Abstract
This study assesses government mechanisms in the fight against terrorism with particular emphasis on the bundling and unbundling of ten governance dynamics. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 53 African countries for period 1998–2012 and generalized method of moments. The following findings are established. First, for the most part, political governance and its constituents, respectively, have negative effects on all terrorism dynamics, with the following consistent increasing order of negative magnitude: unclear terrorism, transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism and total terrorism. Second, overwhelmingly for economic and institutional governances, the governance dynamics and their constituent components affect terrorism negatively, with the magnitude on domestic terrorism consistently higher than that on transnational terrorism. Third, for most specifications, the effect of general governance is consistently negative on terrorism variables. Theoretical and practical policy implications are discussed.
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Notes
Governance and institutions are used interchangeably throughout the study. The latter concept is quite distinct from “institutional governance” which is represented by corruption control and the rule of law (see Asongu 2016a).
In the sentence, “applied econometrics” does not refer to a specific journal, but rather to the use of econometrics to accept or reject existing theoretical underpinnings and empirical trends.
Emphasis on original.
The fixed effects results are not reported because of lack of space.
While the discussion of findings is tailored to incorporate both initial/baseline results and robustness check estimations, emphasis on “initial regressions” here is because the comparative perspective is not apparent with robustness check results. This is essentially because for the most part, the effects on domestic terrorism are not significant in robustness check results.
References
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Acknowledgements
The authors are indebted to the editor and reviewers for constructive comments. The research on which this work is based was made possible in 2015 by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Comparative Research Network Grant funded by SAREC and NORAD. We thank Chris A. Shisanya, Phil R. Oyono and other participants of the Comparative Research Network Workshop of May 2015 in Dakar, for constructive comments. We are also highly indebted to Mamay Jah, Ato K. Onoma and Kouassivi A. Sofonnou for constructive comments, logistics and networking coordination.
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Appendices
Appendices
1.1 Appendix 1: Definitions of variables
Variables | Signs | Definitions of variables (measurement) | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
Political stability | PS | “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” | World Bank (WDI) |
Voice and accountability | VA | “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media” | World Bank (WDI) |
Political governance | Polgov | First principal component of political stability and voice and accountability. The process by which those in authority are selected and replaced | PCA |
Government effectiveness | GE | “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public services, the quality and degree of independence from political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to such policies” | World Bank (WDI) |
Regulation quality | RQ | “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” | World Bank (WDI) |
Economic governance | Ecogov | “First principal component of government effectiveness and regulation quality. The capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services” | PCA |
Rule of law | RL | “Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” | World Bank (WDI) |
Corruption-control | CC | “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” | World Bank (WDI) |
Institutional governance | Instgov | First principal component of rule of law and corruption control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them | PCA |
General governance | G.gov | First principal component of political, economic and institutional governances | PCA |
Domestic terrorism | Domter | Number of domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln) | |
Transnational terrorism | Tranter | Number of transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) | |
Unclear terrorism | Unclter | Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in Ln) | |
Total terrorism | Totter | Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) |
Variables | Signs | Definitions of variables (measurement) | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
Internet | Internet | Internet penetration (per 100 people) | World Bank (WDI) |
Inclusive development | IHDI | Inequality-adjusted human development index | UNDP |
Growth | GDPg | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) | World Bank (WDI) |
Inflation | Inflation | Consumer price index (annual %) | World Bank (WDI) |
Military expense | Milit | Military expenditure (% of GDP) | World Bank (WDI) |
Urbanization | Urban | Urban population growth rate (% of annual) | World Bank (WDI) |
Population | Popg | Population growth rate (% of annual) | World Bank (WDI) |
Foreign aid | NODA | Total net official development assistance (% of GDP) | World Bank (WDI) |
Trade openness | Trade | Export plus import of commodities (% of GDP) | World Bank (WDI) |
Financial openness | FDI | Net foreign direct investment inflows (% of GDP) | World Bank (WDI) |
1.2 Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1998–2012)
Mean | SD | Minimum | Maximum | Observations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Political stability | \(-\) 0.551 | 0.929 | \(-\) 3.297 | 1.087 | 265 |
Voice and accountability | \(-\) 0.679 | 0.723 | \(-\) 2.155 | 1.009 | 265 |
Political governance | 0.0008 | 1.268 | \(-\) 3.304 | 2.671 | 265 |
Government effectiveness | \(-\) 0.723 | 0.620 | \(-\) 2.354 | 0.823 | 265 |
Regulation quality | \(-\) 0.695 | 0.638 | \(-\) 2.630 | 0.906 | 265 |
Economic governance | 0.009 | 1.354 | \(-\) 3.951 | 3.511 | 265 |
Rule of law | \(-\) 0.706 | 0.660 | \(-\) 2.595 | 1.032 | 265 |
Control of corruption | \(-\) 0.602 | 0.577 | \(-\) 1.848 | 0.971 | 265 |
Institutional governance | 0.003 | 1.349 | \(-\) 3.490 | 3.316 | 265 |
General governance | 0.008 | 2.170 | \(-\) 6.208 | 5.242 | 265 |
Domestic terrorism | 0.401 | 0.805 | 0.000 | 4.781 | 265 |
Transnational terrorism | 0.203 | 0.451 | 0.000 | 2.802 | 265 |
Unclear terrorism | 0.060 | 0.193 | 0.000 | 1.566 | 265 |
Total terrorism | 0.500 | 0.885 | 0.000 | 4.895 | 265 |
Internet penetration | 4.766 | 8.022 | 0.002 | 51.174 | 264 |
Inclusive development | 0.872 | 4.210 | 0.161 | 45.231 | 220 |
GDP growth | 4.706 | 4.230 | \(-\) 8.149 | 32.265 | 259 |
Inflation | 10.012 | 25.435 | \(-\) 6.934 | 275.983 | 242 |
Military expenditure | 2.245 | 2.899 | 0.151 | 35.846 | 231 |
Urbanization | 3.551 | 1.556 | \(-\) 0.287 | 12.984 | 265 |
Population | 2.283 | 0.949 | \(-\) 0.220 | 8.382 | 265 |
Foreign aid | 10.463 | 11.425 | 0.017 | 95.445 | 259 |
Trade openness | 77.976 | 35.648 | 24.528 | 230.414 | 252 |
Financial openness | 5.354 | 8.880 | \(-\) 1.846 | 96.149 | 259 |
1.3 Appendix 3: First correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 197)
Political governance | Economic governance | Institutional governance | Control variables | Terrorism variables | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PS | VA | Polgov | GE | RQ | Ecogov | CC | RL | Instgov | G.gov | Internet | IHDI | GDPg | Inflation | Milit | Domter | Tranter | Unclter | Totter | |
1.000 | 0.629 | 0.901 | 0.637 | 0.623 | 0.652 | 0.683 | 0.770 | 0.747 | 0.802 | 0.236 | 0.029 | \(-\) 0.033 | \(-\) 0.238 | \(-\) 0.260 | \(-\) 0.535 | \(-\) 0.530 | \(-\) 0.365 | \(-\) 0.596 | PS |
1.000 | 0.903 | 0.708 | 0.743 | 0.749 | 0.704 | 0.747 | 0.747 | 0.840 | 0.200 | 0.204 | 0.007 | \(-\) 0.136 | \(-\) 0.334 | \(-\) 0.238 | \(-\) 0.266 | \(-\) 0.111 | \(-\) 0.277 | VA | |
1.000 | 0.745 | 0.745 | 0.776 | 0.768 | 0.840 | 0.828 | 0.910 | 0.242 | 0.129 | \(-\) 0.014 | \(-\) 0.207 | \(-\) 0.329 | \(-\) 0.428 | \(-\) 0.440 | \(-\) 0.263 | \(-\) 0.483 | Polgov | ||
1.000 | 0.870 | 0.970 | 0.882 | 0.903 | 0.919 | 0.935 | 0.384 | 0.237 | 0.014 | \(-\) 0.190 | \(-\) 0.156 | \(-\) 0.187 | \(-\) 0.245 | \(-\) 0.121 | \(-\) 0.224 | GE | |||
1.000 | 0.964 | 0.790 | 0.854 | 0.846 | 0.908 | 0.289 | 0.210 | \(-\) 0.045 | \(-\) 0.245 | \(-\) 0.216 | \(-\) 0.156 | \(-\) 0.216 | \(-\) 0.084 | \(-\) 0.194 | RQ | ||||
1.000 | 0.867 | 0.910 | 0.915 | 0.953 | 0.350 | 0.231 | \(-\) 0.014 | \(-\) 0.223 | \(-\) 0.191 | \(-\) 0.178 | \(-\) 0.239 | \(-\) 0.107 | \(-\) 0.217 | Ecogov | |||||
1.000 | 0.885 | 0.971 | 0.923 | 0.309 | 0.207 | \(-\) 0.050 | \(-\) 0.177 | \(-\) 0.103 | \(-\) 0.246 | \(-\) 0.312 | \(-\) 0.212 | \(-\) 0.297 | CC | ||||||
1.000 | 0.970 | 0.962 | 0.363 | 0.134 | \(-\) 0.026 | \(-\) 0.205 | \(-\) 0.175 | \(-\) 0.270 | \(-\) 0.299 | \(-\) 0.181 | \(-\) 0.313 | RL | |||||||
1.000 | 0.970 | 0.346 | 0.176 | \(-\) 0.040 | \(-\) 0.196 | \(-\) 0.143 | \(-\) 0.266 | \(-\) 0.315 | \(-\) 0.202 | \(-\) 0.314 | Instgov | ||||||||
1.000 | 0.334 | 0.191 | \(-\) 0.024 | \(-\) 0.220 | \(-\) 0.227 | \(-\) 0.299 | \(-\) 0.344 | \(-\) 0.197 | \(-\) 0.348 | G.gov | |||||||||
1.000 | 0.018 | \(-\) 0.023 | \(-\) 0.062 | \(-\) 0.087 | 0.079 | 0.052 | 0.129 | 0.063 | Internet | ||||||||||
1.000 | \(-\) 0.078 | \(-\) 0.016 | \(-\) 0.040 | 0.090 | 0.052 | \(-\) 0.031 | 0.080 | IHDI | |||||||||||
1.000 | \(-\) 0.197 | \(-\) 0.052 | 0.076 | 0.157 | 0.060 | 0.089 | GDPg | ||||||||||||
1.000 | \(-\) 0.128 | 0.0002 | 0.030 | 0.061 | 0.027 | Inflation | |||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.185 | 0.107 | 0.040 | 0.194 | Milit | ||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.661 | 0.760 | 0.973 | Domter | |||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.641 | 0.785 | Tranter | ||||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.776 | Unclter | |||||||||||||||||
1.000 | Totter | ||||||||||||||||||
1.4 Appendix 4: Second correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 250)
Political governance | Economic governance | Institutional governance | Control variables | Terrorism variables | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PS | VA | Polgov | GE | RQ | Ecogov | CC | RL | Instgov | G.gov | Urban | Popg | NODA | Trade | FDI | Domter | Tranter | Unclter | Totter | |
1.000 | 0.655 | 0.905 | 0.626 | 0.592 | 0.631 | 0.659 | 0.767 | 0.737 | 0.798 | \(-\) 0.245 | \(-\) 0.234 | \(-\) 0.100 | 0.286 | \(-\) 0.062 | \(-\) 0.530 | \(-\) 0.543 | \(-\) 0.374 | \(-\) 0.589 | PS |
1.000 | 0.913 | 0.718 | 0.727 | 0.749 | 0.682 | 0.763 | 0.747 | 0.849 | \(-\) 0.086 | \(-\) 0.160 | 0.057 | 0.041 | \(-\) 0.070 | \(-\) 0.248 | \(-\) 0.287 | \(-\) 0.141 | \(-\) 0.284 | VA | |
1.000 | 0.740 | 0.727 | 0.760 | 0.737 | 0.814 | 0.816 | 0.906 | \(-\) 0.180 | \(-\) 0.216 | \(-\) 0.021 | 0.177 | \(-\) 0.073 | \(-\) 0.424 | \(-\) 0.287 | \(-\) 0.141 | \(-\) 0.284 | Polgov | ||
1.000 | 0.861 | 0.965 | 0.848 | 0.895 | 0.901 | 0.931 | \(-\) 0.219 | \(-\) 0.364 | \(-\) 0.235 | 0.060 | \(-\) 0.169 | \(-\) 0.150 | \(-\) 0.225 | \(-\) 0.101 | \(-\) 0.184 | GE | |||
1.000 | 0.964 | 0.733 | 0.835 | 0.810 | 0.892 | \(-\) 0.120 | \(-\) 0.231 | \(-\) 0.219 | 0.014 | \(-\) 0.209 | \(-\) 0.130 | \(-\) 0.206 | \(-\) 0.101 | \(-\) 0.165 | RQ | ||||
1.000 | 0.820 | 0.897 | 0.887 | 0.945 | \(-\) 0.176 | \(-\) 0.309 | \(-\) 0.235 | 0.038 | \(-\) 0.196 | \(-\) 0.145 | \(-\) 0.223 | \(-\) 0.105 | \(-\) 0.181 | Ecogov | |||||
1.000 | 0.871 | 0.967 | 0.900 | \(-\) 0.212 | \(-\) 0.324 | \(-\) 0.072 | 0.124 | \(-\) 0.113 | \(-\) 0.238 | \(-\) 0.305 | \(-\) 0.222 | \(-\) 0.285 | CC | ||||||
1.000 | 0.966 | 0.963 | \(-\) 0.258 | \(-\) 0.317 | \(-\) 0.168 | 0.128 | \(-\) 0.156 | \(-\) 0.239 | \(-\) 0.275 | \(-\) 0.172 | \(-\) 0.277 | RL | |||||||
1.000 | 0.963 | \(-\) 0.243 | \(-\) 0.331 | \(-\) 0.140 | 0.119 | \(-\) 0.140 | \(-\) 0.246 | \(-\) 0.300 | \(-\) 0.204 | \(-\) 0.291 | Instgov | ||||||||
1.000 | \(-\) 0.214 | \(-\) 0.308 | 0.358 | \(-\) 0.330 | \(-\) 0.148 | \(-\) 0.281 | \(-\) 0.338 | \(-\) 0.204 | \(-\) 0.327 | G.gov | |||||||||
1.000 | 0.768 | 0.415 | \(-\) 0.295 | 0.153 | 0.070 | 0.060 | 0.042 | 0.080 | Urban | ||||||||||
1.000 | 0.415 | \(-\) 0.295 | 0.153 | \(-\) 0.004 | 0.053 | \(-\) 0.014 | 0.011 | Popg | |||||||||||
1.000 | \(-\) 0.086 | 0.259 | \(-\) 0.055 | \(-\) 0.057 | \(-\) 0.116 | \(-\) 0.062 | NODA | ||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.407 | \(-\) 0.186 | \(-\) 0.132 | \(-\) 0.109 | \(-\) 0.194 | Trade | |||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.022 | 0.093 | 0.058 | 0.037 | FDI | ||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.674 | 0.730 | 0.976 | Domter | |||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.596 | 0.791 | Tranter | ||||||||||||||||
1.000 | 0.755 | Unclter | |||||||||||||||||
1.000 | Totter | ||||||||||||||||||
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Asongu, S., Tchamyou, V., Asongu, N. et al. Fighting terrorism in Africa: evidence from bundling and unbundling institutions. Empir Econ 56, 883–933 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1378-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-017-1378-3