Abstract
The reemergence global Eurasian powers demand adjustments in the grand strategy of the United Statutes. The United States post war Grand Strategy was confrontational and focused on the USSR. Eurasia now holds three of the four global powers: China, the EU and India. This region holds most of the global population and socio-economic resources and has the largest potential for cross regional connectivity. We show that a Grand Strategy that fails to include one of the two Asian Giants will likely lead to global war. Based on the Power Transition rationalist approach we outline the alternative paths that can preserves global stability.
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Notes
- 1.
Effectively anticipate the escalation of crisis to war, mainstream non-cooperative game-theoretic approach assumes opponents seek to maximize individual, not collective gains. This perspective fails to account for the overwhelming number of non-conflictual interactions.
- 2.
Korea, Vietnam. Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East confrontation between Israel and Palestinians were and continue to be heavily reported when violent actions take place. Reports on these regions disappear from the news and policy radar when violence subsides. In the last decade, event data shows that reports of actions from the Middle East that constitutes less than 5% of global populations receive undue attention in the past decades. Reports of events in Africa, Latin America, or Asia, outside of China, are seldom addressed unless violence is involved.
- 3.
Offensive realism assumes protracted confrontation among contenders for global dominance. The Grand Strategy offered by Mearsheimer proposes that the United States should take advantage of the two vast oceans that separate Eurasia from the Americas to defend the motherland. The new two ocean strategy disengages from NATO and security commitments in the Pacific. They now isolated United States does not participate in the persistent search for Hegemony. As confrontations continue in Eurasia, a winner must eventually emerge that will then control massive population and economy. The United States would be overwhelmed by such a massive Eurasian hegemon. If anarchy persist and confrontation is the exchange mode, a confrontation between Eurasia based Hegemon and United States is inevitable.
- 4.
The Cold War Grand Strategy based on defensive realism proposed by Morgenthau and Waltz provided a path to peace when a balance of power was achieved among competitors. At parity each party recognized that the cost of war far exceeded potential gains. Asymmetric power leads to conflict of short duration and limited severity. At balance, massive conflicts are avoided by the fear of huge costs. In the nuclear era, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) assures massive cost. This fear preserved stability through the long Cold War. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is desirable only when the nuclear balance is preserved. This global assessment applies also at the regional level. In the Middle East, Waltz contends the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Iran would be settled by allowing, even providing, Iran a small nuclear arsenal sufficient to deter Israel (Waltz, 2012). Defensive realism is attractive but empirically flawed. Power assessments show that the USSR or the Warsaw Pact never achieved a balance of power with either the United States or NATO. Peace during the Cold War was preserved as Kennan accurately indicted by the ability of a preponderant United States to contain a much weaker USSR. Likewise, in the Middle East, the relative stability has been preserved by Israel’s conventional and nuclear superiority. As Iran overtakes Israel in conventional capabilities’, the addition of nuclear weapons to Iran’s arsenal will likely rise the probability of nuclear war in this highly contested region (Kang & Kugler, forthcoming).
- 5.
Both events took place under McNamara during President Johnson’s administration. In 1964, The destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy were in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin area to conduct reconnaissance and to intercept North Vietnamese communications in support of South Vietnamese war efforts. On August 2, 1964 the Maddox was approached by three North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The Maddox fired warning shots and immediately called in air support as the torpedo boats opened fire in return. In the ensuing firefight, one of the torpedo boats was badly damaged, but the Maddox escaped harm. No other engagement followed. McNamara used this incident to justify the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that escalated into the long the Vietnam War. Contrast this US reaction to a similar act on June 8, 1967 during the Six-Day War. Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attack the USS Liberty conducting reconnaissance and intercepting communications in international waters off Egypt’s Gaza Strip. A total of 34 Americans were killed and 171 were wounded in the two-hour air and sea attack. Liberty made contact seeking support. A US carrier deployed aircraft that never reached Liberty because McNamara recalled them in flight.
- 6.
Volgy et al. (2011) persuasively argues that global powers satisfaction may reflect assessments of ranking within the global hierarchy. Contenders are prone to confrontation when their power does not match the level of international status recognition. He shows that the United Kingdom and Russia, now second tier powers, continue to enjoy higher recognition then China even after reaching superpower status or India the new rising superpower.
- 7.
To succeed in a protracted Cold War confrontation a preponderant United States led alliance needs to emerge in the Pacific adding relative power capabilities to those of NATO. Japan and Australia are central to this alliance, but the posture India chooses is critical. A satisfied India that shifts towards the West can secure global stability. An ambivalent India opens the possibility for a global war.
- 8.
China most likely does not approve of a small nuclear state on its border. If an effective accommodation can be found China has the power to support the United States desire to reverse North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Much is made of the potential destruction the limited North Korean arsenal could inflict on the United States, Japan and of course South Korea, little is said of the danger that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities pose to China. Given distance and delivery capabilities North Korea could devastate Beijing, Shanghai, and other mayor industrial centers The United States could minimize such risks by joining with China to press for a non-nuclear North Korea.
- 9.
There is of course no guarantee that attempts to settle the Taiwan, China Sea, and other disputes will succeed. To gain the needed time in the event of a new Cold War this time led by China, the United States must build a satisfied preponderant coalition. Beyond 2050, if China continues to be dissatisfied and supports now second tier Russia’s ambitions conflict in the Pacific and Europe may emerge. As China overtakes the United States becoming the Dominant nation, China will likely concentrate on reabsorbing Taiwan and consolidating its position in the China Sea. A premature (within the next 5–10 years) attempt to integrate Taiwan by force can now be thwarted by US with direct support from Japan and Australia. A failed conventional conflict short of a nuclear exchange, would increase, in turn rising prospects for another war. Of course, if a failed Taiwan excursion would deeply damage the credibility of China’s government.
- 10.
The proposed Quad alliance with Japan, South Korea and Australia is insufficient to counter China and Russia in the Pacific. India needs to be included in this larger security structure. Recall that before Britain and the United States confronted each other and waged war after war to advance their positions. Recall that the 1923 Monroe doctrine that warned European nations that the United States would not tolerate further colonization of the Americas was proclaimed when US naval power could not sustain such an enterprise.. Britain slowly adopted this posture as its own supported by the massive naval power. US–British relations tawed and shifted from confrontation to stable but fierce competition in the economic arena. Compete when you can even when slight losses for the first mover are involved can shift relations among the United States and China—or for that matter India or Europe.
- 11.
A serious and related economic issue deals with patents infringement. This is an onerous concern for the more advanced societies. Cyberattacks aiming to acquire R&D will no doubt continue. China will encourage but deny any such actions. Until like Japan, China’s technology catches up to competition. As China’s patents become very valued property needing protection, China will protect patents.
- 12.
The United States inconsistently but concurrently supports deepening integration of the EU, opposes Brexit but the same time strongly opposes depending off NAFTA. United States does not allow labor to move freely across borders that led to faster and more even growth in the EU. Restrictions on NAFTA have led to far lower regional growth. The unintended consequence is that the United States has a lower demographic, economic and security profile than would follow from a more robust NAFTA.
- 13.
Dependenca theorists point out that foreign investments can lead to abuses and domestic corruption. This reality can be met if the recipient societies have strong political structures whose constraints are reinforced by well-established international norms. An agreement on norms and implantation is essential for global stability.
- 14.
- 15.
The ongoing war in Ukraine provided an opportunity for mutually beneficial interaction between China and the United States. Both global powers would benefit most from a stable global hierarchy. Russia’s action in Ukraine can be stopped if China joined the oil embargo and refused to provide military support. The United States focus on EU support was warranted, but the delay and disregard of China—the key actor to achieve a viable solution—is puzzling. In part this is because the United States is yet to acknowledge equal status with China or seek to mediate rather than confront over the status of Taiwan. Confrontation has become the norm. In the long term such actions lead to global war.
- 16.
China and Russia, the two currently dissatisfied global and mayor powers, face two fronts. In the West, the United States, already built NATO that is preponderant over Russia even with the help of China. In the East a preponderant coalition is only now forming led by the United States and including among others Japan, Australia, and the still emerging India, still not committed to either side. Establishing a firm alliance is essential to secure peace as policies to diminish China’s dissatisfaction proceed on three paths: confrontation, competition, and cooperation. Offensive realism argues that rising China is more dangerous today because the United States encouraged Sino growth through exports and supported the inclusion of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Economic interactions were valuable, but China achieved its very rapid growth only in part because of open trade and inflow of investments. The phenomenally rapid economic growth starting in the 1960s was propelled by a combination of high education, internal migration, and mobilization of its full economic potential (Zeng & Kulger, forthcoming). Massive internal changes took place. Despite China’s low per capita income, female participation in the economy surpasses that of the United States and most developed nations. Education spread from 20 to 90 percent high school graduates in one generation). The controversial 1960’s China’s one child policy produced a temporary large active population whose negative effects are only now being felt. Distancing the United States from the rise of China may have delayed growth not stopped it. Given the size of the global economy, the availability of technology, and the political maturity of China’s authoritarian regime, the development of China was likely to follow a slower yet very similar path without USD support.
A persistent confrontational posture by the United States that seeks to stifle growth will likely have only a marginal impact on the overall power of China. China’s growth will slow largely because of domestic factors. Economic growth will likely decline in the next two decades because of the expansion of an aged population that will approach the size of the active population, and because as China becomes more affluent overall growth will decline approaching that of more developed societies.
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Kugler, J., Tammen, R. (2023). Impact of the Rise of Eurasia on Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century. In: Thompson, W.R., Volgy, T.J. (eds) Turmoil and Order in Regional International Politics. Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, vol 10. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0557-7_12
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