“Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” and the Reality for the Sciences

Abstract

As a hint for considering what reality means for our acts, knowledge and cognition which include sciences, I would like to examine Alfred North Whitehead’s critique of modern sciences; in particular, his concept of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” I will investigate the significance of the concept of the “fallacy” in his late philosophy on three layers. The first layer of the meaning of this concept consists of instrumental utility for scientific criticism or ethics and norms for scientists. In this layer, the concept alerts us to beware that sciences are prone to the “fallacy.” Its second layer lies in its important role in Whitehead’s later philosophy. Initially, he tries to construct an adequate system of science and philosophy that would not fall prey to this fallacy. However, realizing the inevitability of this fallacy and its serious implications, he deepens his insight into our own existence and the nature of the actual world; that is, we cannot perceive, act, and engage in creative activity without misplacing concreteness. Thus, he suggests the third layer of the meaning of this concept, which implies that our own perceptions, actions, and experiences arise in the midst of this fallacy.