Abstract
In a game with incomplete information, players do not possess full information about their opponents. For such a game, Bayesian approaches which are based on probability theory were employed to find the equilibria. Sometimes, players are lack of data for probabilistic reasoning in which case Bayesian methods cannot be used. In this paper, we adopt a new mathematical framework—uncertainty theory to solve such a game. The player’s type (incomplete information) is modeled as an uncertain variable. In addition to previous studies, the payoff for each player is uncertain in our research, which is a realistic assumption in practice. We first define the games with incomplete information with uncertain payoff (Iu-game). Then, we create a new game (U-game) as a method to solve Iu-game. A theorem is provided to show that the equilibria are the same for both games. We use an example to illustrate the application of the proposed theorem. Finally, we generalize the form of U-game and show the equilibria are independent of the incomplete information.
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Notes
The normal form of a game with some indeterminacy is a determinate game where the payoff is taken the expected value with respect to the random or uncertain variables. In this paper, equilibria are associated with the normal form of the game.
We adopt the basic logic of Harsanyi (1967) but differ him on assumptions of how the Nature selects the players’ types. He assumed the process of selection is a random process (\(c_i\) is a random variable), while we assume the process of selection is an uncertain process (\(c_i\) is an uncertain variable).
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Acknowledgements
The paper is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China Nos. 71704007, 61703014, the Base Project of Beijing Social Science Foundation No. 17JDGLB019
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Appendix
Appendix
The research framework is displayed in Fig. 2.
We introduce some fundamental concepts and properties in uncertainty theory including uncertain measure, uncertain variable and expected value.
Definition 7
(Liu 2007) Let \(\mathcal {L}\) be a \(\sigma \)-algebra on a nonempty set \(\varGamma \). A set function \(\mathcal {M}: \mathcal {L}\rightarrow [0,1]\) is called an uncertain measure if it satisfies the following axioms,
Axiom 1.\(\mathcal {M}\{\varGamma \}=1\)for the universal set\(\varGamma \);
Axiom 2.\(\mathcal {M}\{\varLambda \}+\mathcal {M}\{\varLambda ^{c}\}=1\)for any event\(\varLambda \);
Axiom 3. For every countable sequence of events \(\varLambda _1, \varLambda _2,\) \(\ldots ,\) we have
In order to provide the operational law, Liu (2009a) defined the product uncertain measure on the product \(\sigma \)-algebra \(\mathcal {L}\), called product axiom.
Axiom 4. Let\((\varGamma _k,\mathcal {L}_k,\mathcal {M}_k)\)be uncertainty spaces for\(k=1, 2, \ldots \)The product uncertain measure\(\mathcal {M}\)is an uncertain measure satisfying
where\(\varLambda _k\)are arbitrarily chosen events from\(\mathcal {L}_k\)for\(k=1, 2, \ldots \), respectively.
Definition 8
(Liu 2007) An uncertain variable \(\xi \) is a function from an uncertainty space \((\varGamma ,\mathcal {L},\mathcal {M})\) to the set of real numbers such that for any Borel set B of real numbers, the set
is an event.
In order to describe uncertain variable in practice, uncertainty distribution \(\varPhi :\mathfrak {R}\rightarrow [0,1]\) of an uncertain variable \(\xi \) is defined as \(\varPhi (x)=\mathcal {M}\left\{ \xi \le x\right\} \). An uncertainty distribution \(\varPhi (x)\) is said to be regular if it is a continuous and strictly increasing function with respect to x at which \(0<\varPhi (x)<1\), and
If \(\xi \) is an uncertain variable with regular uncertainty distribution \(\varPhi \), then we call the inverse function \(\varPhi ^{-1}(\alpha )\) as the inverse uncertainty distribution of \(\xi \).
An uncertain variable \(\xi \) is called linear if it has a linear uncertainty distribution
denoted by \(\mathcal {L}(a,b)\), where a and b are real numbers with \(a<b\). The inverse uncertainty distribution of linear uncertain variable \(\mathcal {L}(a,b)\) is
Definition 9
(Liu 2009a) The uncertain variables \(\xi _1,\xi _2,\ldots ,\xi _m\) are said to be independent if
for any Borel sets \(B_1,B_2,\ldots ,B_m\) of real numbers.
The expected value operator of uncertain variable, proposed by Liu (2007), is the average value of uncertain variable in the sense of uncertain measure and represents the size of uncertain variable.
Definition 10
(Liu 2007) Let \(\xi \) be an uncertain variable. Then the expected value of \(\xi \) is defined as
provided that at least one of the two integrals is finite.
For an uncertain variable \(\xi \) with uncertainty distribution \(\varPhi (x)\), Liu (2010b) showed that its expected value can be obtained by
Furthermore, if \(\varPhi (x)\) is regular, then
Theorem 3
(Liu 2009a) Let \(\xi \) and \(\eta \) be independent uncertain variables with finite expected values. Then for any real numbers a and b, we have
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Li, Y., Yang, Z. Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory. Soft Comput 23, 13669–13678 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-019-03906-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-019-03906-7