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Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces

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Abstract

Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 201–218, 1979) proved that majority rule on any proper permutation closed \(j\hbox {-rich}\) ballot space is the only social choice function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, cancellation, and neutrality. Alós-Ferrer (Soc Choice Welf 27:621–625, 2006) showed that neutrality was not needed for Fishburn’s result as long as the ballot space has no restriction on ballot sizes. In this paper, we show that the Alós-Ferrer result can be extended to a much larger class of ballot spaces.

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Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak

Notes

  1. This type of ballot restriction goes back to the concept of “voting system” introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1978).

  2. Alós-Ferrer (2006) points out that such a function is implicitly anonymous.

  3. Alós-Ferrer assumes \(\mathcal {B}=\mathbb {P}(X){\setminus }\{X,\emptyset \}\). However, in a footnote, he points out that his result remains unchanged if \(\mathcal {B} = P_{ne}(X)\).

  4. This argument is similar to the argument given for Step 1 on page 624 in Alós-Ferrer (2006).

  5. A different example for the case of \(m = 4\) is given in Leach (2019).

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Appendix

Appendix

To prove Theorem 4 we will assume that \(m \ge 4\), \({\mathcal B}\) is a j-rich ballot space for some \(j \ge 3\), and \(f: {\mathbb {N}}_0^{{\mathcal B}} \rightarrow P_{ne}(X)\) is a social choice rule satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation. We want to show that f is majority rule, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} f(\pi ) = F_M(\pi ) \end{aligned}$$

for any profile \(\pi \). This proof will involve the following notation. For each alternative \(x_i\in X\), let the profile \(\rho _{x_i}\) be the profile that consists of each of the j sized ballots containing \(x_i\). That is,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _{x_i} = \sum _{B \in {\mathcal B}_j, x_i \in B}B. \end{aligned}$$

For example, if \(X = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4\}\) and \(j = 3\), then

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _{x_1} = \pi _{\{x_1, x_2, x_3\}} + \pi _{\{x_1, x_2, x_4\}} + \pi _{\{x_1, x_3, x_4\}}. \end{aligned}$$

In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_1, \rho _{x_1}) = 3\ \text {and}\ v(x_2, \rho _{x_1}) = v(x_3, \rho _{x_1}) = v(x_4, \rho _{x_1}) = 2. \end{aligned}$$

In the general case,

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \rho _{x_i}) = \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 1\\ j - 1\end{array}}\right) \ \text {and}\ v(x_t, \rho _{x_i}) = \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ j - 2\end{array}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(t \ne i\). It follows from consistency and faithfulness that \(f(\rho _{x_i}) = \{x_i\}\). For any nonempty subset I of \(\{1, \ldots , m\}\) let

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _I = \sum _{i \in I} \rho _{x_i}\ \text {and}\ B_I = \{x_i : i \in I\}. \end{aligned}$$

If \(|I| = k\), then

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \rho ) = \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 1\\ k - 1\end{array}}\right) + (k - 1) \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ k - 2\end{array}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(i \in I\) and

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_t, \rho ) = k \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ k - 2\end{array}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(t \in \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} F_M(\rho _I) = B_I. \end{aligned}$$

We want to show that \(f(\rho _I) = B_I\) as well. The next lemma shows that this equality holds when \(|I| = j\) or \(j - 1\).

Lemma 1

If \(|I| \in \{j, j - 1\}\), then

$$\begin{aligned} f(\rho _I) = B_I. \end{aligned}$$

Proof

Assume \(|I| = j\) and note that \(B_I \in {\mathcal B}\) since \({\mathcal B}\) is \(j\hbox {-rich}\). Let \(\alpha \) and \(\beta \) be the positive integers satisfying

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha = v(x_i, \rho _I)\ \text {and}\ \beta = v(x_j, \rho _I) \end{aligned}$$

for some \(i \in I\) and \(j \in \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Notice that \(\alpha > \beta \). Next, let

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\rho } = \sum _{i=1}^m \rho _{x_i} \end{aligned}$$

and observe that \(f(\widehat{\rho }) = X\) by cancellation. Let \(\gamma \) be the positive integer

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma = v(x, \widehat{\rho }) \end{aligned}$$

for any \(x \in X\). We now compare the two profiles:

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma \cdot \rho _I\ \quad \ \text {and}\ \quad \ [\beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I]. \end{aligned}$$

For any \(x_i \in B_I\),

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \gamma \cdot \rho _I) = \gamma v(x_i, \rho _I) = \gamma \alpha \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I) = \beta \gamma + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) = \gamma \alpha . \end{aligned}$$

Next, for any \(x_j \in X {\setminus } B_I\),

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_j, \gamma \cdot \rho _I) = \gamma v(x_j, \rho _I) = \gamma \beta \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_j, \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I) = \beta \gamma . \end{aligned}$$

We now know that

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, \gamma \cdot \rho _I) = v(x, \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x \in X\). Let \(I' = \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\) and observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _I + \rho _{I'} = \widehat{\rho }. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, \gamma \rho _I + \gamma \rho _{I'}) = v(x, \gamma \cdot \widehat{\rho }) = \gamma ^2 \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x \in X\). Using the previous equation and fact that

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, \gamma \cdot \rho _I) = v(x, \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x \in X\) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} v(x, [ \gamma \rho _{I'} + \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I)]) = \gamma ^2 \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x \in X\) as well. Since f satisfies cancellation we get

$$\begin{aligned} f( \gamma \rho _I + \gamma \rho _{I'}) = f([ \gamma \rho _{I'} + \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I)]) = X. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, using consistency (many times) we get

$$\begin{aligned} f(\rho _I)&= f(\gamma \rho _I)\\&=f(\gamma \rho _I + [\gamma \rho _{I'} +\beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I])\\&=f([\gamma \rho _I + \gamma \rho _{I'}] + \beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I)\\&=f(\beta \cdot \widehat{\rho } + \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I))\\&=f( \gamma (\alpha - \beta ) \cdot B_I))\\&=f(B_I). \end{aligned}$$

Finally, since f is faithful, \(f(\rho _I) = f(B_I) = B_I\) and we’re done with the first part of the proof of Lemma 1.

Now assume \(|I| = j - 1\) and, as above, let \(I' = \{1, \ldots , m\} {\setminus } I\). Using consistency and the first part of this lemma we get

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \sum _{t \in I'}\ [ \rho _I + \rho _{x_t}] \right) = \bigcap _{t \in I'} \left[ B_I \cup \{x_t\} \right] = B_I. \end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum _{t \in I'} [ \rho _I + \rho _{x_t}] = \sum _{i=1}^m \rho _{x_i} + (m - j) \rho _I. \end{aligned}$$

By consistency and cancellation,

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \sum _{i=1}^m \rho _{x_i} + (m - j) \rho _I \right) = f(\rho _I). \end{aligned}$$

Hence \(f(\rho _I) = B_I\).

We are now ready to use Lemma 1 to complete the proof of Theorem 4.

Proof of Theorem 4

Assume that the set

$$\begin{aligned} D = \{ \pi \in {\mathbb {N}}_0^{{\mathcal B}} : f(\pi ) \ne F_M(\pi )\} \end{aligned}$$

is nonempty. So D is the set of profiles where the functions f and \(F_M\) disagree. Choose \(\rho \in D\) such that \(|F_M(\rho )|\) is maximal. This means that if \(\pi \) is a profile such that \(|F_M(\pi )| > |F_M(\rho )|\), then \(f(\pi ) = F_M(\pi )\). Since f is cancellative and \(\rho \in D\) it follows that \(F_M(\rho ) \ne X\). So

$$\begin{aligned} |F_M(\rho )| \le m - 1. \end{aligned}$$

Assume that there exists \(x \in f(\rho )\) such that \(x \not \in F_M(\rho )\). We may assume that \(x = x_1\). Let

$$\begin{aligned} \ell = \text {max}\ v(\rho ) - v(x_1,\rho ) \end{aligned}$$

and note that \(\ell > 0\). Next, let

$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\rho } = \alpha \rho + \ell \rho _{x_1} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha = \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 1\\ j - 1\end{array}}\right) - \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ j - 2\end{array}}\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_1, \widehat{\rho }) = \alpha v(x_1, \rho ) + \ell \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 1\\ j - 1\end{array}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \widehat{\rho }) = \alpha v(x_i, \rho ) + \ell \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ j - 2\end{array}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for all \(i \ne 1\). If \(v(x_i, \rho ) = \text {max}\ v(\rho ) = [\ell + v(x_1, \rho )]\), then

$$\begin{aligned} v(x_i, \widehat{\rho })&= \alpha \cdot [\ell + v(x_1, \rho )] + \ell \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 2\\ j - 2\end{array}}\right) \\&= \alpha v(x_1, \rho ) + \ell \cdot \left( {\begin{array}{c}m - 1\\ j - 1\end{array}}\right) \\&= v(x_1, \widehat{\rho }). \end{aligned}$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} F_M(\widehat{\rho }) = F_M(\rho )\ \cup \{x_1\}. \end{aligned}$$

By our choice of \(\rho \) and the fact that \(|F_M(\widehat{\rho })| > |F_M(\rho )|\) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} f(\widehat{\rho }) = F_M(\widehat{\rho }) = F_M(\rho )\ \cup \{x_1\}. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, by consistency,

$$\begin{aligned} f(\widehat{\rho }) = f(\rho ) \cap f(\rho _{x_1}) = \{x_1\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since \(F_M(\rho )\ \cup \{x_1\} \ne \{x_1\}\) we get a contradiction. It now follows that \(f(\rho ) \subset F_M(\rho )\).

Since \(f(\rho ) \subset F_M(\rho )\) and \(f(\rho ) \ne F_M(\rho )\), there exists \(y \in F_M(\rho ) {\setminus } f(\rho )\). Let \(x \in X {\setminus } F_M(\rho )\) and \(z \in f(\rho )\). We may assume that \(x = x_1\), \(y = x_2\), and \(z = x_3\). As above, let

$$\begin{aligned} \ell = \text {max}\ v(\rho ) - v(x_1,\rho ) \end{aligned}$$

and note that \(\ell > 0\). We now introduce the profile

$$\begin{aligned} \mu = \alpha \rho + \ell [ \rho _{x_1} + \rho _{x_2} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]. \end{aligned}$$

By our choice of \(\rho \) we know that

$$\begin{aligned} f(\alpha \rho + \ell \rho _{x_1}) = F_M(\alpha \rho + \ell \rho _{x_1}) = F_M(\rho ) \cup \{x_1\}. \end{aligned}$$

Using consistency and Lemma 1,

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_2} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) = \{x_2, \ldots , x_j\}. \end{aligned}$$

Using consistency and the fact that \(x_2, x_3 \in F_M(\rho )\) we get

$$\begin{aligned} f(\mu ) = f(\alpha \rho + \ell \rho _{x_1}) \cap f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_2} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) \supseteq \{x_2,x_3\}. \end{aligned}$$

Next, using consistency and Lemma 1, we get

$$\begin{aligned} f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_1} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) = \{x_1, \ldots , x_j\}. \end{aligned}$$

Since \(x_3 \in f(\rho ) = f(\alpha \rho )\) and \(x_3 \in f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_1} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) \) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} f(\mu ) = f(\alpha \rho ) \cap f\left( \ell [ \rho _{x_1} + \cdots + \rho _{x_j} ]\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Since \(x_2 \not \in f(\rho ) = f(\alpha \rho )\) it follows from the previous equation that \(x_2 \not \in f(\mu )\). But this contradicts the fact that \(\{x_2, x_3\} \subseteq f(\mu )\). This final contradiction shows that the set \(D = \{ \pi \in {\mathbb {N}}_0 : f(\pi ) \ne F_M(\pi )\}\) must be the empty set. Hence \(f = F_M\) and we’re done.

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Leach, T., Powers, R.C. Majority rule on j-rich ballot spaces. Soc Choice Welf 54, 639–655 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01223-4

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