Abstract
It is widely assumed that emotions have particular intentional objects. This assumption is consistent with the way that we talk: when we attribute states of anger, we often attribute anger at someone, or at something. It is also consistent with leading theories of emotion among philosophers and psychologists, according to which emotions are like judgments or appraisals. However, there is evidence from the social psychology literature suggesting that this assumption is actually false. I will begin by presenting a criterion for determining whether a mental state has a particular object. It is not sufficient for that state to be caused by an object or by a representation of a given object—the state must influence the subject’s thought and behavior in ways that are specific to that object. I will present evidence that emotions fail this test, and describe some of the reasons why we persistently attribute objects to our emotions. My view may seem untenable, because the literature on various aspects of emotional life such as normativity, linguistic expression, and behavioral influence consistently appeals to intentional objects. I will conclude by presenting a sketch of how I could address this concern.
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Notes
I do not address the vast literature comparing the strengths and weaknesses of various theories of intentionality. However, given the lack of consensus or even significant convergence among theorists of mental content, it would be unhelpful to anchor my discussion to any particular theory. Instead, my strategy is to focus on a datum that any viable theory of intentionality would need to accommodate.
‘Desire’ is sometimes used as an emotion term, referring to sexual arousal and other approach-related emotions. However, what is meant here by ‘desire’ is the type of mental state that we typically report via expressions such as “I want a cup of coffee” or “I want to take a walk”.
Though teleosemantic theories of mental content make explicit reference to natural selection, other naturalistic theories of mental content are also perfectly compatible with intentionality being an adaptation. Teleosemantic theories diverge from other naturalistic theories in claiming that evolutionary history plays a role in determining intentional contents, and my criterion is neutral on that issue. I would like to thank a referee for suggesting that I discuss teleosemantic theories in this context.
Correction processes can have appropriateness-conditions even if emotions do not have particular objects. I will discuss this issue further in part 6.
I would like to thank reviewers for emphasizing this point.
Whiting (2011, p. 10) gives a similar response as part of his own argument that emotions do not have objects. Otherwise his arguments are quite different than the ones in this paper, relying primarily on phenomenology rather than psychological research.
To be precise: if representations of them make you angry…
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Shargel, D. Emotions without objects. Biol Philos 30, 831–844 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-014-9473-8