Abstract
In this paper I analyse different justifications for the claim that the minor premise of the libertarian argument is true, namely, intuition, van Inwagen’s argument from moral responsibility and an argument from rationality. I claim none of these is satisfactory. I conclude by suggesting a possible way of interpreting the meaning of the free will intuition libertarians claim we have.
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Zilhão, A. Free Will and Rationality. Axiomathes 25, 93–106 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9245-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-014-9245-8