Abstract
We provide a Bayesian panel model to consider persistence in US funds’ performance while we tackle the important problem of errors in variables. Our modelling departs from prior strong assumptions such as error terms across funds being independent. In fact, we provide a novel, general Bayesian model for (dynamic) panel data that is stable across different priors as reported from the mapping of the prior to the posterior of the Bayesian baseline model with the adoption of different priors. We demonstrate that our model detects previously undocumented striking variability in terms of performance and persistence across funds categories and over time, and in particular through the financial crisis. The reported stochastic volatility exhibits a rising trend as early as 2003–2004 and could act as an early warning of future crisis.
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Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) study the competition between fund managers across funds’ family. They argue that an optimal policy of fund managers is to alter their risk-taking. Studying US equity mutual funds between 1993 and 2001, they report the presence of the family tournament, which is more pronounced in large families.
Brown et al. (1996) identify that interim losers who underperform the benchmark in the first half of the year are likely to increase their risk relative to mid-year winners. Funds are ranked according to their cumulative return, while risk is measured by the ratio of fund’s standard deviation after the interim performance assessment to its standard deviation before that date. Another proxy for risk is the tracking error variance, which is the variance of the difference between fund’s return and the value-weighted market index (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
Initial conditions are treated as unknown parameters.
It is easy to show that the interpretation of γ and α goes through even when βs are time-varying.
Given the model of Eq. (4) the following applies: (i) we can allow for different temporal coefficients, \( \beta_{t} \), and (ii) we can allow for arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation, since we can assume: \( E\left( {v_{s} v_{t}^{\prime } } \right) = \varSigma_{st} , \, s,t \in \left\{ {1, \ldots ,T} \right\}. \) In addition, we allow for arbitrary autocorrelation and arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity as well. This comes at the cost of allowing for \( \tfrac{T(T + 1)}{2} \) matrices of the form \( \varSigma_{\text{st}} \) each of which is \( n \times n \).
Regarding the elements of \( \varSigma_{ts} ,t \ne s \), since the prior belief is that these are all zero matrices, we can adopt a ‘model selection prior’ (see Koop 2013) of the form: \( \frac{{\sigma_{ij,t} }}{{\sqrt {\sigma_{ii,t} \sigma_{jj,t} } }} = \left\{ \begin{aligned} 0,{\text{ with probability }}p ,\hfill \\ \rho ,{\text{ with probability }}1 - p .\hfill \\ \end{aligned} \right. \)
In this prior we set \( p = \tfrac{1}{2} \) and we treat ρ as unknown parameter with a flat prior.
Regarding \( \varSigma_{tt} \) the diagonal elements, say \( \sigma_{ii,tt} \), allow for arbitrary time-varying heteroskedasticity while \( \sigma_{ij,tt} \) allows for contemporaneous correlation of returns. The matrix has received a great deal of attention in DCC and similar models. Suppose that: \( \varSigma_{tt} = H_{t} H^{\prime}_{t} , \) where \( H_{t} \) is an \( n \times n \) upper diagonal elements and its non-zero elements can be vectorized as: \( h_{t} = vec\left[ {h_{ij,t} ,i,j = 1, \ldots ,\tfrac{n(n + 1)}{2}} \right]. \) We proceed with a prior assuming that: \( h_{t} = a + Ah_{t - 1} + u_{t} , \) where α and Α have dimension \( \tfrac{n(n + 1)}{2} \times 1 \) and \( \tfrac{n(n + 1)}{2} \times \tfrac{n(n + 1)}{2} \), respectively, and the error term \( u_{t} \sim\,N\left( {0,\varPsi } \right). \) To determine a prior for Ψ we use the decomposition \( \varPsi = C_{\varPsi }^{\prime } C_{\varPsi } \) where \( C_{\varPsi } \) is an upper triangular matrix. Let \( c_{\varPsi } = vec(C_{\varPsi } ) \). Our prior is: \( c_{\varPsi } \sim\,N(\bar{c}_{\varPsi } ,\bar{V}_{\varPsi } ). \) In effect, we place a multivariate stochastic volatility prior. Although we have high dimensional objects α and Α, we can proceed with priors to resolve the curse of dimensionality: \( a\sim\,N(\bar{a},\bar{V}_{a} ),vec(A)\sim\,N\left( {\bar{A},\bar{V}_{A} } \right). \).
Moreover, the 5 factors come from Fama and French (2014) and defined as SMB(B/M) = 1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) − 1/3 (Big Value + Big Neutral + Big Growth), SMB(OP) = 1/3 (Small Robust + Small Neutral + Small Weak) − 1/3 (Big Robust + Big Neutral + Big Weak), SMB(INV) = 1/3 (Small Conservative + Small Neutral + Small Aggressive) − 1/3 (Big Conservative + Big Neutral + Big Aggressive) and thus SMB = 1/3 (SMB(B/M) + SMB(OP) + SMB(INV)). HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) − 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth). RMW = 1/2 (Small Robust + Big Robust) − 1/2 (Small Weak + Big Weak). CMA = 1/2 (Small Conservative + Big Conservative) − 1/2 (Small Aggressive + Big Aggressive). Data include all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms.
θ denotes the parameter vector, Y the data and L is the likelihood. Also, p(θ) is the prior.
However, large funds may encounter some disadvantages in terms of liquidity and management (Chen et al., 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008). According to the organisational diseconomies hypothesis (Chen et al., 2004), fund size is inversely related to performance. This could be because of hierarchical costs, or management dilution when the fund expands. One manager can easily manage small assets, but it needs a team to manage a large asset base. Large funds would eventually trade large volumes, which may cause difficulties for them in opening and closing their positions. Hence, this liquidity constraint also explains why large funds could be associated with lower performance.
Empirical findings for the size-performance relationship are somewhat mixed. While Chen et al. (2004), Huang et al. (2011) and Ferreira et al. (2012) find a presence of diseconomies of scale, Pollet and Wilson (2008) report that large funds tend to diversify their portfolios which in turn increases their performance. Jordan and Riley (2015) report a positive effect of small size on fund’s future alpha. Regressing future alpha on past alpha and size, Elton et al. (2012) do not find a statistically significant predictability of size on future alpha. However, they document that as size increases, expense ratios and management fees decrease.
Funds report turnover ratio by taking the lesser of purchases or sales of all securities with maturities from one year and dividing it by the average monthly net assets. The lower the turnover ratio, the more the fund is in favor of the buy-and-hold strategy. Stated differently, high turnover ratio indicates active portfolio management strategies (Daraio and Simar 2006; Khorana and Servaes 2012). As a result, active fund managers classified based on high turnover ratios may induce higher performance.
However, there is some evidence that shows that 12b-1 fee can raise expenses that would eventually compromise performance.
Figure of the posterior distribution of αis conditional on a ‘significant’ γit, that is the ratio of posterior mean to posterior standard deviation exceeds 2 in absolute value shows that persistence predominantly leans towards negative values (figure available under request).
For completeness we present in Table 11 in “Appendix 2” the performance of ten average funds. In addition, in “Appendix 2” we provide figures for posterior distributions for 10 best/worst funds as well as 10 average funds. Note that we also include Fig. 11 that reports posterior distributions of for the best-performing fund for years 2000, 2008, 2012 and 2014.
In addition, results are available under request of posterior distributions obtained through 20 different priors from the last column in Table 1 to examine prior sensitivity. These results provide evidence of the performance for the ten best (worst) funds and are in line with the evidence herein.
The posterior distribution of optimal portfolio P is presented in Fig. 12 and the posterior distribution of average persistence of its component returns is presented in Fig. 13, for 50 different priors from the last column in Table 1. In Fig. 14, we report the posterior distribution of its persistence only when average persistence of its component returns is ‘significant’ (viz. the ratio of posterior mean to posterior S.D. exceeds 2 in absolute value).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Sequential Monte Carlo/particle-filtering (SMC/PF) techniques
Chopin (2002) proposed a sequential PF for static models. Given a target posterior \( p(\theta |Y): = p(\theta |Y_{1:T} ) \) a particle system is a sequence \( \{ \theta_{j} ,w_{j} \} \) such that \( E(h(\theta )|Y): = \smallint h(\theta )p(\theta |Y)d\theta \cong lim_{J \to \infty } \tfrac{{\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^{J} \,w_{j} h(\theta_{j} )}}{{\sum\nolimits_{j = 1}^{J} \,w_{j} }} \), almost surely, for any measurable function \( h \), provided the expectation exists. We consider the sequence of posterior distributions \( p_{t} : = p(\theta |Y_{t} ) \). The PF algorithm is as follows.
Step 1: Reweight: update the weights \( w_{j} \leftarrow w_{j} \tfrac{{p_{t + 1} (\theta_{j} )}}{{p_{t} (\theta_{j} )}},j = 1, \ldots ,J \).
Step 2: Resampling: resample \( \{ \theta_{j} ,w_{j} J_{j = 1}^{H} \to \{ \theta_{j}^{r} ,1\}_{j = 1}^{J} \).
Step 3: Move: draw \( \theta_{j}^{m} \sim \,K_{t + 1} (\theta_{j}^{r} ),j = 1, \ldots ,J \), where \( K_{t + 1} \) is any transition kernel whose stationary distribution is \( p_{t + 1} . \)
Step 4: Loop: \( t \leftarrow t + 1,\{ \theta_{j} ,w_{j} \}_{j = 1}^{J} \leftarrow \{ \theta_{j}^{m} ,1\}_{j = 1}^{J} \) and return to Step 1.
Chopin (2002) recommends the independence Metropolis algorithm to select the kernel, which requires a source distribution. A possible choice, if we sampled from \( p_{n} \) (n < T), with respect to \( p_{n + s} \) is \( N(\mathop {\hat{E}}\nolimits_{n + s} ,\mathop {\hat{V}}\nolimits_{n + s} ) \) where
The strategy can be parallelized easily. If K processors are available, we can partition the particle system into K subsets, say \( S_{k} ,k = 1, \ldots ,K) \), and implement computations for particles of \( S_{k} \) in processor k. The algorithm can deal with new data at a nearly geometric rate and therefore the frequency of exchanging information between processors (after reweighting) decreases at a rate exponential to n, which is highly efficient.
Resampling according to \( \theta_{j}^{m} \sim \,K_{t} (\theta_{j}^{r} ,.) \) reduces particle degeneracy (Gilks and Berzuini 2001) since identical replicates of a single particle are replaced by new ones without altering the stationary distribution. For this application using \( J = 2^{12} \) particles gave a mean squared error in posterior means of 10−5 over 100 runs.
Chopin (2004) introduces a variation of MSC in which the observation dates at which each cycle terminates (say \( t_{1} , \ldots ,t_{L} ) \) and the parameters involved in specifying the Metropolis updates (say \( \lambda_{1} , \ldots ,\lambda_{L} ) \) are specified. Therefore, \( 0 = t_{0} < t_{1} < \cdots < t_{L} = T \) and we have the following scheme (we rely heavily on Durham and Geweke 2013).
Step 1: Initialize \( l = 0 \) and \( \theta_{jn}^{(l)} \sim p(\theta ) \), \( j \in J,n \in N \).
Step 2: For \( l = 1, \ldots ,L \):
(a) Correction phase:
(i) \( w_{jn} (t_{l - 1} ) = 1,\:j \in J,n \in N \)
(ii) For \( s = t_{l - 1} + 1, \ldots ,t_{l} \)
(iii) \( w_{jn}^{(l - 1)} : = w_{jn} (t_{l} ),\:j \in J,n \in N. \)
(b) Selection phase, applied independently to each group \( j \in J \) : Using multinomial or residual sampling based on \( \left\{ {w_{jn}^{(l)} ,n \in N} \right\} \), select
from \( \{ \theta_{jn}^{(l - 1)} ,n \in N\} \).
(c) Mutation phase, applied independently across \( j \in J,n \in N \):
where the drawings are independent and the pdf above satisfies the invariance condition:
Step 3. \( \theta_{jn} : = \theta_{jn}^{(l)} ,\:j \in J,n \in N. \)
At the end of every cycle, the particles \( \theta_{jn}^{(l)} \) have the same distribution \( p(\theta |y_{{1:t_{l} }} ). \) The amount of dependence within each group depends upon the success of the Mutation phase which avoids degeneracy.
Appendix 2
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Mamatzakis, E., Tsionas, M.G. Testing for persistence in US mutual funds’ performance: a Bayesian dynamic panel model. Ann Oper Res 299, 1203–1233 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03691-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03691-9