Abstract
In this chapter, I look at why certain Indian states have well-functioning disaster preparedness, whereas others do not. I analyse the ‘success story’ of disaster governance in the Indian Union Territory of Puducherry. I look at how two recent disasters—the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and cyclone Thane (2011)—shaped its priorities and approaches to disaster risk and facilitated the development of various tools of disaster preparedness among state as well as non-state actors. Furthermore, the chapter explores the opportunities that were presented through these events. Was it a matter of the ‘good’ timing of disaster? To answer this question, I explore the proliferation of technologies as well as the developments of the various tools of disaster preparedness that have been implemented on the ground. How is Puducherry different from other Indian states, which have been much slower in implementing new disaster management policies prescribed by New Delhi? In search of the answer, I take a closer look at the common and widely shared narrative about the reactive Indian population. The findings are based on my field research in 2012 and 2013, as well as the analysis on anthropology of disasters and science and technology studies.
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Notes
- 1.
This chapter is not concerned with the latter two. It is based on research in Puducherry district administration covering mainly Puducherry town and surrounding settlements.
- 2.
According to estimates from the early 2000s, around a fifth of urban population in India was not covered by a sewer system: 26 % had no access to toilet, 31 % had no access to tap water and 14 % had no access to electricity (Bandyopadhyay 2013, p. 38).
- 3.
Note also that, at the time of the tsunami, the territory bore its old name—Pondicherry. Hence, I have used ‘Puducherry’ for the period after 2006 and ‘Pondicherry’ for the period before 2006.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
For example, according to the law, a post-mortem had to be carried out on those who died unnatural deaths. But this would be impossible with the sheer number of bodies. Hence, the act of post-mortem was substituted with the act of identification. Another concern was when bodies could not be found and the person was proclaimed missing and their families missed out on compensation payments.
- 7.
The exact amount of funding is unclear and varies across sources. For example, the Asian Development Bank donated a $205 million loan and grant assistance package, which was aimed at restoring livelihoods and rehabilitating and reconstructing damaged infrastructure in Tamil Nadu and Kerala (Indian Ocean Tsunami Response 2014).
- 8.
It would be a mistake to assume that Pondicherry did not have any form of disaster preparedness before the Disaster Management Act was passed in 2005. For example, some villages had communication infrastructure built by large with the assistance of NGOs. In Veerampattinam, one of Puducherry’s coastal villages with a population of 6,200 people, hundreds of lives have been saved from the impact of the tsunami by the public address system (Subramanian 2005). Cyclone shelters built by the Red Cross in the 1980s dotted the coast, and some of them had been used as refuge (McKerrow 2010; see also Deville et al. 2014), and the elevated seafront protected the city from the wave.
- 9.
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner (RRC) is the incident commander for the entire Union Territory, and District Collectors are incident commanders for their respective regions (Puducherry and Karaikal). In addition, Regional Administrators in Mahe and Yanam (who are also sub-/deputy collectors) are incident commanders for their regions. The DRDM has three emergency support functions within the crisis management framework: (1) emergency public information, helpline and warning, (2) evacuation and (3) damage assessment.
- 10.
The plan effectively gives people within the public administration a clear idea on what to do and whom to contact in a crisis. As such the plan includes a large telephone directory of mobile numbers. It is arguably this part that needs to be updated the most, as transfers are very common and people populating the administrative apparatus move with their phone numbers.
- 11.
The SEOC is a result of joint efforts of global, national and local disaster policies. It was jointly funded by the UNDP and the Puducherry territorial administration following the guidelines and design of the National Disaster Management Authority (Nair 2011).
- 12.
It is based on spatial database platform, and it was developed by Risk Mapping Software International (Delhi).
- 13.
For example, as a result of a test simulation of a cyclone, the PDSS generated a report of 102 pages, detailing the whereabouts of 83 safe shelters (lifeline buildings including schools, temples, churches, community halls and purpose-built shelters).
- 14.
Mobiles in India are popular for multiple reasons including socialisation, business and access to information. Given that it is a relatively simple device, even people with minimal literacy find it easy to use (Jeffrey and Doron 2013).
- 15.
The scenario was that there was an earthquake in one of the South East Asian countries and that a tsunami was hurtling towards India. All coastal states and territories were put on first alert while receiving information from the sensors in the Bay of Bengal about the possible height and direction of the approaching wave. Based on this data and past experience, the modelling software kept providing an estimated picture of the impact on the Indian coast. The SEOC received messages every 10–15 min about the emerging situation.
- 16.
An interviewee in Puducherry (December 2013) said ‘we were asked to successfully send messages down and what time it was taking. That time was to be noted and reviewed after the exercise. You know, easily you can say ‘I sent a message to the collector in Karaikal.’ But what time did it reach him? We had to get confirmation of the message receipt. I sent a fax, he said ‘I sent an SMS message’; ‘I sent an e- mail.’ Only when he sees the e-mail he can respond. Fax message would have gone lying in the fax machine and no one would have taken it to the person who can take a decision. So, it’s when he (Collector of Karaikal) was aware of the communication that was also in that drill for our learning system’.
- 17.
Around 7,500 pukka houses in Puducherry Union Territory were built for fishermen further inland. Yet they could retain the use of their old houses as work sheds.
- 18.
MS Swaminathan Foundation.
- 19.
‘The Area Cyclone Warning Centre, Chennai of IMD issued various user specific bulletins including fishermen warning, port warning, coastal weather bulletin, sea area bulletin, four stage warning for state and districts disaster management officials’ (India Meteorological Department 2012).
- 20.
December 29 at 9.30 pm.
- 21.
‘[We informed the public] what are the do’s and don’ts, and to put latches on the doors and stay inside’ (Interview with DRDM official, July 2012).
- 22.
The head of the Department of Revenue and Disaster Management.
- 23.
In Puducherry town alone, 75 % of trees were damaged (Subramanian 2012).
- 24.
Around 17,000 ha of paddy is affected in Puducherry and Karaikal (Subramanian 2012).
- 25.
The cyclone fully or partially damaged about 350,000 huts and tiled houses in Cuddalore and Villupuram districts.
- 26.
‘In Cuddalore district alone, paddy on 58,000 ha, cashew on 23,500 ha, sugarcane on 5,752 ha and banana, pulses, oilseeds and cotton cultivated on 3,600 ha were damaged. About 27 high-tension electricity pylons, 4,500 distribution transformers, 36,000 electricity poles and cables running to 350 km were damaged,….’ (Subramanian 2012).
- 27.
The Tamil Nadu Government pledged an 8.5 billion rupee package to provide relief to those affected by the cyclone in various districts in Tamil Nadu (Subramanian 2012).
- 28.
‘It happened after Thane only. The severity and you know … they [the Puducherry government] understood the importance of that and they understood that some work has gone into it. And this thing I’m going to tell, it’s not boasting, [but compare] the impact in Cuddalore and Pondicherry… We had only 12 casualties…only now the government has approved new space office for disaster management…Posts are there, right, so we can recruit people now, we can employ people now. New people who will be in-charge of that work alone’ (Interview, DRDM official, Puducherry, July 2012).
- 29.
‘Here, it’s a totalitarian welfare state’ (Interview, Puducherry government official, December 2013).
- 30.
This idea is reinforced also by stories about how the Disaster Management Act itself was passed: the Act was ready since 2002, and dust was falling on it with little political will to push it through the Lok Sabha (lower chamber of federal parliament). At that point India has already experienced two major disasters: the 2001 Bhuj earthquake in Gujarat and the Orissa supercyclone in 1999. In this narrative, the Indian Ocean Tsunami was the final straw in 2004 that prompted the passing of the Act.
- 31.
In 1999, 10,000 people lost their lives in Orissa in a supercyclone. Since then, much effort and resources by governmental and non-governmental actors have been used to develop their disaster preparedness infrastructure and systems. In October 2013, these systems were tested by the Phailin cyclone (with wind speed of about 200 km/h), which resulted in minimal loss of life (BBC News India 2013).
- 32.
In January 2001, a major earthquake of 7.7 magnitude struck Bhuj in the state of Gujarat leaving around 20,000 dead. Since then, the state of Gujarat has developed their disaster preparedness to very high standards.
- 33.
‘Still, I won’t say we are complete, we have just started… we have a better start compared to other agencies in the country. Other agencies they don’t have this framework, this tier system is not there, they don’t have an Emergency Operations Centre. …We are advanced state, we are going to get the state accord in emergency operations, very high quality emergency operations…’ (Mr. K., DRDM, Puducherry, July 2012).
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Acknowledgements
The data presented in this chapter was collected during fieldwork for the ERC-funded ‘Organizing Disaster: Civil Protection and the Population’ project (263731). I would like to extend my gratitude to my informants as well as all people and institutions that have supported my work, especially the National Institute of Disaster Management, the Pondicherry University and the French Institute of Pondicherry. I would also like to thank the editors of this book for their patient guidance which provided me with a sense of direction. Moreover, I would like to express my appreciation of the insightful comments of my colleagues Dr. Michael Guggenheim and Dr. Joe Deville.
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Hrdličková, Z. (2016). ‘Good’ Time for Disaster: The Importance of Temporality in Governance Thinking. In: Miller, M., Douglass, M. (eds) Disaster Governance in Urbanising Asia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-649-2_7
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