Abstract
Price caps, while widely touted, are less commonly implemented. Most incentive schemes involve profit sharing and are, thus, variants of sliding-scale regulation. I show that, relative to price caps, some degree of profit sharing always increases expected welfare. Numerical simulations show that welfare may be enhanced by large amounts of profit sharing and by granting the firm a greater share of gains than of losses. Simulations also suggest profit sharing is most beneficial when the firm's initial cost is high and cost-reducing innovations are difficult to achieve but offer the potential for substantial savings.
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This paper has benefitted from the comments of Mark Bagnoli, Jim Burgess, Michael Crew, Steve Hackett, Paul Kleindorfer, Michael Riordan, Ted Stefos, Ingo Vogelsang, Dennis Weisman, two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at the First Annual Northeastern Health Economics Conference, the Fourth Annual Health Economics Conference, GTE, Indiana University, the Rutgers Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Public Utility Economics, and the 20th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference. Financial support from the Management Science Group of the Department of Veterans Affairs and from Indiana University is gratefully acknowledged.
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Lyon, T.P. A model of sliding-scale regulation. J Regul Econ 9, 227–247 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133475
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133475