Abstract
We examine in a mixed oligopoly setting how foreign competition and the excess burden of taxation will affect privatization policy in the presence of strategic tax/subsidy policies. We show that in the presence of excess burden of taxation with foreign competitors, output subsidy coupled with import tariff and partial privatization is adopted to improve the social welfare. However, if the excess burden of taxation is relatively large, the government may switch to use production tax coupled with tariff policy and partial privatization to improve the social welfare.
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Notes
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969) argued that theorists consider seriously the question of devising the optimal economic policy when social utility cannot take the maximum value that is attainable within the framework of technological, resource and trading opportunities, owing to constraints provided by “non-economic” objectives.
See Chao et al. (2017) who examined the effect of a merger of state-owned firms on wage gap, employment and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting.
Wang and Chen (2010) casted doubt on the robust result in Matsumura and Kanda (2005) who argued that in the long run, welfare-maximizing behavior by the public firm is always optimal in mixed markets. Wang and Chen (2010) showed that the optimal policy for a state-owned firm is partial privatization in the presence of a cost-efficiency gap and further determined that long-run degree of privatization is larger than the short-run one.
Ballard et al. (1985) and Snower and Warren (1996) reported that the shadow cost of public funds is generally assessed to be around 0.3 in industrial countries. However, Capuano and De Feo (2010) assume that it has some higher-bound restriction. In Jacobs (2016), allowing for re-distributional concerns, the marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes is shown to be equal to the marginal distributional gain at the optimal tax system.
See Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Wang et al. (2009) and Wang and Chen (2010) for using the specification of increasing marginal costs (decreasing returns to scale technology) in mixed oligopolies. In the current paper, we use a homogeneous demand function with decreasing returns to scale technology, which is not a general specification of the demand and the cost side of the model. Once the two assumptions are relaxed, our results may qualitatively differ. We thank both reviewers for pointing out that our results are sensitive to the demand and cost specifications.
Lee and Hwang (2003) elaborated on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and showed that under moderate conditions, partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm.
We thank two anonymous referees for pointing out this concern.
Please see “Appendix II”.
This result parallels the analysis of Pal and White (1998), who found that the subsidy is a better choice for the government when the cost parameter is not so large.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Editor and two anonymous referees for the constructive suggestions received.
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Appendices
Appendix I
(i)
(ii)
where \(\lambda ^{*}\equiv \frac{2a+2am-4s-2ms-2ns-mns-2mt-mnt}{2(3+m+n)s}\). When a is sufficiently large, this condition is no longer needed.
Appendix II: The second-order conditions for optimal policies
We check the second-order conditions for the welfare maximization on (\(s,t,\theta )\) at the neighborhood of the equilibrium (\(s^{*} t^{*} \theta ^{*})\).
We have
The second-order conditions for the optimal degree of privatization, output subsidy and import tariff hold.
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Lee, JY., Wang, L.F.S. Foreign competition and optimal privatization with excess burden of taxation. J Econ 125, 189–204 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0592-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0592-y