Abstract
Despite Nursultan Nazarbayev’s oft-proclaimed ‘multivector’ foreign policy—maintaining positive relations with Russia, the West, China, and the Islamic World without firmly committing to any one ‘vector’—Kazakhstan has, instead, pursued a steady policy of aligning itself with Moscow through multilateral and bilateral security agreements. While these do not prevent engagement with other powers within the security realm, they do effectively foreclose Nur-Sultan from seeking other substantive arrangements, reinforce Russia’s regional sphere of influence, and place the country on one side of an increasingly contentious geopolitical environment. The presidential transition in 2019 invites a fresh look at the current state of Kazakhstan’s security relationships and its likely future. This chapter does this by first exploring the concepts of multivectorism, security hedging, and alignment before examining Kazakhstan’s security arrangements under Nazarbayev and the still-emerging Kassym-Jomart Tokayev era to determine whether this new period will be marked by continuity or change.
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Notes
- 1.
These do not include the ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. Even in these cases, however, Toqaev must first consult Nazarbayev and it is likely that Nazarbayev will retain an informal veto.
- 2.
The hedging literature also makes a macro-level distinction between ‘great power’ and ‘smaller state’ hedging. The former is when great powers, as potential challengers to the international system, choose a middle ground under unipolarity between hard and soft balancing. This chapter is examines smaller state hedging, exclusively.
- 3.
This is obviously not the only consideration as domestic factors need to be taken into account.
- 4.
This is perhaps best seen by Russia’s kinetic responses in 2008 and 2014 to Georgia and Ukraine seeking NATO membership.
- 5.
Snyder (1997) referred to this as ‘entrapment’.
- 6.
That is, giving up external and, possibly, internal autonomy for protection.
- 7.
This can be seen in Russia’s response to Viktor Yanukovych attempt to hedge relations between Russia and the EU (Smith 2019).
- 8.
The Islamic World is excluded from this analysis because it does not represent a great power.
- 9.
Sullivan used the term multivectorism but his usage was the equivalent of hedging.
- 10.
Whether it can continue to do so is another story, however.
- 11.
But, perhaps, the Baltic states.
- 12.
The membership of the CST and the CSTO changed over the years and the original signatories of the former do not completely match that of the latter.
- 13.
Even if this is in more form than function.
- 14.
China has reportedly placed some border security personnel in Tajikistan, but not actual military forces.
- 15.
Though, Kazakhstan was not a participant in all of these exercises.
- 16.
This was accomplished when the transit center in Manas, Kyrgyzstan was finally closed in 2014.
- 17.
A lily pad base is a small base used primarily for forward basing of logistical materials.
- 18.
In this scenario, Toqaev would eventually make room for Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, who was elevated to be the Chair of the Senate and next in line for the presidency upon her father’s resignation. However, her fall from power in May 2020 appeared to solidify Toqaev’s control over the country.
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Ambrosio, T. (2021). Security Hedging After Nazarbayev? The Future of Kazakhstan’s Alignment with Russia. In: Caron, JF. (eds) Understanding Kazakhstan’s 2019 Political Transition. The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4308-5_3
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