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Ability and rates of return to schooling—making use of the Swedish enlistment battery test

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Abstract

Using the Swedish military enlistment test, this paper estimates the return to schooling for individuals belonging to different parts of the ability distribution. It also attempts to predict whether an endogenous test score causes bias in the “ability-specific” returns to schooling that varies with the test score. A significant finding is that a higher score in the test is associated with a higher return to schooling, but that the positive association is diminishing in the test score. In general, the bias in the ability-specific returns to schooling does not seem to vary with the test score level.

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Notes

  1. In Card (1999), the causal return to schooling literature is surveyed.

  2. The methods extend the policy evaluation literature by allowing heterogenous treatment effects.

  3. This is the first paper to actually use the test score result from the Swedish Military Enlistment Battery in a cross-sectional study. In Nordin (2005), the Swedish Military Enlistment Battery is further discussed.

  4. There are only a small number of women who have taken the Military enlistment test, and this group of women can hardly be considered a representative sample.

  5. Except for 19 years of schooling, all potential years of schooling between 9 and 20 are contained in our schooling variable.

  6. The variable used in this paper for measuring cognitive ability is in fact the general intelligence factor, G. For more information about the G factor, and the other group factors, see Carroll (1993).

  7. For more information about the “test score groups” and the separate test results, see the Appendix.

  8. When using the Swedish Military Enlistment test we end up with nine test score groups.

  9. We do not report these test score group indicator coefficients because these variables do not yield any relevant information, and they should merely be treated as controls.

  10. Lacking an actual experience measure, we use the standard method of constructing experience, i.e., exp = age - 7 - years of schooling.

  11. Because of a positive relationship between schooling and the probability of belonging to the earnings equation sample, the full return to schooling is higher than the ones estimated in this paper.

  12. As Griliches (1977) points out, when controlling for ability using a test score, schooling might be negatively correlated with the wage equation residual.

  13. Both the decision to study after compulsory education and whether to choose a vocational or a theoretical study programme could then potentially create test score differentials between individuals.

  14. Having 10 years of schooling means that, in the majority of the cases, the individual is an early dropout from upper-secondary education.

  15. Using indicator variables for each of the test score groups instead of the discrete and ordered test score variable does not change the result.

  16. The new SUN 2000 schooling variable with better precision does partly explain our comparatively high estimate.

  17. The appendix describes the family income measure and explains the construction of the variable.

  18. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the educational attainment variables.

  19. This model is not pursued any further because the estimated returns to schooling are conditioned on study programme and obtaining a degree, which means that it is a departure from the mainstream approach.

  20. The difference in the ability-specific return to education between the first and the second and also between the first and the third test score groups is not statistically significant.

  21. Another explanation for the “high” return for the lowest test score group is discussed in the next section.

  22. The estimated ability specific income premiums from Table 4 is used to construct Fig. 2. Estimates with very high standard errors that makes the graphical presentation difficult to interpret are excluded.

  23. By controlling for these variables, we have already shown that these nonlinearities do not cause the relationship between the return to schooling and the test score to change.

  24. This is tested by changing the reference group.

  25. An exception is the income premium for the 16th year of schooling for the third test score group, which is significant at the 10% level.

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Acknowledgment

I am grateful for comments by the editor, two anonymous referees, Peter Fredriksson, Anna Meyer, Inga Persson, Dan-Olof Rooth, and Mårten Wallette. The data has been financed through a research grant from the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research (FAS) that is gratefully acknowledged. This study is part of the project “Ethnic discrimination and Swedish-specific human capital.”

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Correspondence to Martin Nordin.

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Responsible editor: Christian Dustmann

Appendices

Appendix

The test score groups

The transformation of the results of the separate tests into the nine-point scale shows changes during the time period, but because our data contains the results of the separate tests, we are able to construct a test score measure that is time consistent. Information is missing for one, two, or three of the separate test score results for 2.7% of the observations. In these cases, we use the average of the other test score results as a proxy for the missing test score result. Excluding these observations from the sample does not change the estimates.

Using the sum of the separate test score results instead of G in the wage regressions does not change any of the results found in this paper. Dividing the test score groups into 10 deciles, based on either G or the sum of the separate test score results, the estimates change in the tails of the ability distribution because the test score groups in the tails then get larger. This means that we lose the opportunity to analyze what takes place at the ends of the tails, e.g., that there are underachievers in the lowest test score groups and that the relationship between the test score and the return to schooling differs for graduates compared to the rest of the sample.

Family income

Family income is computed in the following manner. The mother’s and father’s average earnings for the years 1970, 1975, and 1980 are first computed. All earnings are in the 1980 prices. If some of the earnings are zero, an average of the remaining earnings is computed. The mother’s and father’s average incomes are then added.

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Nordin, M. Ability and rates of return to schooling—making use of the Swedish enlistment battery test. J Popul Econ 21, 703–717 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0131-6

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