Abstract
According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun, that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way in which this account fails, we can better appreciate the very modest role that associated descriptive information plays in the pragmatics of proper names.
According to the traditional descriptivist theory, the semantic content of a proper name is given by a definite description (or cluster of descriptive information) that speakers associate with it; the name referring to whoever, or whatever, uniquely satisfies that descriptive information. As against this view, Kripke famously argued that, (a) speakers do not typically, and need not ever, associate uniquely identifying descriptive information with the names with which they are competent and (b) even in that rare case in which a speaker does have uniquely identifying descriptive information in her possession, it still does not follow that her use of the name refers to the unique entity that satisfies that information. For these reasons, as well as equally familiar Kripkean considerations concerning the rigidity of names, few theorists these days are sympathetic to the traditional descriptivist account.
Kripke’s arguments gave rise to a widespread endorsement of Millianism—the view that the semantic contribution of a name is exhausted by its referent. But even if we agree with the Millian that the descriptive information associated with a name does not enter into the semantic content of an utterance containing it, this information might nevertheless play an essential role in the pragmatics of names. Indeed, in recent years, a number of theorists have argued in favor of a view we might call Millian Descriptivism—a view according to which proper names have a “Millian semantics,” but “a partially descriptive pragmatics of assertion” (Soames 2008, p 283). Moreover, these theorists have argued that their favored pragmatic theory of names helps to explain some of the most well-known problems with Millian accounts of proper names.
In what follows, I argue that Millian Descriptivism should be rejected. More specifically, I argue that the descriptive information we associate with a proper name no more enters into what we assert by our utterances involving it, than it does the literal, compositionally determined, semantic content thereof. As we will see, once we appreciate the distinctive way in which the Millian Descriptivist account fails, we can better appreciate the very modest role that associated descriptive information plays in the pragmatics of proper names.
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Notes
- 1.
A “linguistically simple name” is one for which “there is little… descriptive information that a speaker must associate with the name (qua expression-type) to be a competent user of it” (Soames 2002, p. 53). Such names contrast with “partially descriptive,” complex names, like “Chief Justice Roberts,” or “Rahway, New Jersey,” which are associated with “substantial descriptive information that must be grasped by any competent speaker who understands and is able to use them correctly” (Soames 2002, p. 53). In what follows, I will only be concerned with “simple” cases. See, for example, Soames (2002, pp. 86–89) for an interesting discussion of the semantic contents of partially descriptive names. See Soames (2005) for some significant, and plausible, revisions to the account of semantic content offered in Beyond Rigidity.
- 2.
Like Jeff Speaks, I suspect that Millian Descriptivism is currently “the most popular Millian reply to Frege’s Puzzle” (2010, p. 202).
- 3.
Let us say that S associates a descriptive condition D with n just in case S would, on competent, sincere, reflection, assent to “D( n).”
- 4.
Here, and in what follows, we can treat those cases in which it is common ground that n’s being G entails (or, makes highly probable) that n does not have the relevant D-property as “atypical.”
- 5.
Once we appreciate that many of the effects of a speaker’s assertion on the common ground are communicative by-product in the foregoing sense, we should resist any view on which the content of an assertion is simply read off from its “update” effects on the context of utterance. For example, any view that identifies the content of an assertion with the set of worlds compatible with the semantic content of the speaker’s utterance and the common ground between her and her audience will fail to distinguish what the speaker actually asserted, and a by-product thereof.
- 6.
Gleakos (2011) goes so far as to say that speakers always assert d-propositions by literal utterances containing proper names. According to her, the ubiquity of asserting d-propositions by our utterances involving names suggests that, contra Soames (2002), such propositions are also the semantic contents of these utterances.
- 7.
Both Braun and Sider, and Soames, only discuss cases in which the appositive clause in the relevant belief report seems to reflect an aspect of how the agent—here, the host—is thinking of the object his belief concerns. In some cases, however, the sole function of such an embedded appositive clause is to help the belief ascribers’s audience identify the object(s), or properties, that the agent’s belief concerns (as in, for example, “Billy thinks that Glenn, who I told you about two days ago, likes chocolate”). In what follows, we will only deal with cases where it is plausible that the function of the appositive is to reflect an aspect of the content of the attitude the speaker is ascribing to the subject of the report.
- 8.
Alternatively, we could just ask whether the speaker asserted anything that entails that the referent of “n” is D, as well, so as to completely avoid the issue of the truth or falsity of the relevant enrichment.
- 9.
- 10.
I take each of these cases to crucially involve both the maxim of manner and the maxim of relevance.
References
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the organizers and all of the participants of the 2013 Conference on Language and Action at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica for extremely helpful feedback on a presentation of an earlier draft of this chapter. I would also like to thank Hsiang-Yun Chen, Josh Dever, Sinan Dogramaci, Matt Evans, Hans Kamp, Bryan Pickel, Gary Ostertag, and David Sosa for discussion of issues in the theory of reference relating directly to this material. I owe a very special thanks to Gary for comments on an earlier draft that significantly improved the final chapter. All of the normal qualifications and disclaimers are in order.
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Buchanan, R. (2014). Names, Descriptions, and Assertion. In: Hung, TW. (eds) Communicative Action. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_1
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