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Auctions with resale at a later date

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular, the auction’s winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Policy and Management Studies, TERI School of Advanced Studies, New Delhi, 110070, India

    Sanyyam Khurana

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  1. Sanyyam Khurana
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Correspondence to Sanyyam Khurana.

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I wish to thank Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, Anirban Kar, Rohit Lamba, Debasis Mishra, Stephen Morris, Ariel Rubinstein, Soumendu Sarkar, Sudhir Shah, and Uday Bhanu Sinha for their feedback. I would also like to thank the conference participants at Winter School of the Econometric Society (Delhi School of Economics), Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development (Indian Statistical Institute Delhi), Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay), Society for Economics Research in India Doctoral Conference, and Annual Economics Conference (Ahmedabad University). A special thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This project was completed when I was a PhD Candidate at Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India.

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Khurana, S. Auctions with resale at a later date. Econ Theory (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6

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