Abstract
Moulin (J Public Econ 31:53–78, 1986; Theorem 4) characterizes the pivotal mechanisms without imposing strategy-proofness under the assumption of the full domain. In this paper, we provide a domain property that is necessary and sufficient for Moulin’s characterization without strategy-proofness to hold. We also provide examples of domains that do (not) satisfy our domain property.
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Notes
In contrast, Mishra and Sen (2012) consider m-dimensional open interval domains.
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Toyotaka Sakai and the two anonymous referees for their insightful and valuable comments. I would also like to thank Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Toru Hokari, Yoko Kawada, Shinsuke Nakamura, Noriaki Okamoto, and Shuhei Shiozawa for their helpful comments. This research is financially supported by JSPS KAKENHI, Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up (19K23200).
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A. Proof of Theorem 1
(i) \(\varvec{\Rightarrow }\) (ii). Let us show that if a domain \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) violates Property 1, then there exists a mechanism that satisfies the five axioms and is not Pareto-dominated by a pivotal mechanism. Suppose that \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) violates Property 1. Let \((d^*,t^*_1, \ldots , t^*_n) \in {\mathscr {M}}(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j)\) be a pivotal mechanism. Since \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) violates Property 1, there exist \(i \in N, {\bar{v}} \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\), and \(\varepsilon >0\) such that for each \(v' \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) with \({\bar{v}} \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ v'\),
Let \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n) \in {\mathscr {M}}(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j)\) be such that for each \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\),
Note that by the same argument as Eq. (6) in Section 3, for each \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\),
Moreover, by definition of \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n)\) and Inequality (9), we have
Therefore, \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n)\) is not Pareto dominated by a pivotal mechanism. In addition, obviously \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n)\) satisfies efficiency. Let us show that \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n)\) satisfies feasibility, no free ride, no disposal of utility, and distribution.
Feasibility Take any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\). Note that
Therefore, by \(v \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ v\),
Hence \(\sum _{j=1}^n t_j(v) \le 0\).
No free ride Take any \(j \in N\) and any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\). If \(j \ne i\), then clearly \(u_j\left( d(v), t_j(v); v_j \right) =v_j\left( d(v)\right) +t_j(v)=\min _{y \in E(\sum _{k \ne j}v_k)} v_j(y)\). Suppose that \(j=i\). Note that since the pivotal mechanism \((d^*,t^*_1, \ldots , t^*_n)\) satisfies no free ride, it follows that \(u_i\left( d^*(v), t^*_i(v); v_i \right) \ge \min _{y \in E(\sum _{j \ne i} v_j)} v_i(y)\). Then, by Eq. (11), we have
Therefore, \((d,t_1, \ldots , t_n)\) satisfies no free ride.
No disposal of utility Take any \(j \ne i\), any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\), and any \(v'_j \in D_j\) with \(v'_j \ge v_j\). Then,
Next, take any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) and any \(v'_i \in D_i\) with \(v'_i \ge v_i\). Then, since \((v_i, v_{-i}) \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ (v'_i, v_{-i})\) and the relation \(\begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array}\) is transitive,
Therefore,
Distribution It suffices to show that for each distinct \(k, \ell \in N\), each \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) with \(E(\sum _{j=1}^n v_{j})=\{z\}\), and each \(v'_{\ell } \in D_{\ell }\) such that
we have
Take any distinct \(k, \ell \in N\).
Let us consider the case with \(k \ne i\). Take any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) such that for some \(z \in X, E(\sum _{j=1}^n v_{j})=\{z\}\). We first show that
Suppose, by contradiction, that \(\min _{y \in E(\sum _{j \ne k}v_{j})} v_{k}(y) > v_{k}(z)\). Then,
a contradiction to \(E(\sum _{j=1}^n v_{j})=\{z\}\). Therefore, Eq. (12) holds.
Now, take any \(v'_{\ell } \in D_{\ell }\) such that \(v'_{\ell }(z)>v_{\ell }(z)\) and \(v'_{\ell }(x)=v_{\ell }(x)\) for all \(x \in X \setminus \{z\}\). Then,
Therefore, by \(k \ne i\) and Eqs. (12) and (13),
Next, consider the case with \(k = i\). Take any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) with \(E(\sum _{j=1}^n v_j)=\{z\}\) and any \(v'_{\ell } \in D_{\ell }\) such that \(v'_{\ell }(z)>v_{\ell }(z)\) and \(v'_{\ell }(x)=v_{\ell }(x)\) for all \(x \in X \setminus \{z\}\). Then, since \((v_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }}) \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ (v'_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }})\), we have
Therefore, \(u_{i}\left( d(v'_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }}), t_i(v'_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }}); v_{i} \right) \ge u_{i}\left( d(v_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }}), t_i(v_{\ell }, v_{-{\ell }}); v_{i} \right) \).
(ii) \(\varvec{\Rightarrow }\) (i). Suppose that a domain \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1. Take any mechanism \((d, t_1, \ldots , t_n) \in {\mathscr {M}}(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j)\) that satisfies efficiency, feasibility, no free ride, no disposal of utility, and distribution. Let \((d^*,t^*_1, \ldots , t^*_n) \in {\mathscr {M}}(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j)\) be a pivotal mechanism. Let us show that for each \(i \in N\) and each \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j, u_i\left( d^*(v), t^*_i(v); v_i\right) \ge u_i\left( d(v), t_i(v); v_i\right) \). Take any \(i \in N\), any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\), and any \(\varepsilon >0\). Since \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1, there exists \(v' \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) with \(v \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ v'\) such that
By the same argument as Eq. (4) in Sect. 3, it follows that
Combining Eqs. (14) and (15), we have
In addition, by \(v \ \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ v'\) and Lemma 1,
Since \(\varepsilon \) was chosen arbitrarily, \(u_i\left( d(v), t_i(v); v_i\right) \le u_i\left( d^*(v), t^*_i(v); v_i\right) \). \(\square \)
1.2 B. Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that a domain \( \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1*. Take any \(i \in N\), any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\), and any \(\varepsilon >0\). Then, there exists \(v' \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) with \(v \ \, \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ \, v'\) such that for some \(z \in E(\sum _{j \ne i} v_j)\) the following two conditions are satisfied:
-
(i)
\(\left\{ v'_i(z)+ \sum _{j \ne i} v_j(z)\right\} -\max _{y \in X} \sum _{j=1}^n v_j(y) < \varepsilon \),
-
(ii)
\(E(\sum _{k \ne j} v'_k)=\{z\}\) for all \(j \in N\).
Note that by Condition (ii), \(E(\sum _{j =1}^n v'_j)=\{z\}\). Therefore, by Conditions (i) and (ii),
Thus,
Therefore, the domain \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1. \(\square \)
1.3 C. Proof of Lemma 3
Take any \(i \in N\), any \(v \in \prod _{j=1}^n D_j\), and any \(\varepsilon >0\). Fix some \(z \in E(\sum _{j \ne i} v_j)\). Note that \(\max _{y \in X} \sum _{j=1}^n v_j(y)- \sum _{j \ne i} v_j(z) \ge v_i(z)\). Then, by Property 2*, there exists \(v'_i \in D_i\) such that:
-
(i)
\(\max _{y \in X} \sum _{j=1}^n v_j(y)- \sum _{j \ne i} v_j(z)< v'_i(z) <\max _{y \in X} \sum _{j=1}^n v_j(y)- \sum _{j \ne i} v_j(z) +\varepsilon \),
-
(ii)
\(v'_i(y)= v_i(y)\) for all \(y \in X \setminus \{z\}\).
First, Condition (i) implies that \(\left\{ v'_i(z)+ \sum _{j \ne i} v_j(z)\right\} -\max _{y \in X} \sum _{j=1}^n v_j(y) < \varepsilon \). Second, Conditions (i) and (ii) together imply that for each \(y \ne z\),
and hence, \(E(v'_i+\sum _{j \ne i} v_j)=\{z\}\).
On the other hand, again by Property 2*, there exists \(v'_{-i} \in \prod _{j \ne i} D_j\) such that for each \(j \ne i\),
where \(\delta >0\) is a sufficiently large number such that \(E(\sum _{k \ne j'} v'_k)=\{z\}\) for all \(j' \in N\). Then, obviously \(v \ \, \begin{array}{c} \rightarrow \\ i \end{array} \ \, v'\) holds. Therefore, the domain \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1*. This and Lemma 2 in turn imply that \(\prod _{j=1}^n D_j\) satisfies Property 1. \(\square \)
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Nakamura, Y. The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness. Rev Econ Design 24, 171–186 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00236-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00236-1