Abstract
Using a sample of 21,030 US firm-year observations that represents more than 3000 individual firms over the 1998–2012 period, we investigate the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and investment efficiency. We provide strong and robust evidence that high CSR involvement decreases investment inefficiency and consequently increases investment efficiency. This result is consistent with our expectations that high CSR firms enjoy low information asymmetry and high stakeholder solidarity (stakeholder theory). Moreover, our findings suggest that CSR components that are directly related to firms’ primary stakeholders (e.g. employee relations, product characteristics, environment, and diversity) are more relevant in reducing investment inefficiency compared with those related to secondary stakeholders (e.g. human rights and community involvement). Finally, additional results show that the effect of CSR on investment efficiency is more pronounced during the subprime crisis. Taken together, our results highlight the important role that CSR plays in shaping firms’ investment behaviour and efficiency.
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Notes
In 2014, the plenary of the European Parliament adopted a directive on extra-financial information disclosure that concerns large companies and groups. The companies concerned will have the obligation of disclosing information on policies, risks, and outcomes as regards environmental-, social-, and employee-related aspects, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues, and diversity in their board of directors. These new extra-financial information disclosure rules will be applied to some large companies with more than 500 employees.
Several other studies provide similar results regarding the negative effect of CSR on information asymmetry and earnings management. For instance, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) provide similar findings by analysing sin companies; Cohen et al. (2011) show that investors expressed an interest in increasing their use of non-financial information in the future, and Dhaliwal et al. (2012) demonstrate that the benefits associated with high CSR disclosure exceed the reduction of information asymmetry and generate a reduction in the cost of equity.
The mechanism through which CSR increases firms’ competitive advantages are multiple, namely, firm’s image, firm’s reputation, segmentation, and long-term cost saving.
As in Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we do not believe that corporate governance is a part of CSR. Corporate governance concerns the mechanisms that allow shareholders to reward and exert control on agents. CSR deals with the social and environmental objectives of the company and stakeholders other than shareholders. We thus follow Servaes and Tamayo (2013) by the excluding corporate governance component when constructing our overall CSR score. However, our results remain unchanged when we include the corporate governance area in the calculation of our overall CSR measure.
Previous literature shows alternative methods for creating a single CSR score. For example, Cai el al. (2015) calculate a CSR index by dividing the net of strengths and concerns by the total maximum possible number of strengths and concerns. In unreported results we calculate the overall CSR score using this alternative approach and re-run our main analysis. Our findings fully confirm the preliminary results and suggest that our results are not driven by the choice of the CSR measure.
We follow Benlemlih and Girerd-Potin (2014) by considering the definition of the National Bureau of Economic Research, which defines recession as a significant decline in economic activity that lasts more than a few months and that is visible in different macroeconomic variables. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession cycle period in the subprime crisis endured between December 2007 and June 2009.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Qualitative Issue Area Definitions
We use six qualitative issue areas from KLD: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, product characteristics, and human rights. Each area has several strengths and concerns, as illustrated below. We calculate a score for each area equal to the number of strengths minus the number of concerns. The overall CSR score is equal to the sum of all areas’ scores.
Dimension | Strengths | Concerns |
---|---|---|
Community | Charitable giving | Investment controversies |
Innovative giving | Negative economic impacts | |
Non-US charitable giving | Indigenous peoples relations | |
Support for housing | Tax disputes | |
Support for education | Other concerns | |
Indigenous peoples Relations | ||
Volunteer programmes | ||
Other strengths | ||
Diversity | CEO’s Identity promotion | Controversies (e.g. fines) |
Board of directors | Non-representation | |
Women and minority contracting | Other concerns | |
Employment of the disabled | ||
Gay and lesbian policies other strengths | ||
Employee relations | Union relations | Union relations |
No-layoff policy | Health and safety concerns | |
Cash profit sharing | Workforce reductions | |
Employee involvement | Retirement benefits concerns | |
Retirement benefits Strengths | Other concerns | |
Health and safety strengths | ||
Other strengths | ||
Environment | Beneficial products and services | Hazardous waste |
Pollution prevention | Regulatory problems | |
Recycling | Ozone-depleting Chemicals | |
Clean energy | Substantial emissions | |
Communications | Agricultural chemicals | |
Property, plants, and equipment | Climate change | |
Management systems | Other concerns | |
Other strengths | ||
Product characteristics | Quality | Product safety |
R&D/innovation | Marketing/contracting Concerns | |
Benefits for the economically disadvantaged | Antitrust | |
Other strengths | Other concerns | |
Human rights | Positive record in South Africa | South Africa concerns |
Indigenous peoples relations strengths | Northern Ireland concerns | |
Labour rights strengths | Burma concerns | |
Other strengths | Mexico concerns | |
Labour Rights Concerns | ||
Indigenous peoples relations concerns other concerns |
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variables | Definition | Source |
---|---|---|
Panel A. Dependent variables | ||
INV_INEFF | Investment inefficiency is measured as the residual from a simple investment model (Biddle et al. 2009) that predicts the level of investment based on growth opportunities (measured by sales growth). Deviations from the model, as reflected in the error terms of the investment model, represent the investment inefficiency \(Investment_{i, \, t} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} Sales\,Growth_{i, \, t - 1} + n_{I,t}\) Investment i, t is the total investment of firm i in year t, defined as the net increase in tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets. Sales Growth i,t−1 is the rate of change in sales from year t − 2 to year t − 1 of firm i. The estimation of the model is made cross-sectionally for each year and industry | Authors’ calculations based on COMPUSTATdata |
I | A proxy for investment efficiency equals the sum of yearly growth in property, plants, and equipment, plus growth in inventory, plus R&D expenditure, deflated by the lagged book value of assets (Chen et al. 2014) | As above |
CAPX_RAT | A proxy for investment efficiency equals capital expenditure deflated by the lagged book value of assets (Chen et al. 2014) | As above |
CAPX_XRD | A proxy for investment efficiency equals capital expenditure plus R&D deflated by the lagged book value of assets (Chen et al. 2014) | |
Panel B. CSR variables | ||
HUM_NET | The human rights score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the human right issues area | Authors’ calculations based on MSCI ESG STATS data |
EMPL_NET | The employee relations score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the employee relations qualitative issues area | As above |
DIV_NET | The diversity score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the diversity qualitative issues area | As above |
COM_NET | The community score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the community qualitative issues area | As above |
PRO_NET | The product score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the product qualitative issues area | As above |
ENV_NET | The environment score equals the number of strengths minus the number of concerns in the environment qualitative issues area | As above |
CSR_NET | The overall CSR score equals the sum of the human rights, employee relations, diversity, community, product characteristics, and environment qualitative issues areas’ scores | As above |
CSR_STR | The total number of strengths of the human rights, employee relations, diversity, community, product characteristics, and environment qualitative issues areas | As above |
CSR_CON | The total number of concerns of the human rights, employee relations, diversity, community, product characteristics, and environment qualitative issues areas | As above |
Panel C. Control variables | ||
SIZE | Natural logarithm of the dollar value of the total book value assets | Authors’ calculations based on COMPUSTAT data |
S_CASH | Standard deviation of cash and short-term investments from t − 3 to t | As above |
LN_AGE | Logarithmic value number of the years between the fiscal year and the Compustat listing year | As above |
TANG | The ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets | As above |
S_ROA | Standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) from t − 4 to t | As above |
TOB_Q | Market value of equity minus book value of equity plus the book value of assets, all scaled by book value of assets | As above |
F_CONS | An index of financial constraints developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as: \(- 0.0 7 3 7*{\text{SIZE}} + 0.0 4 3*{\text{SIZE}}^{ 2} - 0.0 40*{\text{AGE}}.\) | As above |
LOSS | A dummy that takes the value of one if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise | As above |
CASH_AT | The ratio of cash flow to total assets | COMPUSTAT data |
LEV | The ratio of the book value of total liabilities and debt scaled by book value of total assets | As above |
CRISE | A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years 2007 and 2008 and 0 otherwise | |
INDUSTRY FE | A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is active in one of the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes and otherwise | |
Panel D. Instrumental variables | ||
CSR_IND | The industry-year average of the overall CSR score | Authors’ calculations based on MSCI ESG STATS data |
CSR_INI | The firm-level initial value of the overall CSR score | KLD STATS data |
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Benlemlih, M., Bitar, M. Corporate Social Responsibility and Investment Efficiency. J Bus Ethics 148, 647–671 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3020-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3020-2