical behavior: Field experimental evidence from an online labor marketplace. Working Paper. Columbia Business School Research Paper Series.
Cheah, E. T., Chan, W. L., & Chieng, C. L. L. (2007). The corporate social responsibility of pharmaceutical product recalls: An empirical examination of US and UK markets. Journal of Business Ethics, 76(4), 427–449.
Chen, Y., Ganesan, S., & Liu, Y. (2009). Does a firm’s product-recall strategy affect its financial value? An examination of strategic alternatives during product-harm crises. Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 214–226.
Chen, Y., & Nguyen, N. H. (2013). Stock price and analyst earnings forecast around product recall announcements. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 5(6), 1–10.
Cheng, B., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and access to finance. Strategic Management Journal, 35(1), 1–23.
Cleeren, K., Dekimpe, M. G., & Helsen, K. (2008). Weathering product-harm crises. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(2), 262–270.
Cleeren, K., Van Heerde, H. J., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2013). Rising from the ashes: How brands and categories can overcome product-harm crises. Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 58–77.
Coombs, J. E., & Gilley, K. M. (2005). Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: Main effects and interactions with financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 26(9), 827–840.
Craig, S. N., & Thomas, R. J. (1996). A strategic approach to managing product recalls. Harvard Business Review, 74(5), 102–112.
Cunningham, L. M., Johnson, B. A., Johnson, E. S., & Lisic, L. L. (2020). The switch-up: An examination of changes in earnings management after receiving SEC comment letters. Contemporary Accounting Research, 37(2), 917–944.
Davidson, W. N., III., & Worrell, D. L. (1992). Research notes and communications: The effect of product recall announcements on shareholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal, 13(6), 467–473.
Dawar, N., & Pillutla, M. M. (2000). Impact of product-harm crises on brand equity: The moderating role of consumer expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 215–226.
Deckop, J. R., Merriman, K. K., & Gupta, S. (2006). The effects of CEO pay structure on corporate social performance. Journal of Management, 32(3), 329–342.
Del Guercio, D., & Tran, H. (2012). (2012). Institutional investor activism. In H. K. Baker & J. Nofsinger (Eds.), Socially Responsible Finance and Investing: Financial Institutions, Corporations, Investors, and Activists (pp. 359–380). Wiley.
Dhaliwal, D. S., Li, O. Z., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y. G. (2011). Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. The Accounting Review, 86(1), 59–100.
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X. (2015). Active ownership. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(12), 3225–3268.
Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Letting people off the hook: When do good deeds excuse transgressions? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(12), 1618–1634.
Eilert, M., Jayachandran, S., Kalaignanam, K., & Swartz, T. A. (2017). Does it pay to recall your product early? An empirical investigation in the automobile industry. Journal of Marketing, 81(3), 111–129.
Fombrun, C., & Shanley, M. (1990). What’s in a name? Reputation building and corporate strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 33(2), 233–258.
Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gao, H., Xie, J., Wang, Q., & Wilbur, K. C. (2015). Should ad spending increase or decrease before a recall announcement? The marketing–finance interface in product-harm crisis management. Journal of Marketing, 79(5), 80–99.
Germann, F., Grewal, R., Ross, W. T., & Srivastava, R. K. (2014). Product recalls and the moderating role of brand commitment. Marketing Letters, 25(2), 179–191.
Glaum, M., Landsman, W. R., & Wyrwa, S. (2018). Goodwill impairment: The effects of public enforcement and monitoring by institutional investors. The Accounting Review, 93(6), 149–180.
Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B., & Hansen, J. M. (2009). The relationship between corporate social responsibility and shareholder value: An empirical test of the risk management hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal, 30(4), 425–445.
Graves, S. B., & Waddock, S. A. (1994). Institutional owners and corporate social performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37(4), 1034–1046.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis. Pearson: Pearson Education.
Gubler, T., Larkin, I., & Pierce, L. (2018). Doing well by making well: The impact of corporate wellness programs on employee productivity. Management Science, 64(11), 4967–4987.
Hardy, C., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(10), 1402–1413.
Haunschild, P. R., & Rhee, M. (2004). The role of volition in organizational learning: The case of automotive product recalls. Management Science, 50(11), 1545–1560.
Hedblom, D., Hickman, B. R., & List, J. A. (2019). Toward an Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence (No. w26222). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Herzenstein, M., Posavac, S. S., & Brakus, J. J. (2007). Adoption of new and really new products: The effects of self-regulation systems and risk salience. Journal of Marketing Research, 44(2), 251–260.
Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: What’s the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal, 22(2), 125–139.
Hora, M., Bapuji, H., & Roth, A. V. (2011). Safety hazard and time to recall: The role of recall strategy, product defect type, and supply chain player in the US toy industry. Journal of Operations Management, 29(7–8), 766–777.
Hsu, L., & Lawrence, B. (2016). The role of social media and brand equity during a product recall crisis: A shareholder value perspective. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 33(1), 59–77.
Humphreys, B. R., McLeod, L., & Ruseski, J. E. (2014). Physical activity and health outcomes: Evidence from Canada. Health Economics, 23(1), 33–54.
Imbens, G., & Wooldridge, J. (2007). “What’s new in econometrics” lecture 5. National Bureau of Economic Research, Summer Institute.
Jarrell, G., & Peltzman, S. (1985). The impact of product recalls on the wealth of sellers. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 512–536.
Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. A. (2011). Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 103(3), 351–383.
Jonas, E., Greenberg, J., & Frey, D. (2003). Connecting terror management and dissonance theory: Evidence that mortality salience increases the preference for supporting information after decisions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9), 1181–1189.
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model. Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366–395.
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 404–437.
Judge, G. G., Hill, R. C., Griffiths, W. E., Lütkepohl, H., & Lee, T. C. (1988). Introduction to the theory and practice of econometrics (2nd ed.). Wiley.
Kalaignanam, K., Kushwaha, T., & Eilert, M. (2013). The impact of product recalls on future product reliability and future accidents: Evidence from the automobile industry. Journal of Marketing, 77(2), 41–57.
Kang, C., Germann, F., & Grewal, R. (2016). Washing away your sins? Corporate social responsibility, corporate social irresponsibility, and firm performance. Journal of Marketing, 80(2), 59–79.
Kim, Y., Park, M. S., & Wier, B. (2012). Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility? The Accounting Review, 87(3), 761–796.
Klein, J., & Dawar, N. (2004). Corporate social responsibility and consumers’ attributions and brand evaluations in a product–harm crisis. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 21(3), 203–217.
Kotchen, M., & Moon, J. J. (2012). Corporate social responsibility for irresponsibility. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 12(1), 1–23.
Kouchaki, M. (2011). Vicarious moral licensing: The influence of others’ past moral actions on moral behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(4), 702.
Larson, J. R., Foster-Fishman, P. G., & Keys, C. B. (1994). Discussion of shared and unshared information in decision-making groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(3), 446.
Lasarov, W., & Hoffmann, S. (2020). Social moral licensing. Journal of Business Ethics, 165(1), 45–66.
Lauriano, L. A., Reinecke, J., & Etter, M. (2022). When aspirational talk backfires: The role of moral judgements in employees’ hypocrisy interpretation. Journal of Business Ethics, 181(4), 827–845.
Lee, L. F., Hutton, A. P., & Shu, S. (2015). The role of social media in the capital market: Evidence from consumer product recalls. Journal of Accounting Research, 53(2), 367–404.
Lei, J., Dawar, N., & Gürhan-Canli, Z. (2012). Base-rate information in consumer attributions of product-harm crises. Journal of Marketing Research, 49(3), 336–348.
Lichtenstein, D. R., Drumwright, M. E., & Braig, B. M. (2004). The effect of corporate social responsibility on customer donations to corporate-supported nonprofits. Journal of Marketing, 68(4), 16–32.
List, J. A., & Momeni, F. (2021). When corporate social responsibility backfires: Evidence from a natural field experiment. Management Science, 67(1), 8–21.
Liu, A. Z., Liu, A. X., Wang, R., & Xu, S. X. (2020). Too much of a good thing? The boomerang effect of firms’ investments on corporate social responsibility during product recalls. Journal of Management Studies, 57(8), 1437–1472.
Liu, A. X., Liu, Y., & Luo, T. (2016). What drives a firm’s choice of product recall remedy? The impact of remedy cost, product hazard, and the CEO. Journal of Marketing, 80(3), 79–95.
Liu, D., & Varki, S. (2021). The spillover effect of product recalls on competitors’ market value: The role of corporate product reliability. Journal of Business Research, 137, 452–463.
Liu, Y., & Shankar, V. (2015). The dynamic impact of product-harm crises on brand preference and advertising effectiveness: An empirical analysis of the automobile industry. Management Science, 61(10), 2514–2535.
Liu, Y., Shankar, V., & Yun, W. (2017). Crisis management strategies and the long-term effects of product recalls on firm value. Journal of Marketing, 81(5), 30–48.
Luo, X., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2009). The debate over doing good: Corporate social performance, strategic marketing levers, and firm-idiosyncratic risk. Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 198–213.
Marsh, T. L., Schroeder, T. C., & Mintert, J. (2004). Impacts of meat product recalls on consumer demand in the USA. Applied Economics, 36(9), 897–909.
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 117–127.
Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees us to be bad. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(5), 344–357.
Minor, D., & Morgan, J. (2011). CSR as reputation insurance: Primum non nocere. California Management Review, 53(3), 40–59.
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J. B., & Cort, S. G. (1998). Information asymmetry and levels of agency relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 35(3), 277–295.
Mishra, S., & Modi, S. B. (2016). Corporate social responsibility and shareholder wealth: The role of marketing capability. Journal of Marketing, 80(1), 26–46.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853–886.
Morrison, D. G. (1969). On the interpretation of discriminant analysis. Journal of Marketing Research, 6(2), 156–163.
Mullen, E., & Monin, B. (2016). Consistency versus licensing effects of past moral behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 67(1), 363–385.
Neubaum, D. O., & Zahra, S. A. (2006). Institutional ownership and corporate social performance: The moderating effects of investment horizon, activism, and coordination. Journal of Management, 32(1), 108–131.
Noack, D., Miller, D. R., & Smith, D. (2019). Let me make it up to you: Understanding the mitigative ability of corporate social responsibility following product recalls. Journal of Business Ethics, 157(2), 431–446.
Nofsinger, J. R., Sulaeman, J., & Varma, A. (2019). Institutional investors and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Corporate Finance, 58, 700–725.
Peloza, J. (2006). Using corporate social responsibility as insurance for financial performance. California Management Review, 48(2), 52–72.
Petrin, A., & Train, K. (2010). A control function approach to endogeneity in consumer choice models. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(1), 3–13.
Pruitt, S. W., & Peterson, D. R. (1986). Security price reactions around product recall announcements. Journal of Financial Research, 9(2), 113–122.
Robinson, S., & Wood, S. (2018). A “good” new brand—What happens when new brands try to stand out through corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Research, 92, 231–241.
Rubel, O., Naik, P. A., & Srinivasan, S. (2011). Optimal advertising when envisioning a product-harm crisis. Marketing Science, 30(6), 1048–1065.
Sen, S., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2001). Does doing good always lead to doing better? Consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility. Journal of Marketing Research, 38(2), 225–243.
Servaes, H., & Tamayo, A. (2013). The impact of corporate social responsibility on firm value: The role of customer awareness. Management Science, 59(5), 1045–1061.
Shi, H., Grewal, R., & Sridhar, H. (2021). Organizational herding in advertising spending disclosures: Evidence and mechanisms. Journal of Marketing Research, 58(3), 515–538.
Siegel, D. S., & Vitaliano, D. F. (2007). An empirical analysis of the strategic use of corporate social responsibility. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 16(3), 773–792.
Siomkos, G. J., & Kurzbard, G. (1994). The hidden crisis in product-harm crisis management. European Journal of Marketing, 28(2), 30–41.
Surroca, J., Tribó, J. A., & Waddock, S. (2010). Corporate responsibility and financial performance: The role of intangible resources. Strategic Management Journal, 31(5), 463–490.
Thirumalai, S., & Sinha, K. K. (2011). Product recalls in the medical device industry: An empirical exploration of the sources and financial consequences. Management Science, 57(2), 376–392.
Thomsen, M. R., & McKenzie, A. M. (2001). Market incentives for safe foods: An examination of shareholder losses from meat and poultry recalls. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(3), 526–538.
Tonin, M., & Vlassopoulos, M. (2015). Corporate philanthropy and productivity: Evidence from an online real effort experiment. Management Science, 61(8), 1795–1811.
Turban, D. B., & Greening, D. W. (1997). Corporate social performance and organizational attractiveness to prospective employees. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 658–672.
Van Heerde, H., Helsen, K., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2007). The impact of a product-harm crisis on marketing effectiveness. Marketing Science, 26(2), 230–245.
Waddock, S. A., & Graves, S. B. (1997). The corporate social performance–financial performance link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 303–319.
Wagner, T., Lutz, R. J., & Weitz, B. A. (2009). Corporate hypocrisy: Overcoming the threat of inconsistent corporate social responsibility perceptions. Journal of Marketing, 73(6), 77–91.
Wei, L., & Diddi, P. (2022). Morality rules: Understanding the role of prior reputation in consequences of scansis. Public Relations Review, 48(1), 102–147.
Welbourne Eleazar, M. J. (2022). Immoral entrenchment: How crisis reverses the ethical effects of moral intensity. Journal of Business Ethics, 180(1), 71–89.
Whelan, J., & Dawar, N. (2016). Attributions of blame following a product-harm crisis depend on consumers’ attachment styles. Marketing Letters, 27(2), 285–294.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT Press.
Zhao, X., Li, Y., & Flynn, B. B. (2013). The financial impact of product recall announcements in China. International Journal of Production Economics, 142(1), 115–123.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflicts of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Research involving Human Participants and/or Animals
Not Applicable.
Informed consent
Not applicable.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Liu, A.Z., Liu, A.X., Moon, S. et al. Does Corporate Social Responsibility Always Result in More Ethical Decision-Making? Evidence from Product Recall Remediation. J Bus Ethics 191, 443–463 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05467-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-023-05467-0