Abstract
The paper deals with poverty orderings when multidimensional attributes exhibit some degree of comparability. The paper focuses on an important special case of this, that is, comparisons of poverty that make use of incomes at different time periods. The ordering criteria extend the power of earlier multidimensional dominance tests by making (reasonable) assumptions on the relative marginal contributions of each time dimension to poverty. Inter alia, this involves drawing on natural symmetry and asymmetry assumptions as well as on the mean/variability framework commonly used in the risk literature. The resulting procedures make it possible to check for the robustness of poverty comparisons to choices of intertemporal aggregation procedures and to areas of intertemporal poverty frontiers. The results are illustrated using a rich sample of 23 European countries over 2006–2009.
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Notes
For expositional simplicity, we focus on the case of two dimensions of individual well-being. Extensions to cases with more than two dimensions are discussed in footnotes.
For the unidimensional case, see Foster and Shorrocks (1991).
Ravallion (2011) only deals with the case of linear aggregation using a fixed set of prices, but the use of well-being functions like \(\lambda \) could also be considered.
This continuity assumption therefore precludes most members of the Alkire and Foster (2011a) family of poverty indices from being part of \(\ddot{\varPi }(\lambda ^+)\).
As noted in Duclos et al. (2006), we must also have that \(\pi ^{(1)}<0,\, \pi ^{(2)}< 0\), and \(\pi ^{(1,2)}>0\) over some ranges of \(x_1\) and \(x_2\) for the indices to be non-degenerate.
To our knowledge, the literature has failed until now to provide robust rankings of poverty across areas of poverty frontiers when complementarity of dimensions is allowed—such robustness is, however, not needed in the context of social welfare comparisons, see Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) for instance.
Note also that, in Roberts (1980)’s terminology on interpersonal comparability, the assumptions made in (4) require only ordinality and non-comparability of the dimensions. This is equivalent to saying that strictly monotonically increasing transformations of the dimensional indicators should not affect social welfare rankings.
Note that the need to compare the different values of \(x_1\) and \(x_2\) imposes the relatively weak assumption of “ordinality and level comparability” of the dimensions in a setting similar to that of Roberts (1980). An example of this is when \(x_1\) and \(x_2\) represent the health status of an individual at two points in time and when we need to be able to tell whether a value \(a\) at the first period is lower or larger than a value \(b\) at the second period. It would seem that such comparability is possible with many indicators of well-being, including those based on education or health and those involving different income sources and different recipients of these incomes in the same household.
Extending Proposition 2 to cases with more than two dimensions is relatively straightforward. For instance, if symmetry is assumed with three dimensions, one has to compare the sum of the joint distributions for the six permutations of each possible set of per-period poverty lines, that is \(F(u,v,w)+F(u,w,v)+F(v,u,w)+F(v,w,u)+F(w,u,v)+F(w,v,u)\).
In the tridimensional case mentioned in footnote 13, multiple counting also occurs but in a more complex manner. Those individuals whose incomes are less than \(z^*\) in each period are counted six times when checking dominance. Double counting occurs for those poor individuals whose incomes are below \(z^*\) during only two periods of time. The multidimensional dominance criterion thus introduces weights on poor households that depend on the number of periods of deprivations that they experience. Because of this, the social benefit of decreasing individual deprivation increases with the number of income shortfalls (with respect to \(z^*\)): a two-period-deprived person is twice as important as a single-period-deprived person, and a three-period-deprived person is thrice as important as a two-period-deprived person.
These definitions of \(\mu \) and \(\tau \) mean that the two dimensions are necessarily fully comparable in the sense of Roberts (1980).
See Zheng (2007) for more on this.
While the cases of \(\eta \) equal to \(1\) and \(0\) can easily be understood, intermediate cases are more difficult. For instance, with \(\eta =0.5\), inequality will be preserved when moving from \(\mu _1\) to \(\mu _2\) if each additional euro is distributed in the following manner between the two periods: fifty cents are distributed proportionally to the shares of each period in total income and the remaining fifty cents are equally shared; then fifty cents are allocated according to the new income shares and the remaining fifty cents are equally distributed, and so on until the individual’s mean income is \(\mu _2\).
Were these conditions not met, it would be possible for some income profiles to leave the poverty domain by an increase in intertemporal variability.
Although not as straightforward as with the poverty indices of Sect. 2, extending this mean/variability framework to \(T>2\) periods can be done. Let \(\mu _k\) be the average value of the \(k=1,\dots T\) lowest values of an income profile. \(\mu _1\) is thus the minimal value of the income profile and \(\mu _T=\mu \) is average income. Then, define \(\tau _{k,\eta }:=\frac{\mu _k-\mu }{\mu ^\eta }\), with \(\tau _{k,\eta }\in [-\mu ^{1-\eta },0]\). It can be seen that for each income profile of size \(T\), only \(T-1\) observations of inequality are needed to describe all relevant intertemporal inequalities. So an income profile \((x_1,x_2\dots , x_T)\) can be fully described in terms of intertemporal inequalities and average income by the \(T\)-vector \((\tau _{1,\eta },\tau _{2,\eta }\dots ,\tau _{T-1,\eta },\mu )\).
If income timing matters for poverty assessment (as for asymmetric poverty indices), this vector will not be sufficient. For instance, in the three-period case, it would be necessary to make use of \(3!=6\) possibly different individual poverty indices \(\rho _{s,t}\), where \(s\) indicates the period of the lowest income and \(t\) is the period for the second-lowest income. Once this is done, generalizing Propositions 4–7 is relatively straightforward.
Equal weights for each deprivation are necessary in order to obtain individual poverty indices that are decreasing with respect to \(\tau _0\).
Assuming \(x_1<x_2\), symmetry means that condition (36) can be expressed as:
$$\begin{aligned} \pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_2) \le \pi ^{(1)}(x_2,x_1). \end{aligned}$$(38)At the same time, we know that \(\pi ^{(1,2)}(x_1,x_2)\ge 0\), i.e. \(\pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_1) - \pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_2) \le 0\). Combining this with (38) yields:
$$\begin{aligned} \pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_1) \le \pi ^{(1)}(x_2,x_1). \end{aligned}$$(39)which implies that second-order derivatives of \(\pi \) are non-negative \(\forall (x_1,x_2)\).
The countries are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Hungary (HU), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE), and United Kingdom (UK).
Incomes were censored at the bottom, so that our results should be regarded as restricted dominance tests (see Davidson and Duclos 2012, for theoretical and practical arguments). Censoring was applied at the second centile of the pooled distribution of incomes in 2006 and 2009, that is, at around €2,100 per person and per year.
This figure is almost exactly equal to Italy’s median income over the period. This choice is quite conservative but would undoubtedly meet unanimous agreement as a value above which an individual cannot be considered as deprived in the European context.
More specifically, we consider poverty indices from \(\tilde{\varPi }_S(\tilde{\lambda }_S)\) such that \(\rho _t^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )=\rho _t^{(1,2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )=0\) \(\forall t=1,2\). It can then be easily be seen from Eq. (81) in Appendix 2 that the poverty domain is necessarily defined as the set of income profiles such that \(\mu <z^*\). Moreover, the corresponding dominance relationship compares the cumulative distribution of mean income up to a maximum value \(z^+\) for the two populations.
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche of the French government through the program “Investissements d’avenir” ANR-10-LABX-14-01. This research was partly funded by Canada’s SSHRC and by Québec’s FRQSC. It was also carried out with support from the Poverty and Economic Policy (PEP) Research Network, which is financed by the Government of Canada through the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).
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Appendices
Appendix 1: proof of propositions from Sect. 2
Let \(z_1(x_2)\) and \(z_2(x_1)\) be respectively the value of the first and second-period income, such that \(\lambda \bigr (x_1,z_2(x_1)\bigr )=0\) and \(\lambda \bigr (z_1(x_2),x_2\bigr )=0\). Thus, \(z_1\bigr (z_2(x_1)\bigr )=x_1\), and \(z_1\) is then the inverse of \(z_2\). Let \(z^*\) be the value of income such that \(\lambda (z^*,z^*)=0\). We then can define a two-period poverty index as a sum of low \(x_1\) (with respect to \(x_2\)) and of low \(x_2\) (with respect to \(x_1\)) time poverty:
We first proceed with the first part of the right-hand term of (46). Integrating that expression by parts with respect to \(x_1\), we find:
Rearranging the first element of (47), we find
since \(\pi \bigr (z_1(x_2),x_2\bigr )=0\).
To integrate the second part of the right-hand term of (47) by parts with respect to \(x_2\), let \(K(x_2)=\int _{x_2}^{z_1(x_2)} \pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_2)\) \(F(x_1,x_2)\; dx_1\). We then get:
Integrating that expression along \(x_2\) and over \([0,z^*]\) and rearranging, we have:
since \(z_1(z^*) = z^*\) (hence \(K(z^*)=0\)) and \(F(x_1,0)=0\) \(\forall x_1\) (hence \(K(0)=0\)). Using (49) and (53), we obtain:
Proceeding similarly with the second part of the right-hand term of (46) and adding the above, we obtain:
It can be observed that \(F(x_2=x_1|x_1)f(x_1) = \frac{\partial F(x_1,x_1)}{\partial x_1} - F(x_1|x_2=x_1)f(x_2=x_1)\), so that:
Using that result and changing the integration variable in \(\int _0^{z^*}\pi ^{(2)}(x_2,x_2)\) \(F(x_2,x_2)\; dx_2\), we then have:
1.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Symmetry implies the following properties:
At the poverty frontier, we also have \(\lambda ({x_1},{x_2})=0\) and \(\pi ^{(x_2)}\bigr (z_1(x_2),x_2\bigr ) = 0\). Since:
we obtain:
Symmetry also leads to \(z_1(x_2)=z_2(x_2)\) and \(z_1'(x_2) = z_2'(x_2)\). Using (60), we find that:
From the expression of \(P(\lambda )\) in (59), the symmetry assumptions therefore lead to:
The necessary and sufficient conditions for Proposition 2 follow upon inspection.
1.2 Proof of Proposition 3
With asymmetry, we assume that \(z_2(x_1) \ge z_1(x_1)\) for all \(x_1\in [0,z^*]\). Equation (46) can then be rewritten as:
Equation (59) then becomes:
We obtain:
with, by assumption, \(\pi ^{(1)}\big (x_1,z_2(x_1)\big )-\pi ^{(2)}\big (z_2(x_1),x_1\big )\le 0\) and \(\pi ^{(1,2)}({x_1},{x_2})-\pi ^{(1,2)}({x_2},{x_1})\ge 0\). The second and fourth terms of the right-hand side of (69) account for the first condition of Proposition 3, while the first and third terms account for its second condition.
Appendix 2: proof of propositions from Sect. 3
Let the lowest value of mean income on the mean/variability poverty frontier be obtained for \(\tau _\eta =0\) at \(\mu =z^*\), so that \(\tilde{\lambda }(z^*,0) = \lambda (z^*,z^*)=0\). At this point, it is also necessary to differentiate between the cases of \(x_1<x_2\) and \(x_1>x_2\). Let \(\tau _\eta ^{z1}(\mu )\,(\tau _\eta ^{z2}(\mu ))\) be the value of \(\tau _\eta \) such that \(\tilde{\lambda }\big (\mu ,\tau _\eta ^z(\mu )\big )=0\) when \(x_1<x_2\) (\(x_1>x_2\)). Since individuals are supposed to be poor \(\forall \tau ^\eta \) if \(\mu \le z^*,\, \tau _\eta ^{z1}(\mu )\) and \(\tau _\eta ^{z2}(\mu )\) are defined on the intervals \([z^*,+\infty )\). Due to the monotonicity assumptions, \(\frac{\partial \tau _\eta ^{z1}}{\partial \mu }\le 0\) and \(\frac{\partial \tau _\eta ^{z2}}{\partial \mu }\le 0\).
Let \(q:=\text {prob}(x_1<x_2)\) and \(\rho _1\,(\rho _2)\) be the individual poverty measure to be applied when \(x_1<x_2\,(x_1>x_2)\). Let \(f_1\,(f_2)\) denote the joint density function of \(\mu \) and \(\tau _\eta \), conditional on \(x_1<x_2\,(x_1>x_2)\). The same notation applies for the cdf, conditional cdf and marginal cdf and marginal density functions. With the above, lifetime poverty defined in (19) can alternatively be defined as:
For convenience, \(\tilde{\lambda }\) is dropped from the expression of \(\rho \). We first consider the first and third elements of the right-hand term of (70) and, integrating by parts, find \(\forall j=1,2\):
As \(F_j(\tau _\eta =-\mu ^{1-\eta }|\mu )=0\) and \(F_j(\tau _\eta =0|\mu )=1\), the first element on the right-hand side of (71) can be expressed as:
since \(F_j(\mu =0) = 0\) and the function \(\rho _j\) is zero at the poverty frontier (\(\rho _j(z^*,0)=0\)).
We now can turn to the second element of the right-hand term of (71). Define \(Q_j(\mu ) = \int _{-\mu ^{1-\eta }}^0 \rho _j^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )F_j(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\; d\tau _\eta \). We have:
since \(F_j(\mu ,-\mu ^{1-\eta })=0\). Integrating that expression along \(\mu \) and over \([0,z^*]\) and rearranging, we have:
We then consider the second and fourth elements on the right-hand side of (70) and, using once again integration by parts, find:
as \(\rho _j\big (\mu ,\tau _\eta ^{zj}(\mu )\big )=0\) and \(F_j(\tau _\eta =-\mu ^{1-\eta }|\mu )=0\).
Let \(R_j(\mu ) = \int _{-\mu ^{1-\eta }}^{\tau _\eta ^{zj}(\mu )} \rho _j^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )F_j(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\; d\tau _\eta \). We have:
Integrating that expression along \(\mu \) and over \([z^*,+\infty ]\) and rearranging, we have:
Using (72), (74), (77), and \(\rho _1(\mu ,0)=\rho _2(\mu ,0)\, \forall \mu \) , we finally obtain the following expression for \(P(\lambda )\):
Proposition 4 then follows directly from (78) by inspection.
1.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Letting \(\rho _1(\mu ,\tau _\eta ) = \rho _2(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\) \(\forall (\mu ,\tau _\eta )\in \varGamma _S(\tilde{\lambda })\), it follows that \(\forall (\mu ,\tau _\eta )\in \varGamma _S(\tilde{\lambda })\):
Moreover, \(\tau _\eta ^{z1}(\mu )=\tau _\eta ^{z2}(\mu )\), so that \({\tau _\eta ^{z1}}'(\mu )={\tau _\eta ^{z2}}'(\mu )\). Equation (78) can then be rewritten as:
The rest of the proof follows by inspection.
1.2 Proof of Proposition 7
With asymmetry, it is assumed that \(\tau _\eta ^{z1}(\mu ) \ge \tau _\eta ^{z2}(\mu )\) for all \(\mu \in [z^*,+\infty )\). As a consequence, Eq. (46) can be rewritten as:
Noting that \(\rho _1^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )-\rho _2^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta ) \le 0\) and \(\rho _1^{(1,2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )-\rho _2^{(1,2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\ge 0\), we obtain:
The rest of the proof follows by inspection.
Appendix 3: intersection of the different classes of poverty measures
1.1 The derivations of additional restrictions on the individual poverty measure \(\pi \) and \(\rho \)
We first consider the conditions that \(\rho \) must obey so that members of \(\ddot{\varPi }(\lambda ^+)\) are also members of \(\tilde{\varPi }(\tilde{\lambda }^+)\). First, we have \(\pi ^{(x_i)}(x_1,x_2)\le 0\),\(\forall i=1,2\), so that we should also observe \(\rho _t^{(x_i)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\le 0\) \(\forall t\). When \(x_i\) is not the lowest income, an income increment increases variability (\(|\tau _\eta |\) rises) while increasing mean income, so that the net effect of this is a priori not known. Assuming \(x_1\) to be the lowest income, if that net effect is supposed to correspond to a decrease in the level of poverty, we should have:
In the same manner, it would also be necessary to observe \(\rho ^{(x_1,x_2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\ge 0\). Still supposing \(x_1\) to be the lower income, we have:
Considering the case of absolute variability aversion (\(\eta =0\)), \(\rho _t\) must exhibit the following two properties:
With relative variability aversion (\(\eta =1\)), the conditions become:
It can also be shown that \(x_1=\mu +\tau _\eta \mu ^\eta \) and \(x_2=\mu -\tau _\eta \mu ^\eta \) if \(x_1<x_2\). It is then possible to compute \(\pi ^{(\mu )},\, \pi ^{(\tau _\eta )}\) and \(\pi ^{(\mu ,\tau _\eta )}\) to see what conditions have to be met so that \(\pi \) respects the conditions imposed on \(\rho \). First, considering the derivatives of \(\pi \) with respect to mean income, we should observe:
That condition is always fulfilled since \(1+\eta \tau _\eta \mu ^{\eta -1}\) and \(1-\eta \tau _\eta \mu ^{\eta -1}\) are positive for \(\eta \in [0,1]\), and \(\pi ^{(1)}(x_1,x_2)\) and \(\pi ^{(2)}(x_1,x_2)\) are also non-negative. The result is intuitive. Increasing the mean without altering variability implies increasing income at both periods, so that poverty should logically fall.
Considering now a decrease in variability without a change in mean income, things are less clear since such a change raises the lower income but decreases the higher one. It is then necessary to consider the net sum of those opposite effects. Since \(\rho _t^{(2)}(\mu ,\tau _\eta )\le 0\), we should obtain:
Finally, \(\pi \) has to be defined so as to respect \(\pi ^{(\mu ,\tau _\eta )}(x_1,x_2)\ge 0\). We have:
With absolute variability aversion (\(\eta =0\)), \(\pi \) should be such that:
With relative variability aversion (\(\eta =1\)), we obtain, for \(x_1<x_2\):
1.2 Proof of Proposition 8 and Corollary 1
We have shown that it is possible to impose restrictions on the derivatives of both \(\pi (x_1,x_2)\) and \(\rho (\mu ,\tau _\eta )\) to obtain measures that are included in both \(\tilde{\varPi }(\tilde{\lambda }^+)\) and \(\ddot{\varPi }(\lambda ^+)\). Since the class of poverty measures \(\breve{\varPi }_\eta (\tilde{\lambda }^+)\) is not empty, any measure \(P(\tilde{\lambda })\in \breve{\varPi }_\eta (\tilde{\lambda }^+)\) can equally be expressed using equation (8) or equation (19). Consequently, both (59) and (78) are valid expressions for \(P(\tilde{\lambda })\). For Proposition 8 not to hold, it would be necessary to show that one can find two distributions \(A\) and \(B\) such that \(A\; \ddot{\succcurlyeq }_{\tilde{\lambda }^+} \;B\) and \(B\tilde{\succcurlyeq }_{\eta ,\tilde{\lambda }^+}\; A\). However, with the restrictions imposed on the classes \(\ddot{\varPi }(\lambda ^+)\) and \(\tilde{\varPi }(\tilde{\lambda }^+)\), such a situation would imply that for any poverty measure in \(\breve{\varPi }_\eta (\tilde{\lambda }^+)\), the difference \(P_A(\tilde{\lambda }) - P_B(\tilde{\lambda })\) should simultaneously be non-negative and non-positive. This will happen if and only if \(P^{1,1}_A(x_1,x_2) = P^{1,1}_B(x_1,x_2),\, \forall (x_1,x_2)\in \varGamma (\tilde{\lambda })\). This proves Proposition 8.
The demonstration of Corollary 1 is straightforward. As long as the class of poverty measures \(\breve{\varPi }_\eta (\tilde{\lambda }^+)\) is not empty, observing dominance with respect to either \(\ddot{\varPi }(\lambda ^+)\) or \(\tilde{\varPi }(\tilde{\lambda }^+)\) precludes observing an opposite strong dominance relationship with the other class of poverty measures, as both classes include \(\breve{\varPi }_\eta (\tilde{\lambda }^+)\).
Appendix 4: additional tables
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Bresson, F., Duclos, JY. Intertemporal poverty comparisons. Soc Choice Welf 44, 567–616 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0855-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0855-2