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General economic equilibrium with financial markets and retainability

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Abstract

A theory of economic equilibrium for incomplete financial markets in general real assets is developed in a new formulation with currency-denominated prices. The “goods” are not only commodities, and they can influence utility through retention as an alternative to consumption. Perfect foresight is relinquished in a rolling horizon approach to markets which lets agents pursue long-term interests without being sure of future prices. The framework is that of an economy operating in a fiat currency that agents find attractive to retain, in balance with other needs. The attractiveness comes from Keynesian considerations about uncertainty which until now have not been brought in. The existence of equilibrium is established directly—not just generically—and moreover under weaker assumptions on endowments than before, except that utility functions are taken to be concave. Agents do not need to start out with, or end up with, positive amounts of everything. With a single currency denominating the units of account in all states, price indeterminacy is avoided and all contracts issued in the financial markets can be interpreted as “real contracts.” Derivative instruments and collateralized contracts based on money prices are thereby encompassed for the first time. Transaction costs on sales of contracts, generated endogenously, lead to bid–ask spreads and in particular to a gap between interest rates for lending and borrowing money.

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Notes

  1. Keynes wrote that the “desire to hold money as a store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations and conventions concerning the future...” Keynes (1978b), and that money is “above all a subtle device for linking present and future” Keynes (1978a). More can be read about his views and their present-day relevance in recent publications of Skidelsky (2008, 2009).

  2. The original version of this paper, with the same model, results, and equilibrium proof as here, was circulated and made website-available in May 2010 under the title “General economic equilibrium with incomplete markets and money”; the results in a streamlined case were published in Jofre et al. (2011). The paper’s title was subsequently changed to “General economic equilibrium with financial markets and money” and finally, in 2013, to the present title. The content in these versions has remained the same except for evolving attempts at better explaining the ideas and their consequences.

  3. For a review of the economic importance of fiat money, see (Krugman and Wells 2009, Chapter 14).

  4. More about “investment goods” will come later. Observe that this is not akin to production, because the utility effects permitted for retention would not be appropriate for inputs to production.

  5. Agents are then no longer required to enter each state with a positive quantity of every good, as typically has been assumed to facilitate proving the existence of equilibrium.

  6. For existence of solutions, this amounts to a advantageously structured setup for locating a fixed point.

  7. We aim at applying that theory in later work to investigate the degree to which an equilibrium, as formulated here, may be “locally unique” and nicely behaved with respect to shifts in parameters such as the agents’ endowments. For one-stage nonfinancial models, that program has already been initiated with surprising results in our paper (Jofre et al. 2013), drawing on recent work of Dontchev and Rockafellar (2012).

  8. Our existence development centers, in effect, on this full combination of equilibrium elements as the targeted “fixed point.” Condensing it to a customary type of fixed point argument in “price space” alone would be extremely unwieldy and result in lost information.

  9. The endowments in state \(s=0\) serve also as a repository for resources transmitted from the past.

  10. Nonnegativity in goods can be relaxed by an obvious trick, which could be important eventually. The goods quantities here could be reinterpreted as distances above negative but naturally generated lower bounds for the “true” goods in the economy, with negativity standing for “debts” carried over from past obligations.

  11. The amounts of this money good component in the endowment vectors \(e_i(s)\) might be provided or manipulated by a government, but that will not be pursued here.

  12. Assuming concavity in place of quasi-concavity is highly beneficial to our later analysis. Although this is more restrictive than usual, our utilities are in other ways much less restrictive than usual.

  13. Utility might tend to \(-\infty \) at a point in the boundary of \(U_i\) is approached, or even if it stays bounded it could jump to \(-\infty \) as the boundary is crossed.

  14. An equilibrium model that does not account for this must, in our opinion, be seen as seriously falling short. Such lack of interest can extend to either consumption or retention or both, depending on the “good.”

  15. It should be noted, in connection with our assumption of concavity of \(u_i\) instead of the more common quasi-concavity, that this is followed also by researchers working nowadays with “ambiguity,” since expectations of quasi-concave functions can hardly ever themselves be just quasi-concave.

  16. This transformation might seem like elementary “home production” in which inputs within \(w_i(0)\) lead to output bundles \(A_i(s)w_i(0)\), but an important distinction needs to be underscored. Retaining \(w_i(0)\) may boost \(u_i\), but in production the benefits have always been connected with outputs. Agents have never been portrayed as getting utility directly from the quantities of goods they may devote to inputs, and therefore our retention vectors \(w_i(0)\) cannot rightly be interpreted as production inputs.

  17. In comparison, the nominal asset models of Cass (1984) and Werner (1985) make payments directly in “units of account,” which may seem akin to money but are unbounded in availability. Such units are valid only in a single state and, unless anchored to a currency as here, are replaced to different, unrelated units in the other states.

  18. Investment goods, as envisioned, may live on after transition. An agent can desire to retain them at time 1 even though the model has no time 2, because of anticipations of the future built into utility.

  19. The agents in Geanakoplos et al. (1990) have perfect foresight into the production decisions of the firms (however carried out). From a modeling perspective, there is no difference between that and simply assuming the outputs in each future state are known in advance. The exclusion of short-selling in Geanakoplos et al. (1990) further reinforces this interpretation of their equities as investment goods in our sense instead of two-party contracts.

  20. Tying deliveries to future “units of account” in the established framework of GEI cannot have the same effect because of inherent ambiguities in scaling.

  21. For the sake of the algebra in our formulas, we consistently regard p(s) and q as row vectors, in contrast to \(w_i(s), c_i(s), z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +}\) and \(z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\), which we regard as column vectors.

  22. Note that this cost is essentially budgetary and does not, in itself, force actual money to change hands out of the limited supply of good 0 at time 0.

  23. In nominal asset models like those in which Cass (1984) and Werner (1985) demonstrated the existence of equilibrium, with the units of account in state s considered to be denominated by the money in state s, there are no such bounds. In effect, each state has its own special money, and the supply of that money is infinite.

  24. This could be broadened in many ways, for instance in replacing m(s) by a (generalized) goods vector h(s), the market value of which is to be compared with that of g. On the other hand, g could become g(s).

  25. Sales of contracts are bounded in Seghir and Torres-Martinez (2011) by the amounts of collateral an agent acquires. The rules for that enter exogenously, like our sets \(K_i\).

  26. That does not exclude the well observed phenomenon that promised delivery amounts of a commodity like copper may far exceed the available supply. Some of the promises, in aggregate, can cancel out others.

  27. Florig’s results are so extremely subtle and complex in their statements that it is very hard to see how to apply them effectively to specific situations.

  28. We have held back here from trying, within our framework, to include intertemporal production carried out by a “firm” because of the serious additional modeling challenges it would entail. For current ideas on meeting those challenges, see Britz et al. (2015).

  29. It would be easy to add general “home production,” i.e., production with a single agent-owner, to our model, but we have refrained from doing so in order not to obscure the main ideas in our approach.

  30. Their two-party contracts deliver only in money, and deliveries must be carried out in cash. That could raise serious questions about supplies. Anyway, their equilibrium proof depends on very strong assumptions like every good being attractive to every agent for consumption, together with a complicated and indirect “gains to trade hypothesis.”

  31. Furthermore the financial market has the peculiarity that profits made from selling holdings in other goods cannot be used to buy contracts.

  32. The so-called money illusion provides strong evidence. People commonly express preferences that involve money without facing up to the effects of inflation or deflation. This may better be interpreted as indicating that money enters preferences in other ways than just what it can be anticipated to be able to buy.

  33. Although in microeconomics an agent’s utility has generally not been applied to money holdings, this has been commonplace in macroeconomics, starting with Sidrauski (1967).

  34. Inevitably, any model in this subject is highly distilled from the world in its discretization of time and uncertainty and must be assessed mainly for its usefulness in furnishing basic insights (as with mathematical models everywhere).

  35. This may be combined with holding on to a currency’s notes and coins, which do, of course, pass from present to future unchanged in the possession of various agents.

  36. Hicks also saw “frictions” of dealing with a savings account as a disincentive relative to just retaining money. Here we will only impose transaction costs on borrowers, since that suffices with minimum complications, but inflicting them also on lenders/depositors would be easy.

  37. It must be stressed that the advances in our results would persist even if our future prices were interpreted as perfect forecasts. What would slip, however, would be the capability of building on Keynes’ ideas about money to ensure it has value, which has never before been attempted in a GEI model.

  38. In macroeconomic theory, a long-range future is fundamental, and even the notion of perfect foresight relative to rational expectations Muth (1961) is different.

  39. “The possession of actual money lulls our disquietude; and the premium we require to make us part with money is a measure of the degree of our disquietude” (Keynes 1978b). Note that this quote also supports the distinction between money held and money lent as an investment, which is fundamental to our treatment.

  40. Optimality in the case of merely quasi-concave utility can’t be characterized by a saddle point.

  41. This assumption, for convenience, really loses no generality because ample survivability requires a positive endowment of money initially, and a tiny amount of could freely be saved.

  42. This sense of monotonicity, with a long history and literature in the mathematics of optimization and partial differential equations, takes the opposite sign from the one often associated with this term in economics.

  43. The derivation is simple because, in terms of the “resolvent” \(P_f = (I+\partial f)^{-1}\), the condition \(-F(x)\in \partial f(x)\) is equivalent to having \(M(x)=x\) for \(M(x)=P_f(-F(x))\). The resolvent \(P_f\) maps the whole space single-valued into \(\,\mathop {\hbox {dom}}\nolimits f\) and is Lipschitz continuous with constant 1. If F is continuous, M therefore maps the closure of the convex set \(\,\mathop {\hbox {dom}}\nolimits f\) continuously into itself and has to have a fixed-point when \(\,\mathop {\hbox {dom}}\nolimits f\) is bounded.

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Correspondence to R. T. Rockafellar.

Appendix: truncations and the existence proof

Appendix: truncations and the existence proof

Let \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) denote the variational inequality of Theorem 6 for which we are seeking a solution. Step by step, we will replace \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) by other variational inequalities with smaller domains until we arrive at one with bounded domain, which therefore has a solution. We will execute this in such a manner that the solution we get must also be a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\).

To get started down this track, we consider what happens when a complementary slackness condition (11), corresponding to \( N_{\scriptscriptstyle +}=N_{\,[0,\infty )}\), is replaced by \( N_{\scriptscriptstyle +}^\eta =N_{\,[0,\eta ]}\) for some \(\eta \in (0,\infty )\):

$$\begin{aligned}&\beta \in N_{\scriptscriptstyle +}^\eta (\alpha ) \iff \; \beta \le 0\quad \text {for}\, \alpha =0,\quad \beta = 0\quad \text {for}\,0< \alpha <\eta , \nonumber \\&\beta \ge 0\quad \text {for}\,\alpha =\eta . \end{aligned}$$
(33)

It’s important to observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \beta \in N_{\scriptscriptstyle +}^\eta (\alpha ) \implies \alpha \beta =\eta \max \{0,\beta \}. \end{aligned}$$
(34)

For any \(\eta \in (0,\infty )\), let \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) denote the variational inequality obtained from \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) through replacement of (D) and (E) by

figure a

which entail by (34) that

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle p_l(s)\sum \limits _i d_{il}(s,p(s)) \;= & {} \;\eta \max \Big \{0,\sum \limits _i d_{il}(s,p(s))\Big \}, \nonumber \\ \displaystyle q_k\Big [\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\Big ] \;= & {} \;\eta \max \Big \{0, \sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\Big \}. \end{aligned}$$
(35)

Obviously, since this modification has no effect on (A), (B) and (C) of Theorem 6, which are equivalent to the saddle point expression of optimality in Theorem 2. When we pass from \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\), we are thus dealing with a modified formulation of economic equilibrium in which the agents are confronted with the same utility maximization problems \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i(p,q)\), but the market-clearing requirements have undergone a sort of “\(\eta \)-relaxation.”

In what follows, however, we also wish to contemplate truncations with respect to goods and portfolios in the agents’ problems. Assistance will come from the notation that

$$\begin{aligned} G_\mu = \big \{\text {the vectors in}\,{IR}^{\,1+L} \text { having all components } \le \mu \big \} \end{aligned}$$
(36)

We fix \({\bar{\eta }}\in (0,\infty )\) and deal with elements \({\hat{w}}_i\) and \({\hat{c}}_i\) such as appear in the assumption of ample survivability. As observed ahead of Theorem 1, there is no loss of generality in supposing for these elements that actually

$$\begin{aligned} {\hat{d}}_{i0}(s) <0 \quad \text {for}\,s=1,\ldots ,S,\quad \text {as well as for}\,s=0. \end{aligned}$$
(37)

Choose \({\bar{\mu }}\) high enough that

$$\begin{aligned} {\hat{w}}_i(s) \in G_{{\bar{\mu }}}\quad \text {and}\quad {\hat{c}}_i(s) \in G_{{\bar{\mu }}}\quad \text {for all}\,s. \end{aligned}$$
(38)

For \(\mu \in [{\bar{\mu }},\infty )\), we define potential substitutes \(u_i^\mu \) for the utility functions \(u_i\) by

$$\begin{aligned} u_i^\mu (w_i,c_i) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u_i(w_i,c_i) \text { if } w_i(s) \in G_\mu \text { and } c_i(s) \in G_\mu \text { for all } s \\ \quad \text { along with } u_i(w_i,c_i)\ge u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1, \\ -\infty \quad \text {otherwise}. \end{array}\right. \end{aligned}$$
(39)

Then \(u_i^\mu \), like \(u_i\), is concave and upper semicontinuous, and its associated domain \(U_i^\mu \) (i.e., the set where \(u_i^\mu \) is finite) is nonempty, convex and bounded. The subgradient condition

figure b

can potentially serve therefore as a substitute for (A) which fits with our modular variational inequality scheme.

We denote by \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) the variation inequality obtained from \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) by substituting \((\hbox {A}_\mu )\) for (A) and at the same time replacing (B) by

figure c

Step 1 For the problems \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\mu (p,q)\) obtained by substituting \(u_i^\mu \) for \(u_i\), conditions \((\hbox {A}_\mu ), (\hbox {B}_\mu )\) and (C) characterize optimality in terms of a saddle point of the corresponding Lagrangian \(L_i^\mu \) just as (A), (B) and (C) do in Theorem 2 for the problems \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i(p,q)\).

This is elementary but underscores the fact that \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) stands for a version of “\(\eta \)-relaxed” equilibrium in which the agents’ problems have undergone truncation.

Step 2 There exists \({\bar{\eta }} \in (0,\infty )\) such that, for all \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty )\) and \(\mu \in [{\bar{\mu }},\infty )\), the solutions to the variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) (if any) are the same as those of the variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\).

A solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) will also solve \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) if the additional bounds in the truncated problems \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\mu (p,q)\) are not active. This will certainly be true for the utility bound entering the definition of \(u_i^\mu \) in (38): namely since \(({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)\) satisfies (38) and thus, together with the (0, 0) portfolio, furnishes a feasible solution to \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\mu (p,q)\), any optimal solution \((w_i,c_i,z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -})\) to \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\nu (p,q)\) must have \(u_i(w_i,c_i)\ge u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)\), not merely \(u_i(w_i,c_i)\ge u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1\).

The issue in Step 2 can be settled, therefore, by demonstrating that the conditions \((\hbox {D}_\eta )\) and \((\hbox {E}_\eta )\) that are common to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) and \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) already produce, by themselves, bounds on goods and portfolios which make the further bounds introduced with \(\mu \) be inactive when \(\mu \) is high enough. For this we first note that, by adding over all agents i the budget equations that are guaranteed by (C), we must have

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle 0= & {} p(0)\sum \limits _i d_i(0,p(0))+q\Big [\sum \limits _i z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits _i z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\Big ]\nonumber \\ \displaystyle= & {} \sum \limits _i d_{i0}(0,p(0)) +\sum \limits _{l>0} p_l(0) \sum \limits _i d_{il}(0,p(0))\nonumber \\&+\sum \limits _k q_k \Big [\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\Big ], \nonumber \\ \displaystyle 0= & {} \sum \limits _i d_{i0}(s,p(s)) + \sum \limits _{l>0} p_l(s)\sum \limits _i d_{il}(s,p(s))\quad \text {for}\,s>0, \end{aligned}$$
(40)

where, in the notation of (7),

$$\begin{aligned} d_i(0,p(0))= & {} w_i(0)+c_i(0)) +D(0,p(0)) z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -}-e_i(0), \\ d_i(s,p(s))= & {} w_i(s) +c_i(s) -D(s,p(s))\left[ z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\right] -e_i(s) -A_i(s)w_i(0)\quad \text {for}\,s>0, \\&\text { with goods components }\; d_{il}(s,p(s)),\;\; d_{il}(0,p(0)),\quad \text {for}\,l=0,1,\ldots ,L. \end{aligned}$$

The relations in (35) coming from \((\hbox {D}_\eta )\) and \((\hbox {E}_\eta )\) translate (40) into

$$\begin{aligned} \displaystyle -\sum \limits _i d_{i0}(0,p(0)) \;= & {} \; \eta \sum \limits _{l>0} \max \Big \{0,\sum \limits _i d_{il}(0,p(0))\Big \}\nonumber \\&+ \eta \sum \limits _k q_k\max \Big \{0,\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\Big \}, \nonumber \\ \displaystyle - \sum \limits _i d_{i0}(s,p(s)) \;= & {} \; \eta \sum \limits _{l>0} \max \Big \{0,\sum \limits _i d_{il}(s,p(s))\Big \}. \end{aligned}$$
(41)

In the first equation of (41), we have \(-\sum \limits \nolimits _i d_{i0}(0,p(0)) \le \sum \limits \nolimits _i e_{i0}(0)\). Recalling our assumption in the specification of D(0, p(0)) that there exists, independently of p(0), of a lower bound \(D(0,p(0))\ge D^*(0)\ge 0\) in which the matrix \(D^*(0)\) has at least one positive entry in each column, we see that the first equation in (41), after being turned into an inequality by lowering \(\eta \) to \({\bar{\eta }}\), places upper bounds on the nonnegative vectors \(w_i(0), c_i(0)\) and \(z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\) which are independent of the particular \(\eta \ge {\bar{\eta }}\). The \(w_i(0)\) bounds then induce an upper bound on the left side of the second equation in (41), and with \(\eta \) again lowered to \({\bar{\eta }}\), that yields upper bounds independent of the particular \(\eta \ge {\bar{\eta }}\) for the vectors \(w_i(s)\) and \(c_i(s)\) as well as, through our assumptions on the matrices D(sp(s)), an estimate for the size \(\sum \limits \nolimits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle +}-\sum \limits \nolimits _i z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\). That estimate, with the bounds already obtained for the vectors \(z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\) places bounds on the vectors \(z_{ik}^{\scriptscriptstyle -}\). We now merely have to take \(\mu \) high enough that none of these bounds can be active.

Step 3 For \({\bar{\mu }}\) as in Step 2, there further exists \({\bar{\zeta }}\in (0,\infty )\) large enough that, for any \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty )\) and \(\mu \in [{\bar{\mu }},\infty )\), solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) are sure to have

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(w_i,c_i) \le {\bar{\zeta }} \;\text { and }\; \lambda _i(s) <{\bar{\zeta }}\quad \text {for}\,s=0,1,\ldots ,S. \end{aligned}$$
(42)

The first upper bound in (42) results from the bounds in Step 2 for \({\bar{\mu }}\) and the upper semicontinuity of \(u_i\). In terms of \({\bar{\zeta }}_i\) being the max of \(u_i\) over a closed set associated with those bounds, we can take \({\bar{\zeta }} > \max _i {\bar{\zeta }}_i\). For the bounds on \(\lambda _i(s)\), we appeal to the saddle point condition for optimality in \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\mu (p,q)\) mentioned in Step 1. That condition says, in part, that

$$\begin{aligned} L_i^\mu (w_i,c_i,z_i{\scriptscriptstyle +},z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -};\lambda _i) \;\ge \;L_i^\mu ({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i,0,0;\lambda _i). \end{aligned}$$

Because the budget constraints in \({{\mathcal {P}}}_i^\mu (p,q)\) must hold as equations in optimality by (C), we have

$$\begin{aligned} L_i^\mu (w_i,c_i,z_i{\scriptscriptstyle +},z_i^{\scriptscriptstyle -};\lambda _i) \;=\; u_i(w_i,c_i) \le {\bar{\zeta }}_i. \end{aligned}$$

via (38). Consequently, though the formula for \(L_i^\mu ({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i,0,0;\lambda _i)\) corresponding to the one in (15) for \(L_i\) in terms of excess demands, we have

$$\begin{aligned}&{\bar{\zeta }}_i \;\ge \;u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i) -\sum \limits _s \lambda _i(s)p(s){\hat{d}}_i(s) \;=\; u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)\nonumber \\&\qquad -\sum \limits _s \lambda _i(s)\Big [{\hat{d}}_{i0}(s) +\sum \limits _{l>0}p_l(s){\hat{d}}_{il}(s)\Big ]. \end{aligned}$$
(43)

Condition (a) of ample survivability allows the sums over \(l>0\) to be dropped without upsetting the inequality, and as enhanced in (37), provides us then with the upper bounds \(\lambda _i(s) \le {\bar{\zeta }}_i/|{\hat{d}}_{i0}(s)|\). Taking \({\bar{\zeta }}\) greater than these bounds produces the desired result.

The bounds achieved in Step 3 furnish the platform for truncating the one condition in \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) that has not been modified until now, namely (C), to

figure d

Let \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) be the variational inequality obtained from \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu )\) with \((\hbox {C}_\zeta \)) replacing (C).

Step 4 For \({\bar{\mu }}\) and \({\bar{\zeta }}\) as in Steps 2 and 3 and the variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) with respect to any choice of \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty ), \mu \in [{\bar{\mu }},\infty )\) and \(\zeta \in [{\bar{\zeta }},\infty )\),

  1. (a)

    solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) are the same as the solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\),

  2. (b)

    a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) exists.

Here (a) summarizes what we already know from Step 3, whereas (b) holds by the existence criterion above, inasmuch as truncations have made the domain in \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) be bounded. Only one thing still remains: demonstrating that by taking \(\eta \) large enough we can ensure that the price bounds from \((\hbox {D}_\eta )\) and \((\hbox {E}_\eta )\) will be inactive, so that the solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) must actually be solutions to original variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\). A lower bound on the multipliers, complementary to the upper bound in Step 3, will help us toward this goal.

Step 5 There exists \(\varepsilon >0\) such that, as long as \(\mu \in [{\bar{\mu }}+1,\infty )\) and \(\zeta \in [{\bar{\zeta }},\infty )\) as well as \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty )\), solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) will have

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda _i(s) \ge \varepsilon \quad \text {for}\,s=0,1,\ldots ,S. \end{aligned}$$
(44)

To see this, fix an s, initially \({>}0\) because that case is easier, and let \(w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +}\) denote for any \(w_i\) the modification in which the component \(w_{i0}(s)\) is replaced by \(w_{i0}(s)+1\) but all other components are kept the same. Our focus is on condition \((\hbox {A}_\mu )\), which implies for the elements \((w_i,c_i)\) in solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) that

$$\begin{aligned} u_i^\mu (w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i) \le u_i^\mu (w_i,c_i) +\lambda _i(s). \end{aligned}$$
(45)

We know from Step 2 that in such a solution the vector components of \(w_i\) and \(c_i\) in the various states must lie in \(G_{{\bar{\mu }}}\), in the notation (36), and the corresponding vector components of \(w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +}\) will then lie in \(G_\mu \), inasmuch as \(\mu \ge {\bar{\mu }}+1\). In that case we have from the definition of \(u_i^\mu \) in (39) that \(u_i^\mu (w_i,c_i) = u_i(w_i,c_i)\) and \(u_i^\mu (w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i) = u_i(w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i)\), along with \(u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1 \le u_i(w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i)\), so that (45) yields

$$\begin{aligned} u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1 \le u_i(w_i^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i) \le u_i(w_i,c_i) +\lambda _i(s). \end{aligned}$$
(46)

We claim that for \(w_i\) and \(c_i\) having vector components in \(G_{{\bar{\mu }}}\), whether or not they are part of a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_2(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\), there is a positive lower bound to the values of \(\lambda _i(s)\) occurring in (46).

Indeed, if a lower bound were not available, there would be a sequence of elements \((w_i^n,c_i^n)\) with vector components in \(G_{{\bar{\mu }}}\) such that

$$\begin{aligned} u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1 \;\le \;u_i(\,[w_i^n]^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i^n)\le & {} u_i(w_i^n,c_i^n) +\lambda _i^n(s) \;\text { for } n\nonumber \\= & {} 1,2,\ldots , \text { with } \lambda _i^n(s)\rightarrow 0. \end{aligned}$$
(47)

The boundedness of the goods vectors allows us to suppose, without loss of generality that \((w_i^n,c_i^n)\) converges as \(n\rightarrow \infty \) to some \((w_i^\infty ,c_i^\infty )\), in which case \(([w_i^n]^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i^n)\) converges to \((\,[w_i^\infty ]^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i^\infty )\). Under our assumptions, \(u_i\) is continuous relative to the set \(\big \{(w_i,c_i)\,\big |\,u_i(w_i,c_i)\ge u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)-1\big \}\), which is closed, so we get in (47) as \(n\rightarrow \infty \) that \(u_i(\,[w_i^\infty ]^{\scriptscriptstyle +},c_i^\infty ) \le u_i(w_i^\infty ,c_i^\infty )\). This contradicts the insatiability of \(u_i\) with respect to good 0.

The argument for the case of \(s=0\) is essentially the same, but with \(\lambda _i(0)\) initially replaced by \(\lambda _i(0)-\theta _i\), where \(\theta _i\) is the component for good 0 in the vector \(\sum \limits \nolimits _{s>0}\lambda _i(s)p(s)A_i(s)\) appearing in (A), or for that matter, \((\hbox {A}_\mu )\). Since \(\theta _i\ge 0\), it can be removed and we can proceed with \(\lambda _i(0)\) by itself just as in the argument already given.

Step 6 There is a bound \(\psi \) such that, in any solution to the variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) with \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty ), \mu \in [{\bar{\mu }}+1,\infty )\) and \(\zeta \in [{\bar{\zeta }},\infty )\), the prices satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} p_l(s)< \psi \text { for all } l>0 \text { and states } s=0,1,\ldots ,S, \text { and } q_k <\psi \text { for all } k. \end{aligned}$$

In order to confirm this, we return to the inequalities in (43), where we have through (a) of ample survivability that \({\hat{d}}_{i0}(s)<0\) and \({\hat{d}}_{il}(s)\le 0\) for \(l>0\) and therefore

$$\begin{aligned} {\bar{\zeta }}_i \;\ge \;u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i) -\varepsilon \sum \limits _s \Big [{\hat{d}}_{i0}(s) +\sum \limits _{l>0}p_l(s){\hat{d}}_{il}(s)\Big ] \end{aligned}$$

when \(\lambda _i(s)\) is replaced by the lower bound in Step 5. This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum \limits _{l>0}p_l(s)[-{\hat{d}}_{il}(s)] \;\le \;[{\bar{\zeta }}_i -u_i({\hat{w}}_i,{\hat{c}}_i)]/\varepsilon \text { for } s=0,1,\ldots ,S. \end{aligned}$$

Adding now over i and invoking from part (b) in the assumption of ample survivability the property that \(\sum \limits \nolimits _i[-{\hat{d}}_{il}(s)] >0\), we obtain upper bounds on the prices \(p_l(s)\).

Condition \((\hbox {B}_\mu )\) in \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) now has a role for the prices \(q_k\). We already know that it reduces to (B) of \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\) as a property of solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\), because the \(\mu \) upper bounds on the portfolio variables are inactive in a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) for the choices stipulated for \(\mu \). Condition (B) entails

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda _i(0)[q_k -p(0)D_k(0,p(0))] -\sum \limits _{s>0}\lambda _i(s)p(s)D_k(s,p(s)) \le 0\quad \text {when}\,k\notin K_i. \end{aligned}$$

There is at least one i with \(k\notin K_i\) by (6), and for that i then we have

$$\begin{aligned} q_k \le \frac{1}{\lambda _i(0)}\Big [p(0)D_k(0,p(0)) +\sum \limits _{s>0}\lambda _i(s)p(s)D_k(s,p(s))\Big ] \end{aligned}$$

Utilizing the lower bound \(\varepsilon \) on \(\lambda _i(0)\) in Step 5 together with the upper bound in Step 3 on \(\lambda _i(s)\) for \(s>0\) and the upper bound on the p prices that we have just produced, and recalling the continuous dependence of the \(D_k\) vectors on those prices, we arrive at an upper bound on \(q_k\).

Concluding argument. We already knew from Step 4 that, by taking \(\mu \) and \(\zeta \) large enough, we could get the solutions to the fully truncated variational inequality \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) to come out the same as the solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\) for all \(\eta \in [{\bar{\eta }},\infty )\). Now, though, we know further that by taking \(\eta \) larger than the bound \(\psi \) in Step 6, we can make the truncations in \((\hbox {D}_\eta )\) and \((\hbox {E}_\eta )\) be inactive in solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) and hence also in \({{\mathcal {V}}}_1(\eta )\). In this case, the solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) can be identified with the solutions to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\). Since the existence of a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_3(\eta ,\mu ,\zeta )\) has been established, this verifies the existence of a solution to \({{\mathcal {V}}}_0\), which we set out to prove.

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Jofré, A., Rockafellar, R.T. & Wets, R.JB. General economic equilibrium with financial markets and retainability. Econ Theory 63, 309–345 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1031-y

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