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Does the Accounting Profession Discipline Its Members Differently After Public Scrutiny?

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An Erratum to this article was published on 31 October 2016

Abstract

This study examines how the accounting profession disciplines its members for professional misconduct in periods of increased public scrutiny. We conjecture and find that increased public scrutiny of the Canadian accounting profession, marked by the establishment of the Canadian Public Accountability Board in 2003, is positively associated with the severity of punitive sanctions administered by the profession’s disciplinary committees. We find that disciplinary committees are more likely to also demand rehabilitation outcomes and greater future monitoring for offenders. Finally, reporting of discipline outcomes has increased in outlets internal to the accounting profession, but not in publications targeted outside to the public. This latter finding is consistent with the private interest theoretical model of professional ethics developed by Parker (Acc Organ Soc 19:507–525, 1994) as evidence of a latent motivation of the profession to protect its professional private interests. Exploratory analyses indicate that punishment, rehabilitation, and reporting in external publications significantly influence whether offenders return to good standing.

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Notes

  1. We focus on the ICAO because, for the period of our study, it was the largest provincial Chartered Accountant institute in Canada. Prior to the unification of the three accounting bodies in Canada, ICAO had 38,278 members (ICAO 2014); the next largest provincial society was the Ordre des Comptables agréés du Québec at 18,477 members (Ordre 2012). Differences in the disciplinary processes among provinces, particularly between Ontario and Québec (Bédard 2001), complicate sample expansion to other jurisdictions. Further, with the country’s major stock exchanges and regulators based in Ontario, we anticipated that the greatest public scrutiny would be felt in Ontario, thereby increasing our ability to detect the profession’s responses to such increased public scrutiny. We encourage future research that extends the current study to other Canadian (and foreign) jurisdictions.

  2. See Jamal and Bowie (1995) for comparable categorization of codes of conduct from a theoretical level.

  3. See Shaefer and Welker (1994) and Badawi (2002) for more recent descriptive evidence of disciplinary sanctions of professional accounting bodies.

  4. At the same time CPAB was being established, the Ontario accountancy profession also was undergoing change. On December 5, 2002, the Ontario Legislature unanimously passed the Justice Statute Law Amendment Act, 2002, which proposed to reconstitute the Public Accountants Council (PAC) and give each of the three accounting bodies in Ontario (CAs, CGAs, and CMAs) the authority to issue public accounting licenses directly to their own qualified members. However, the 2002 Act stopped short of specifying the standard of practice that would be expected of public accountants. This uncertainty was clarified on August 29, 2003, when the Ontario government announced the PAC would adopt the CA profession’s standards for qualification and enforcement of its rules of professional conduct (ICAO 2003).

  5. The impact of an accountability board such as CPAB is felt not only by auditors. This broader impact is evident in CPAB’s mandate to improve financial reporting integrity by also engaging those charged with governance, regulators, and standard setters. Viewed through Parker’s (1994) private interest theoretical model of professional accounting ethics, establishment of an accountability board signals an external threat to self-regulation that undermines the authority of the accounting profession.

  6. Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2002) highlight that, in the European Union, disciplinary systems differ at a national level. However, as Bédard (2001) illustrates, in Canada, disciplinary systems may differ at a provincial level given the provincial jurisdiction of the professional accounting bodies.

  7. This is especially pertinent in the Canadian context given CPAB’s strategic emphasis on “judicious transparency” (CPAB 2012, p. 9).

  8. In contrast to H2a and H2b, we only specify main effects for H3 and H4 given the lack of theory permitting higher order effect predictions pertaining to rehabilitation and monitoring.

  9. For tabulated results, 2003 is included in the pre-CPAB period. To determine the sensitivity to this grouping, all analyses were re-run after excluding data from 2003. The statistical significances of these sensitivity analyses are unchanged from the tabulated univariate and multivariate tests of hypotheses. As an even more conservative test, we also re-ran univariate and multivariate analyses after excluding data from 2002 through 2004. The results of these more conservative tests were materially similar to those tabulated; the few instances of statistical significance loss that arise only for selected punishment measures are presented in footnotes 17 and 18.

  10. All dollars are adjusted for inflation and are presented using a common base of 2012 dollars.

  11. We also provide results using an alternative continuous measure of public interest PUBLIC_PERCENTAGE.

  12. In subsequent untabulated analyses, we replace the indicator variable MULTIPLE_VIOLATION with the continuous measure VIOLATION (the number of violations in the case); results were substantively similar.

  13. Unlike Eq. ( 2 ), Eq. ( 3 ) does not include Year controls because PUBLISHED_INTERNALLY and PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY are not evenly distributed across years. Estimation of the Logistical Regression with Year dummies results in a reduction of sample for each specification, leaving a resulting sample of 337 observations for the estimation of PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY and 108 observations for PUBLISHED_INTERNALLY. Despite this reduction in sample size, when we run our analysis including Year dummies, we find substantively similar results. With these reduced samples we continue to find a coefficient (18.91) on POST_CPAB when estimating INTERNALLY_PUBLISHED that is statistically significant at a 1 % level and statistically larger than the coefficient on PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY at a 5 % level of statistical significance.

  14. H2a and H2b require multivariate analysis so they are addressed in the “Multivariate Analysis” section that follows.

  15. Because subsequent analyses compare private versus public interest code violations where the offender has committed only one violation, we restrict the initial tabulation in Table 1 to this same subsample. This restriction resulted in a loss of 46 % of the sample. To offset this loss of power and also recognize that hypotheses are directional, we report statistical significance in Table 1 using one-tailed tests. All other tables report two-tailed tests.

  16. The $864 represents 2012 dollars, as all dollars are adjusted for inflation to a common base.

  17. As indicated in footnote 9, all analyses were re-run after excluding data from 2003 and from 2002 through 2004. The statistical significances of all results reported in Tables 4 and 5 remain unchanged when excluding only 2003 data. When excluding the 53 observations (13 % of the sample) from 2002 to 2004 data, all results reported remain unchanged with the exception that the coefficient on POST_CPAB reported in column (3) of Tables 4 and 5 is no longer positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.

  18. In additional analyses, the statistical significances of all results reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Tables 4 and 5 remain unchanged when excluding only 2003 data. When excluding the 53 observations (13 % of the sample) from 2002 to 2004 data, the results remain unchanged with the exception that the coefficients on PUBLIC_TRI in Table 4 and PUBLIC_PERCENTAGE in Table 5 are no longer statistically significant in column (6).

  19. Note that there is a reduction of the sample from the total sample of 403 observations because CPE_CLASS is not evenly distributed across years and estimation of the Logistical Regression with Year dummies results in a reduction of sample to 371 observations as some years cannot be estimated. When we remove the year dummies and estimate the model on the entire sample of 403 observations the results are substantively similar. The coefficient on POST_CPAB is 0.55 and statistically significant at a 5 % level.

  20. Untabulated multivariate analysis also finds that, consistent with the shifts in SUPERVISION and FUTURE_ACTION, the likelihood of receiving a REINVESTIGATION sanction increases in the post-CPAB era.

  21. Bédard (2001)’s sanction measure is used rather than SEVERITY as we wanted to measure the role of threats as a separate sanction and SEVERITY encompasses THREAT_OF_PUNISHMENT. When we run the analysis replacing PUNISHMENT wtih SEVERITY and omitting THREAT_OF_PUNISHMENT, the results are substantively similar.

  22. Within the restricted sample of 97 cases there were no observations of PUBLISHED_INTERNALLY, therefore transparency was limited to only PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY actions.

  23. The number of observations in the within-violation type analysis in Column (4) drops to 66 because there must be more than one case within violation type to perform the analysis.

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank workshop participants at the University of Auckland and the University of Waterloo Ethics Symposium, and especially the detailed comments provided by David Hay and our discussant Irene Gordon. The authors gratefully acknowledge the generous research funding provided by the Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada and the Canadian Academic Accounting Association. The authors also are grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by Lanae Martin and Paul Nielsen, and the ongoing support of the Edward Research Scholar and George C. Baxter Scholar positions at the Edwards School of Business.

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  1. Edwards School of Business, University of Saskatchewan, 25 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, SK, S7N 5A7, Canada

    Devan Mescall, Fred Phillips & Regan N. Schmidt

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  1. Devan Mescall
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Correspondence to Regan N. Schmidt.

Additional information

An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3358-5.

Appendix 1: Variable Definitions

Appendix 1: Variable Definitions

Variables Used in the Means Analysis in Tables 1 and 4

POST_CPAB :

Equal to 1 if the discipline was assigned after 2003; 0 otherwise

PRE_CPAB :

Equal to 1 if the discipline was assigned in 2003 and before; 0 otherwise

PUBLIC :

Equal to 1 if the violation was identified as the breach of a rule in place to protect the public’s interest, based on Parker (1987) and summarized in Appendix 2; 0 otherwise

PRIVATE :

Equal to 1 if the violation was identified as the breach of a rule in place to protect the profession and its members’ interests, based on Parker (1987) and summarized in Appendix 2; 0 otherwise

REPRIMAND :

Equal to 1 if reprimanded in writing; 0 otherwise

FINE :

Equal to 1 if fined; 0 otherwise

DOLLARS_OF_FINE :

Equal to the specific dollar value of the fine

CHARGED_COSTS :

Equal to 1 if in addition to the fine the member is assessed the cost of the investigation; 0 otherwise

THREAT_OF_SUSPENSION :

Equal to 1 if threatened to be suspended; 0 otherwise

SUSPENDED :

Equal to 1 if the member is suspended; 0 otherwise

MONTHS_OF_SUSPENSION :

Equal to the number of months that the member is suspended

DISALLOWED_SERVICES :

Equal to 1 if the member is no longer allowed to provide professional services in the future; 0 otherwise

CPE_CLASS :

Equal to 1 if the member is required to complete CPE; 0 otherwise

NUMBER_OF_CLASSES :

Equal to the number of CPE classes the member is required to take

REINVESTIGATION :

Equal to 1 if the member is required to have his or her practice inspected or reinvestigated in the future; 0 otherwise

SUPERVISION :

Equal to 1 if the member is required to be supervised in the future; 0 otherwise

FUTURE_ACTION :

Equal to 1 if their future actions other than CPE training are required of the member; 0 otherwise

PUBLISHED_INTERNALLY :

Equal to 1 if the order is published for the public in a form and manner determined by the Discipline Committee to all members of the Institute (i.e., not solely restricted to the member newsletter CheckMark); 0 otherwise

Variables Used in the Multivariate Analysis in Table 4

PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY :

Equal to 1 if the order is published for the public in newspapers and other external avenues; 0 otherwise

SEVERITY :

Based on Bédard’s (2001) sanction level, modified to include threat of suspension, resulting in a 5-point scale where: reprimand = 1, fine = 2, threat of suspension = 3, temporary suspension = 4, and indefinite suspension = 5

PUBLIC_TRI :

Equal to 0 if all violations were identified as private interest code violations, 1 if the case involved both private and public code violations, and 2 if all violations were identified as public interest code violations

PUBLIC_PERCENTAGE :

Equal to the total number of public interest code violations involved in the action divided by the total number of violations identified in the action against the member

MULTIPLE_VIOLATIONS :

Equal to 1 if the action involved more than one violation; 0 otherwise

VIOLATIONS :

The total number of violations identified in the action against the member

GUILTY_PLEA :

Equal to 1 if the member pleaded guilty and accepted full responsibility for the wrong; 0 otherwise

Variables used in the Multivariate Analysis in Table 5

GOOD STANDING :

Equal to 1 if the post script identifies that the offender returned to being a member in good standing; 0 otherwise

PUNISHMENT :

Bédard (2001)’s sanction level, where: reprimand = 1, fine = 2, temporary suspension = 3, and indefinite suspension = 4

THREAT_OF_PUNISHMENT :

Equal to 1 if the respondent receives a threat of suspension; 0 otherwise

REHABILITATION :

Equal to 1 if the member is required to take CPE courses; 0 otherwise

MONITORING :

Equal to 1 if the member is required to be reinvestigated in the future, supervised in the future or required to take other future actions; 0 otherwise

PUBLISHED_EXTERNALLY :

Equal to 1 if the order is published for the public in newspapers and other external avenues; 0 otherwise

Appendix 2: Description of Public and Private Violations

Public and private violations were coded based on Parker (1987). Examples of provisions specific to Ontario are identified below. The percentage of cases in our samples relating to each rule violation is indicated for cases involving single violations and multiple violations.

Distribution of public rule violations

Distribution of private rule violations

Single violation sample (%)

Multiple violation sample (%)

Rules

Single violation sample (%)

Multiple violation sample (%)

Rules

45.12

50.87

(201.1) Failed to maintain the good reputation of the profession

0.93

2.23

(101) Failed to comply with bylaws, regulations, and rules

3.72

13.15

(202.1) Failed to perform his professional duties with integrity and due care

0.00

0.25

(102) Failed to report matter to the institute

0.00

0.99

(203.1) Failed to sustain professional competence

0.00

0.25

(103) Associated with false or misleading applications

0.47

4.22

(204.1) Failed to maintain independence in respect of an assurance engagement

16.74

21.09

(104.1) Failed to co-operate with the regulatory process of the Institute

0.47

2.48

(204.2) Failed to identify, evaluate, and apply safeguards against threats to personal independence

11.63

13.15

(104.2) Failed to promptly reply in writing to a letter from the Institute

0.00

0.50

(204.3) Failed to document a significant threat to independence

0.00

0.50

(201.3) As a student, engaged on his own or in association with others in the practice of public accounting

0.00

0.25

(204.4) Participated on the engagement team for an assurance client when the member or student while a threat to independence existed

0.00

0.25

(217.2) Solicited in a manner that is persistent, coercive or harassing, for any professional engagement entrusted to another member

2.79

17.62

(205) Association with statements and representations which were false or misleading

0.00

3.23

(218) Failed to retain documentation and working papers

15.81

22.58

(206.1) Failed to perform his professional service in accordance with Generally Accepted Standards of Practice of the Profession

0.47

0.25

(302.1) Failed to communicate with predecessor accountant before accepting an engagement

Distribution of public rule violations

Distribution of private rule violations

Single violation sample (%)

Multiple violation sample (%)

Rules

Single violation sample (%)

Multiple violation sample (%)

Rules

0.00

1.24

(206.2) Failed to ensure the financial statements were prepared in accordance with GAAP

0.00

0.50

(302.2) Failed to respond promptly to successor accountant

0.00

0.74

(206.3) Failed to give a qualified opinion on materially misstated financial statements

0.47

1.49

(303.1) Failed to co-operate with successor accountant

0.00

0.25

(207) Failed to communicate to client a transaction that directly or indirectly resulted in a personal advantage

0.00

1.24

(303.2) Failed to transfer promptly to the client or, on the client’s instructions, to the successor, all property of the client in his possession

0.47

0.25

(208.1) Failed to maintain confidentiality of client information

0.00

0.25

(305) Failed to notify the appointed auditor or accountant of the engagement

0.47

0.25

(210.1) Used a client’s confidential information for personal gain

0.00

0.50

(401) Engaged in the practice of public accounting under a name other than his own

0.00

1.74

(212) Failed to handle the money or other property of the trust in accordance with the terms of the trust and the general laws relating to the trust

0.00

0.25

(405) Failed to properly represent his practice as that of a sole practitioner

0.00

0.74

(213) Associated himself with unlawful activity

0.00

0.25

(406) Failed to maintain responsibility over non-member when performing public accounting services

0.47

1.24

(216) Accepted directly or indirectly a commission or remuneration not from a sale or purchase of a practice

0.00

0.25

(409) Practiced public accounting in corporate form

69.77

75.18

Total with at least one public violation

30.23

38.46

Total with at least one private violation

  1. This summary presents the distribution of the number of professional conduct cases in Ontario from 1984 to 2014, involving violations relating to public or private rules of professional conduct. The columns presents the distribution of the percentage of cases involving single (215 obs.) or multiple violations (403 obs.)

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Mescall, D., Phillips, F. & Schmidt, R.N. Does the Accounting Profession Discipline Its Members Differently After Public Scrutiny?. J Bus Ethics 142, 285–309 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3156-0

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