Abstract
This paper studies the surplus-/deficit-sharing effects on the risk-taking of a corporate defined benefit pension plan. Our analytical results show that when a surplus-/deficit-sharing rule is introduced, the participants’ risk-taking increases, while the direction of the surplus-/deficit-sharing effect on the equityholders’ risk-taking is ambiguous. The numerical analysis reveals that for plausible parameter values, the equityholders’ risk-taking increases due to the introduction of surplus/deficit sharing. The participants’ risk-taking increases much more substantially than the equityholders’ risk-taking when introducing surplus/deficit sharing. The participants’ risk-taking is more sensitive to the level of funding than the equityholders’ risk-taking: The participants’ risk-taking can become extremely high for low funding levels. This high sensitivity of the participants’ risk-taking to low funding levels is reduced by introducing deficit sharing. Risk-taking is independent of the funding level when the surplus and deficit proportions are equal.
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Notes
See Broeders and Chen (2013) for a list of pension guarantee funds with their intervention policies by country.
We chose to take the values of the three main parameters from one paper for the sake of consistency.
There is support for the chosen levels in the literature. Pennacchi and Lewis (1994) estimate \(\sigma _{A}=0.18\). Ang et al. (2013) choose \(\sigma _{L}=0.1\). \(\rho _{AL}=0.11\) is the 3-year correlation found by Lucas and Zeldes (2006).
Of course, some papers opt for different values, but they do not fundamentally contradict Kalra and Jain’ (1997) choice. \(\sigma _{A\text { }}\) is closer to 0.1 following the Employee Benefits Security Administration (2013) and Ang et al. (2013). \(\sigma _{L}\) is 0.085 for Hsieh et al. (1994). \(\rho _{AL}\) is 0.2 for Hsieh et al. (1994) and 0.35 for Ang et al. (2013).
As noted before, the sustainability cuts practice in the Netherlands seems to be leading to rather marginal benefits decreases.
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I wish to thank the Editors and two anonymous referees for helpful analyses that substantially improved the quality of the paper. All remaining errors are mine.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of the speculative fund with program (2)
With optimization program (2), the utility function argument, denoted by X, is defined by:
One differentiates Eq. (21) and divides by X. The following is obtained:
Let us derive the A dynamics. One introduces the S and \(\eta \) dynamics, as given by Eqs. (7) and (8), respectively, in Eq. (6), and takes account of the relationship \(x_{S}+x_{\eta }=1\). One obtains:
Replacing the A and L dynamics, as given by Eqs. (23) and (9), respectively, in Eq. (22), yields:
Let the indirect utility function J be defined as:
with J increasing, strictly concave in X, once differentiable with respect to t and twice differentiable with respect to X and K.
The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman optimality condition is:
where D denotes the Dynkin operator.
The Dynkin of J is defined by:
The subscripts on J denote partial derivatives. \(\sigma _{kl}\) stands for the covariance between any variables k and l. The variable X dynamics is written under its general form \(\frac{\hbox {d}X}{X}=\mu _{X}\hbox {d}t+\sigma _{X}\hbox {d}W^{X}\) .
One replaces the parameters of the X dynamics, as given by Eq. (24), in Eq. (27), and derives with respect to \(x_{S}\) to obtain the speculative fund shown in Table 1.
Appendix B: Proof of the speculative fund with program (3)
With optimization program (3), the utility function argument, denoted by Y, is defined by:
One differentiates Eq. (28) and divides by Y. One obtains:
Let us derive the dynamics of the call C. One applies Ito’s lemma to the function \(C(t,A,L,K_{1},K_{2},\ldots ,K_{N})\). This yields:
where subscripts on C denote partial derivatives.
One replaces the A, L and \(K_{i}\) dynamics, as given by Eqs. (23), (9) and (10), respectively in Eq. (30). The obtained C dynamics are replaced in Eq. (29). The following Y dynamics is obtained:
The indirect utility function J, the optimality condition and the Dynkin of J are as defined when deriving the speculative fund for program (2), except that X is replaced with Y in Eqs. (25), (26) and (27), respectively.
One replaces the parameters of the Y dynamics, as defined by Eq. (31), in the Dynkin of J, and derives with respect to \( x_{S} \). This yields the speculative fund shown in Table 1.
Appendix C: Proof of the speculative fund with program (4)
With optimization program (4), the utility function argument, denoted by Z, is defined by:
Differentiating Eq. (32) and dividing by Z, one obtains:
One replaces the dynamics of A, L and C, as given by Eqs. (23), (9) and (30) respectively, in Eq. (33). This yields:
Applying the method described above, one obtains the speculative fund shown in Table 1.
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Romaniuk, K. Does surplus/deficit sharing increase risk-taking in a corporate defined benefit pension plan?. Decisions Econ Finan 43, 229–249 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-019-00252-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-019-00252-z