Abstract
Unlike the constitution of any democratic country, the post-1979 Iranian constitution precisely exhibits Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism and Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism as the two foundations of Iran’s political system. As “Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism” is defined as “a form of government where founder(s) or follower(s) of any sect, religion, or faith possess absolute power by opposing greater regional autonomy,” similarly, “Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism” supposes as “a society where Pro-Persian communities live together and cooperate with each other as a single community.” Therefore, besides Iranian officials’ apparent claim of giving equal rights to all ethno-sectarian communities, this constitution only authorizes some specific sectarian (or religious) segments for enjoying constitutional privileges. Theoretically, this constitution equalizes all the ethno-linguistic communities, but the official practices do not meet with this provision. This study will explain the terms Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism and Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism in the context of Iran. This study will attempt to answer how and which ethno-sectarian (or religious) communities are being suppressed due to Shia-hegemonic orientations of central government. Also, the study will analyze what kind of austerity ethno-linguistic communities face when they seek linguistic rights (under Articles 15 and 19 of the constitution) in the Persianate society. By analyzing the pro-constitution and anti-constitution viewpoints of numerous Iranian scholars, this chapter investigates the impacts of ethno-sectarian and ethno-linguistic dilemmas in Iran’s society, on the Iranian economy, and on the Iranian foreign policy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Faith can be described as “mysterious (sometimes inexpressible or indefinable) beliefs of an individual that have become popular and acceptable among a significant group of people” (Aslan 2016). On the other hand, religion can be defined as “the feeling of absolute dependence” (Finlay 2005, 81–94), “the belief in spiritual beings” (Winzeler 2008, 5), or “unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things” (Durkheim and Cladis 2001, xxi). While sect is the sub-group of religion, as it has some sort of unique interpretations of the primary teachings in any religion, such uniqueness motivates adherents of a sect to claim about following authentic version of religion from which they split (Sims and Rodney 1979, 117–133).
- 2.
Several Sunni and Shia scholars count Sunni Islam and Shia Islam as the separate religions rather than considering them as the two major sects of Islam (Saroglou 2014, 232). Therefore, this study uses both words—sect and religion—together.
- 3.
Sometimes, Iranian officials suppress respective ethno-sectarian (or religious) or ethno-linguistic communities by forbidding women to go to school or own their businesses (Afshari 2011, 252–253).
- 4.
The latest census in Iran was held in 2016 (Amar 2020). However, the Statistical Center of Iran (Markaz Amar Iran) did not release population ratios of different social segments within Iran on ethno-linguistic, ethno-sectarian, or ethno-religious bases; neither in booklet form nor on official website https://www.amar.org.ir/english (Amar 2020). Similarly, no one researcher (live in Iran) or organization (based in Iran) is allowed to conduct research for estimating population ratio of any ethno-linguistic, ethno-sectarian, or ethno-religious community (Nadjmabadi 2009, 53). Therefore, this study relies upon the reports prepared by numerous authors in their personal capacity or published by different organizations and research centers (outside the Iran) regarding comparatively analyzing ratio of distinct ethno-sectarian (or religions) and ethno-linguistic communities within Iran. Although some of the authors, organizations, and research centers are being run or assisted by Iranians, they have settled abroad.
- 5.
As the Tati language has no alphabets, Tat people generally use Azeri script for their writings and literature (Mirvahedi 2019). Therefore, some scholars consider Talysh and Tati languages similar to each other (Siewierska 1998, 783). However, this similarity is conveyed only in the Zanjan Province where both people, Talysh and Tat, live among each other. And this can be the reason that a significant portion of both ethno-linguistic communities in Zanjan province have the same sentiments for “Movement for sovereign Talysh-Mughan Republic” or “Talyshstan” (Minahan 2000, 673–676). Conversely, Tat people living in the Qazvin Province and the Gilan Province have several socio-cultural differences from the Tat people living in the Zanjan Province (Mirvahedi 2019).
- 6.
In 2007, Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber traced 51 percent native Persian speakers (Cordesman and Kleiber 2007, 27). However, Ann E. Lucas claims that modern Iran only has 50 percent native Persian speakers (Lucas 2019, 14–15). On the other hand, a report published in 2019 by American Foreign Policy Council highlighted 61 percent of the Iranian population was able to speak Persian language (AFPC 2019, 255).
- 7.
April Fast believes that Azeri ethno-linguistic community covers 25 percent of total population in Iran during 2005 (Fast 2005, 19). Whereas Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber trace this percentage as 24 percent during 2007 (Cordesman and Kleiber 2007, 27). On the other hand, a report on American Foreign Policy Council records 16 percent population of respective community in Iran till 2019 (AFPC 2019, 255).
- 8.
In 1997, Kurd population was recorded as 7.3 million (11.56 percent) out of 63.14 million total population in Iran (Meho 1997, 1). In 2005, this ratio came down to 7 percent and remained almost same till 2008 (Fast 2005, 19; LoC 2008, 5). However, according to the Human Rights Watch, this percentage was somewhat increased up to 7.10 percent when 4.5 million Kurd population was observed out of nearly 69 million total population in Iran during 2009 (Ibrahimi 2009, 6). On the other hand, a report published by American Foreign Policy Council traces 10 percent Kurdish population in Iran till 2019 (AFPC 2019, 255).
- 9.
- 10.
Same population ratio has been recorded by American Foreign Policy Council in 2019 (AFPC 2019, 255).
- 11.
- 12.
- 13.
Mazandarani speakers (other than Gilak) approximately number around 5 to 6 percent (Ghazzal et al. 2007, 483).
- 14.
During the 1970s, according to Eliz Sanasarian, Armenians’ population in Iran was 250,000. It then decreased toward 200,000 during the 1990s (Sanasarian 2000, 36).
- 15.
During 1970s, estimated population of Assyrians was 30,000 that became low between 16,000 and 18,000 till 1992 (Sanasarian 2000, 39).
- 16.
Until 2020, the estimated population of Brahui people in Iran is 24,000 (Mirvahedi 2019).
- 17.
Almost 50,000 Circassians have settled in Iran from Russia (Itekushev 2018).
- 18.
Approximately 10,000 Georgians are counted in Iran (Rezvani 2009).
- 19.
The estimated population of Tat people in Iran is 9500 (Mirvahedi 2019).
- 20.
Eighty-nine percent of the total Iranian population follows Twelver sect of Shia Islam (Armajani 2020, 2).
- 21.
Nine percent Iranians follow Sunni Islam (Armajani 2020, 2).
- 22.
Although Zaidi Muslims once lived in Northern Iran, now they have completely disappeared (Hunter 2015).
- 23.
According to the Institute of Ismaili Studies London, Ismaili-Shia Muslims have smaller population in Iran. However, it did not mention their share in the total Iranian population (Nanji 2003).
- 24.
It is difficult to trace the actual population size number of Baha’i people because the majority of them have been forced to hide their religious identity due to the suppressive attitude of the post-1979 central government against them. However, in 2002, their population was assumed as 4.25 million (6.32 percent) out of Iranian’s total population of 67.28 million (Minahan 2002, 229). While another report counted approximately 300,000 Baha’i people in Iran during 2003 (FIDH 2003, 11). On the other hand, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Country’s (DFAT) Information Report about Iran, published on April 14, 2020, estimated their population to be from 300,000 to about 350,000 (DFAT 2020, 34).
- 25.
Like the Baha’i people, Yarsanis have also been coerced to hide their identity, register themselves as Twelver-Shia regarding obtaining government services and constitutional privileges (Brownback et al. 2020, 4 & 6). However, Australian DFAT’s Country Information Report about Iran identifies one million followers of Yarsanism in the country (DFAT 2020, 35).
- 26.
Population size of Darvesh (Sufi) people in Iran is approximated between two and five million during 2020 (DFAT 2020, 35).
- 27.
It is also a difficult task to count the Mandaean population due to the three reasons. First, unavailability and conflicting information about their population within the greater populations of the countries where the people currently reside (like Iran). Second, the ability to trace and find Mandaeans who have now been settled outside of Iran. Finally, the lack of transparency in the information about who left Mandaeism causes an issue about the accuracy of the Mandaean population size (Baker 2017, 3). However, in 1989, their total population was reported as 6200. Yet in the year 2002, their number was almost as high as 25,000 (Häberl 2009, 10 & 11). During 2017, their number continued to increase, and it was reported about 10,000 Mandaeans were living in Iran (Baker 2017, 3).
- 28.
- 29.
Different sources claim varied statistics about Sikh population in Iran. However, they are in very little number; whereas, historically, they have settled in Iran (especially in Tehran and Isfahan) for trade from India during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Singh and Fenech 2014, 382). According to the caretaker of Gurudwara Sahib Tehran, almost 800 Sikhs are living in Tehran (AllaboutSikhs 2020). Moreover, Sikhs have also settled in Bushehr, Mashhad, and Isfahan (AllaboutSikhs 2020).
- 30.
Assyrians are not the only ethno-linguistic minority, but they are also counted as one of the ethno-sectarian communities among Christians in Iran. They mostly follow the Assyrian Church of the East but several also adhere to the Assyrian Evangelical Church, Assyrian Pentecostal Church, and Ancient Church of the East (Price 2005, 264–265).
- 31.
Ethnic Assyrians tend to follow the Chaldean Catholic Church (also called Chaldean Catholics, Chaldean Christians, or Chaldo-Assyrians). The Chaldean Catholic Church originated from the Church of the East (Price 2005, 264–265).
- 32.
This Arabic, Persian, and Urdu term means guardianship of Islamic jurist. In 1970, Imam Khumeni presented an idea in his lectures and public meetings that there should be a jurist leading the Muslims of the world during occultation of Mahdi (the twelfth Imam in Shia Islam). He claimed he extracted the idea from the teachings of Agha Khoi (belong to Najaf, Iraq); however, Agha Khoi (along with his colleagues) rejected this idea. Khoi argued he never taught or presented such an idea to his students (Aarabi 2019).
- 33.
Article 5 delivers guardianship to Muslims within Iran and Muslims of the entire world to an individual jurist, until the reappearance of the twelfth Imam (Aarabi 2019).
- 34.
Article 107 discusses the appointment process of the Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts. All eighty-eight members of the Assembly of Experts must be approved by the Guardian Council. However, the members of Guardian Council are directly or indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council also judges the qualification of the candidates for the Assembly of Experts before their elections. All candidates must fulfill the requirements (described in Articles 5 and 109) for the role of Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council further elects one “expert” among them as the Iranian Supreme Leader (Constitution of Iran 1989).
- 35.
Article 109 describes the attributes and qualities for a Supreme Leader. For example, the person should have administrative capabilities, charismatic social skills, a sound political perspective, and aptitude for leadership (Constitution of Iran 1989).
- 36.
Article 110 defines the authorities and responsibilities of Supreme Leader such as—
Determining entire political scenario of Iran by consulting with the Expediency Council (Majma Maslehat Andeshi Nizam),
Supervising effective and efficient implementation of the entire political policies,
Conducting referendum,
Commanding armed forces,
Declaring peace, war. or mobilization of forces,
Appointing, dismissing or accepting the resignations of the jurisprudents of Guardian Council, officials within judiciary, president of mass media in Iran, chief of general staff, commander-in-chief of Revolutionary Guards, and supreme commanders of police and armed forces,
Solving issues between executive, legislature, and judiciary,
Resolving issues (that cannot be address by the simple means) in the system by the consultation of Expediency Council (Majma Maslehat Andeshi Nizam),
Signing the appointment of the president of Iran when he will be elected by the public,
Dismissing the president of Iran in the best interest of the country (only when if Supreme court will issue a ruling about his deviation from legal duties or if Islamic Consultative Assembly will cast vote for no confidence against him),
Reducing or pardoning the sentences of criminals/convicts within the context of Islamic criteria, and,
Having the right to transfer some of his power to any other person (Constitution of Iran 1989; Asim et al. 2020, 273–287).
On the other hand, article 05 and article 110 jointly empower the Supreme Leader to look all the affairs (mentioned above) in the Shia populated countries (or regions) as an absolute guardian of Shia Muslims (Aarabi 2019).
- 37.
Under article 110 of the constitution the Supreme Leader of Iran is also the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp. Article 150 allows him to use force if the leader feels any threat to the revolutionary ideology (Constitution of Iran 1989).
- 38.
Azerbaijan was forced to established warm relations with Israel due to counter Iranian revolution-exporting orientations (Murinson 2009, sec. 13). While Azerbaijani Shia Muslim jurists have rejected the idea of VilayateFaqih presented by Imam Khumeni, declared this office as the political post (AFPC 2011, 545). They further argue that no one country or region beyond the borders of Iran have representation in the Assembly of Experts, then how an elected person from respective house has an authority to direct the lives of Twelver-Shia Muslims outside the Iran (AFPC 2011, 545).
- 39.
Like Azerbaijani and the Twelver-Shia Muslim jurists, several Iraqi Twelver-Shia Muslim jurists (including Agha Khoi, the teacher of Imam Khumeni) also rejected the concept of VilayateFaqih. Intelligence information came to light about the Iranian involvement in Shia populated areas regarding the initiation of a 1979-styled revolution to disintegrate Iraq. In 1991, Saddam Hussain ordered a military operation in Najaf and Karbala resulting in the killing of numerous pro-Iranian and pro-VilayateFaqih religious scholars (Eric 1992, 24 & 26).
- 40.
Tajikistan unofficially banned Tajik students to get an education in Iran due to the uprising of independence movements in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (Rubin 1998, 81 & 104). This is because Tajik intelligence agencies trace many Pamiri ethno-nationalist leaders in the respective region as they were once the students in Iranian universities where they had been prepared for 1979-styled revolution (Najibullah 2010).
- 41.
Article 112 describes the reasons of establishing Expediency Council (by an order of Supreme Leader) such as:
Resolving issues between Islamic Consultative Assembly and Guardian Council,
Consulting upon affairs which Supreme Leader will refer to the Expediency Council, or,
Other duties mentioned in the constitution (Constitution of Iran 1989; Asim et al. 2020, 273–287).
- 42.
- 43.
Article 176 discusses the purposes for establishing Supreme Council of National Security. Duties of this council are:
Designing defense and security policies for the country under the direction of Supreme Leader,
Coordinating socio-economic, political and cultural activities in context of defense and security concerns, and
Utilizing materialistic and spiritual resources of the country in case of having domestic or foreign threats (Constitution of Iran 1989; Asim et al. 2020, 273–287).
Furthermore, members of respective council are the heads of judiciary, executive and legislature, commander-in-chief of armed forces, two representatives elected by Supreme Leader, minister for state, minister for foreign affairs, and minister for intelligence, highest leadership of Revolutionary Guards, and administrative officer of the budget and planning (Constitution of Iran 1989; Asim et al. 2020, 273–287).
- 44.
Until 2020, the majority among Iranian Georgians have adopted Twelver-Shia Islam and Persian language but a significant portion of them still follow Georgian Orthodox Church. Although Iranian constitution does not recognize Georgian Orthodox Church but warm relations between Iran and Georgia have become the reason of delivering religious freedom to the followers of respective sect, staying in Fereydan, Gilan Golestan, Isfahan, Mazandaran, and more than 50 percent in Tehran. Another reason of their satisfactory religious life in Iran is their respect for the teachings of Twelver-Shia Islam and the post-1979 state structure (Juneau and Razavi 2013, 151–152).
- 45.
Although the Iranian constitution does not mention the death penalty for religious conversion from Islam to another faith, judges do impose the penalty due to the social and official pressure (Afshari 2011, 140).
- 46.
In 1990, Hussain Sudmand and, in 2013, Yousaf Nadarkhani were both executed because they both converted to Christianity (Afshari 2011, 140). Similarly, in 1993, Mahdi Dibaj was arrested and then, imprisoned for ten years before he was sentenced to death. Although he was freed due to international pressure in 1994, he was murdered the very next year (Afshari 2011, 140). Saeed Abedini was imprisoned for eight years with allegations of establishing a secret Christian network in Iran (Sekulow 2013).
- 47.
The Ismaili-Shia sect is the second largest branch of Shia Islam after Twelver-Shia sect. There are different sub-sects of Ismaili-Shia Islam, and the Nizari-Ismaili sect is the largest sub-sect branch (McCandless and Bergamaschi 2014).
- 48.
Initially, they practiced taqiyya and declared themselves as Sunni Muslims. Yet, now, the majority of them claim to be Twelver-Shia Muslims (Virani 2007, 113).
- 49.
In Iran, Ismailis are generally called Muriden-e-Agha Khan (the followers of Agha Khan). Similarly, their Jamatkhana—worship place—is called Khanqah Panjtani (Tajddin 2020).
- 50.
According to the 2002 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Submitted to Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the US House of Representatives by the Department of State), Mandaeans are considered as Christians in Iran. Therefore, they enjoy all the constitutional privileges along with other constitutionally recognized religious minorities. However, they face discrimination when they highlight themselves not as Christians (Biden and Hyde 2002, 535).
- 51.
Gozinesh means choosing. Since 1979, this term is most commonly used in Iran, and it is “an important step in the official recruitment process whereby the applicant’s knowledge about Islamic principles is tested” (Qubadzadah 2015, 91). While the Gozinesh Law 1985 has not only restricted Mandaean lives in Iran, it has also inhibited them from securing any government jobs (Amnesty 2005, 132).
- 52.
Although Kurdish sense of separatism in Iran is much weaker than in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the 2007 membership of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) in Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) triggered the Iranian government to see every Iranian Kurd with a suspicious eye. On the other hand, unlike Kurds’ orientations in Iraqi Kurdistan, PDKI seeks regional autonomy within the federal state structure rather than to disintegrate Iran (UNPO 2015a).
- 53.
Majority of Iranian Kurds follow Islam (either Twelver-Shia Islam or Shafa’i-Sunni Islam) and Yarsanism, whereas others have adopted the Baha’i faith.
- 54.
A worship place of the Yarsani people is in IslamabadeGarb city.
- 55.
In Azimabad (Zabol) on August 27, 2008, security forces attacked a Sunni mosque and a religious school. The security forces arrested all the staff and students, and, then finally, destroyed the mosque. To date, no one knows what happened to those who were arrested in this sudden attack (Borr 2008). A similar attack happened on July 29, 2015, in Tehran. The security forces destroyed another Sunni mosque (NCRI 2015). Since then, Sunni Muslims in Tehran are not allowed to construct their mosques or offer Eid separately. The Sunni Muslims have also been coerced for not to offer Friday prayers separately from others (Alipour 2017). Stories of destructions have not ended here, as Iranian authorities keep destroying mosques in Sunni-populated areas (especially in Razavi Khorasan Province and Sistan-o-Balochistan Province) and they blame the custodians for involvement in anti-state or anti-VilayateFaqih activities (Lumsden 2019). Although the construction of Sunni mosques in Sunni-populated areas is not prohibited in the Iran constitution, Muhammed Bagher Tabataei (Advisor to the General Directorate of Islamic Culture and Guidance of Razavi Khorasan Province) has demanded Iranian authorities to destroy grand Sunni mosques. In Zahedan, Muhammed Bagher Tabataei called the Sunni mosque “a house of corruption” on the eve of EidulFitr (Stone 2020). Moreover, Human Rights Network of Kurdistan, Baloch Activists Campaign, and Human Rights News Agency reported numerous cases of harassment, suppression, and discrimination cases of Sunni Muslims in the Kurdistan Province and the Sistan-o-Balochistan Province (Stone 2020).
- 56.
Iranian Azerbaijan generally covers the East Azerbaijan Province, the West Azerbaijan Province, the Zanjan Province, and the Ardabil Province. The Azeri community has also settled in the Qazvin Province and the Hamedan Province (Moaddel and Karabenick 2013, 101).
- 57.
Followers of United Azerbaijan Movement demand unification of the Iranian Azerbaijan Region and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This movement is quite different from the Movement for “Whole Azerbaijan,” which was initiated by Piruz Dilanchi. Dilanchi argued the borders of Azerbaijan must cover the geographical land from Derbant to the Persian Gulf, including contemporary Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Armenia, and contemporary Georgia (Asim et al. 2019, 239–252).
- 58.
On May 12, 2006, the Iranian magazine Iran-e-Jomee published a cartoon where there was an exhibition of conversation between a Persian-speaking child and an Azeri-speaking cockroach (Amnesty 2006). This publication led to massive protests in Azeri-populated cities of Ardabil, Tabriz, Urmia, and Zanjan. Amnesty International claimed that ten Azeris were shot dead by police, while Iranian authorities confirmed the arrest of 330 Azeris during respective protests and declared their association with Tudeh Party or Baha’i community (RFE 2006; Gambrell 2019).
- 59.
Iranian Kurdistan comprises of Kermanshah Province, Kurdistan Province, Ilam Province, and Hamedan Province. Moreover, Kurds are also a major ethno-linguistic group in West Azerbaijan Province and Lorestan Province (Hosseini 2019, 63).
- 60.
The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was a short-lived Kurdish state under Soviet patronage during 1945–1946 (Bayandor 2019, 64).
- 61.
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) describes “Greater Kurdistan” as the territory consisting four parts: North Kurdistan (also called Turkish Kurdistan labeled as Bakur), West Kurdistan (also known as West Kurdistan defined as Rojava), South Kurdistan (also classified as Iraqi Kurdistan or Bashur), and East Kurdistan (also designated as Iranian Kurdistan or Rojhilat) (Kaya 2020, 137).
- 62.
Majority of both Khamseh Arabs (staying in Fars Province) and Khorasani Arabs (live in South Khorasan Province and Razavi Khorasan Province) never criticize the post-1979 state structure, maybe because of following the Twelver-Shia Islam (Khoury and Kostiner 1990, 202–203). However, some of Khorasani Arabs are Zaidi-Shia too (Daftary 2006).
- 63.
The Iranian constitution does not mention any penalty for being converted to Sunni from Shia or Shia from Sunni (Alabbasi 2015).
- 64.
Majority of Iranian Baloch follow Hanafi-Sunni Islam. However, a tiny portion of them also follow Twelver-Shia Islam (Taheri 2014, 31).
- 65.
Although Gilak and Mazandarani ethno-linguistic communities are gradually losing their socio-cultural identity because of Persian dominance. However, their support to the post-1979 state structure is due to their sect; the majority among them follows Twelver-Shia Islam (Borjian 2005, 68 & 71).
- 66.
Gilak ethno-linguistic community lives in the Gilan Province, the Golestan Province, and the Mazandaran Province (Boulanger 1965, 775). However, advocates of Soviet-style Marxism only have only been traced in Rasht, Lahijan, and BandareAnzali counties of the Gilan Province (Dailami 2007, 51–82; Borjian 2005, 68).
- 67.
In the Gilan Province, the majority of Talysh people live in Tavalesh county and Rizwanshahr county (Dorronsoro and Grojean 2018, Part.01, Chapter.03).
- 68.
It was short-lived autonomous republic (June to August 1993) within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Asim et al. 2019, 239–252).
- 69.
An organization of Azerbaijani Talysh leaders exiled in the Netherlands (UNPO 2015b).
- 70.
Before 1979, Iranian Turkmen were enjoying their socio-cultural life and had acquired all the basic necessities not only in villages but also in cities. But the post-1979 state structure caused heavy loss to their socio-cultural lives. Their modern lifestyle has been replaced by theocratic norms, their free-market economy has almost collapsed, and their literacy rate has highly decreased (Rashidvash 2013, 88–93).
- 71.
Economic Cooperation Organization—established in 1985—founding members were Pakistan and Iran. Turkey, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the organization later (Asim et al. 2019, 239–252).
- 72.
Iranian support to different Shia militant groups in Iraq encourages connections between Kurd nationalists of Iraq and Iran, or between the speakers of Gulf-Arabic (who live either in Ahvaz city of Iran or in Basra Governorate of Iraq) (Manfredi 2020, 447). While Iranian authorities consider such socio-cultural, historical, or political connections as anti-state activities (Eisenstadt et al. 2011, 6–20).
References
Aarabi, Kasra. 2019. What Is Velayat-e Faqih? March 20. https://institute.global/policy/what-velayat-e-faqih.
Abdulla, Jamal Jalal. 2012. The Kurds: A Nation on the Way to Statehood. Bloomington: Author House.
AFPC. 2011. The World Almanac of Islamism: Denmark. Lanham and New York: American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) and Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
———. 2019. The World Almanac of Islamism 2019. Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield.
Afshari, Reza. 2011. Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Alabbasi, Mamoon. 2015. Iran’s Ahwazi Arab Minority: Dissent against ‘Discrimination’, February 28. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/irans-ahwazi-arab-minority-dissent-against-discrimination.
Alavi, Mahmoud. 2019. Iran Intelligence ‘Summons’ People ‘Who Showed Interest In Christianity’, May 4. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-intelligence-ministry-summons-iranian-who-showed-interest-in-christianity-/29921102.html.
Alexander, Murinson. 2009. Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan. London and New York: Routledge.
Alipour, Zahra. 2017. Tehran’s Sunnis Still Waiting for Their Own Mosque, September 21. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/iran-tehran-sunni-mosque-prayer-space-pounak.html.
AllaboutSikhs. 2020. Gurudwaras in Iran, July 30. https://www.allaboutsikhs.com/gurudwaras/world-gurudwaras/gurudwaras-in-iran/.
Alsultan, Fahad M. 2016. The Development of Saudi-Iranian Relations since 1990s. London and New York: Taylor & Francis.
Amar. 2020. Statistical Center of Iran, July 17. https://www.amar.org.ir/english.
Amnesty. 2005. The Amnesty International Report. Belgium: Amnesty International Publications.
———. 2006. Iran: Continuing Crackdown against Peaceful Critics, September 26. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/iran-continuing-crackdown-against-peaceful-critics.
Armajani, Jon. 2020. Shia Islam and Politics: Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Lanham and London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Asim, Muhammad, Yasmin Roofi, and Mussawar Hussain Bokhari. 2019. Ethnic Dilemma in Iranian Azerbaijan during Post-Soviet Era: Impacts on Multilateral Trade under ECO. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) 39: 239–252.
Asim, Muhammad, Muhammad Akram Zaheer, and Yasmin Roofi. 2020. Constitutional Economics under an Official Thought to be Divinely Guided: Implication on Islamic Republic of Iran. Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization (JITC) (Department of Islamic Thought and Civilization, School of Social Science and Humanities, University of Management and Technology, Lahore) 10 (1): 274–287.
Aslan, Reza. 2016. The Biggest Difference Between Faith and Religion, According to this Religious Scholar, April 11. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/faith-religion-difference_n_581ce83fe4b0d9ce6fbc02ca.
Awde, Nicholas, and Camilla Shahribaf. 2006. Farsi: Farsi-English, English-Farsi Dictionary & Phrasebook. New York: Hippocrene Books Inc.
Baker, Karen. 2017. The Mandaeans—Baptizers of Iraq and Iran. Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers.
Barry, James. 2018. Armenian Christians in Iran: Ethnicity, Religion, and Identity in the Islamic Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baumann, Dan. 2001. Imprisoned in Iran: Love’s Victory Over Fear. Seattle: YWAM Publishing.
Bayandor, Darioush. 2019. The Shah, the Islamic Revolution and the United States. Nyon: Palgrave Macmillan.
Biden, Joseph R., and Henry J. Hyde. 2002. Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2002. Washington, DC: US State Department.
Borjian, Maryam. 2005. Bilingualism in Mazandaran: Peaceful Coexistence with Persian. New York: Department of Arts and Humanities, Teachers College, Columbia University.
Borr, Reza Hossein. 2008. The Destruction of Another Sunni Mosque in Iran, October 24. https://m.dailyhunt.in/news/india/english/bayside+journal-epaper-baysidej/the+destruction+of+another+sunni+mosque+in+iran-newsid-75231057.
Boulanger, Robert. 1965. The Middle East: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran. New York: Hachette Book Group.
Brenda, Shaffer. 2002. Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Brookshaw, Dominic Parviz, and Seena B. Fazel. 2012. The Baha’is of Iran: Socio-Historical Studies. London and New York: Routledge.
Brownback, Sam, Dan Nadel, Stacy Bernard Davis, and Khashayar Ghashghai. 2020, June. International Religious Freedom Report 2019 for Iran. Washington, DC: Office of International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State.
BWNS. 2014. Muslim Leaders Embrace Ayatollah Tehrani’s Call for Religious Coexistence, May 13. https://news.bahai.org/story/995/.
———. 2015. In Another Brave Gesture, Senior Cleric Calls for Justice, December 21. https://news.bahai.org/story/1089/.
Cafiero, Giorgio. 2017. The Khuzestan Factor in Saudi-Iran Relations, November 20. https://lobelog.com/the-khuzestan-factor-in-saudi-iran-relations/.
Casaca, Paulo, and Siegfried O. Wolf. 2017. Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship. Brussels: Springer.
Castellino, Joshua, and Kathleen A. Cavanaugh. 2013. Minority Rights in the Middle East. London: Oxford University Press.
Chaliand, Gérard. 1993. A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Zed Books.
Chaqueri, Cosroe. 1995. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921: The Birth of Trauma. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
CNN. 2008. Iran’s Arrest of Baha’is Condemned, May 16. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/16/iran.bahais/.
Comrie, Bernard. 2009. The World’s Major Languages. London and New York: Routledge.
Constitution of Iran. 1989. Tehran: Assembly of Experts for Constitution.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Martin Kleiber. 2007. Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities; The Threat in the Northern Gulf. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Daftary, Dr. Farhad. 2006. What is Shi’a Islam? https://www.iis.ac.uk/what-shia-islam.
Dailami, Pezhmann. 2007. The Bolshevik Revolution and the Genesis of Communism in Iran; 1917–1920. Central Asian Survey 11: 51–82.
Danver, Steven L. 2015. Native Peoples of the World: An Encyclopedia of Groups, Cultures and Contemporary Issues. London and New York: Routledge.
Dashti, Naseer. 2017. The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan: Aspects of a National Liberation Struggle. Bloomington: Trafford Publishing.
Davidson, James Dale. 1994. The Great Reckoning: Protecting Yourself in the Coming Depression. London and Tokyo: Simon and Schuster.
DFAT. 2020, April. Country Information Report about Iran. Canberra: Australian Government.
Dorronsoro, Gilles, and Olivier Grojean. 2018. Identity, Conflict and Politics in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press.
Durkheim, Emile, and Mark Sydney Cladis. 2001. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Auckland and Bangkok: Oxford University Press.
Eisenstadt, Michael, Michael Knights, and Ahmed Ali. 2011. Iran’s Influence in Iraq. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Elling, Rasmus Christian. 2013. Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Eric, Goldstein. 1992. Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath. New York: Human Rights Watch.
Esposito, John L., and John O. Voll. 1996. Islam and Democracy. London: Oxford University Press.
Fahlbusch, Erwin, Jan Milic Lochman, Geoffrey William Bromiley, John Mbiti, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Lukas Vischer. 1999. The Encyclopedia of Christianity, Volume 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing.
Farson, Anthony Stuart. 2008. PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: Europe, the Middle East, and South Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
Fast, April. 2005. Iran the People. Ontario: Crabtree Publishing Company.
FIDH. 2003, August. Discrimination against Religious Minorities in IRAN. Paris and Geneva: International Federation for Human Rights.
Finlay, Hueston E. 2005. ‘Feeling of Absolute Dependence’ or ‘Absolute Feeling of Dependence’? A Question Revisited. Religious Studies 41: 81–94.
Gambrell, Jon. 2019. Hard-line Cleric Says Social Media Fed Iran Protests, Unrest, January 6. https://www.rferl.org/a/1069380.html.
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. How Dictatorship Work; Power, Personalization and Collapse. London: Cambridge University Press.
Ghazzal, Zouhair, Ronald Legon, and Margaret Lee. 2007. World and Its Peoples, Volume 1. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation.
Gholipour, Behnam. 2018. Iranian Arab Groups Who Oppose the Islamic Republic, September 24. https://iranwire.com/en/features/5552.
Gilman, Benjamin A., William Goodling, and Thomas G. Tancredo. 2000. Annual Report, International Religious Freedom 1999. Washington, DC: Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate.
Gorder, Christian A. Van. 2010. Christianity in Persia and the Status of Non-Muslims in Modern Iran. Lanham and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Häberl, Charles. 2009. The Neo-Mandaic Dialect of Khorramshahr. New Jersey: Harrassowitz Verlag.
Hakim, Ahmad. 2018. The Ongoing Struggle for Independence in Ahwaz, October 7. https://www.dusc.org/en/drasat/1559/.
Hassan, Hussein D. 2010. Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities. Washington, DC: CRS Report for Congress.
Havardi, Jeremy. 2016. Refuting the Anti-Israel Narrative: A Case for the Historical, Legal and Moral Legitimacy of the Jewish State. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
Heradstveit, Daniel. 2009. Azerbaijani Ethno-nationalism: A Danger Signal for Iran, January 29. https://www.mei.edu/publications/azerbaijani-ethno-nationalism-danger-signal-iran.
Hopkins, Peter. 2016. Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender and Belonging. London and New York: Routledge.
Hosseini, S. Behnaz. 2019. Women in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: An Anthology of Cases from Iraq, Iran, Syria and Other Countries. Zurich: LIT Verlag Münster. Copyright.
HRANA. 2019. Three Baha’is Were Arrested in Shiraz, October 21. https://www.en-hrana.org/three-bahais-were-arrested-in-shiraz.
Hunter, Shireen. 2015. Is Iran the Leader of a Shia International? February 4. https://lobelog.com/is-iran-the-leader-of-a-shia-international/#:~:text=There%20were%20Zaidis%20in%20Iran,historically%20has%20not%20been%20close.
Ibrahimi, Ruzbih Mir. 2009. Iran: Freedom of Expression and Association in the Kurdish Regions. New York and Berlin: Human Rights Watch.
IDEA. 2014, September. Religion-State Relations. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Illahi, Mahboob. 2018. Doctrine of Terror: Saudi Salafi Religion. Victoria, BC: FriesenPress.
IRB-Canada. 2000. Treatment of Ismailis by the Iranian Authorities, November 29. https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1330051.html.
Ismayilov, M. 2018. The Dialectics of Post-Soviet Modernity and the Changing Countours of Islamic Discource in Azerbaijan. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Itekushev. 2018. Circassians in Iran, February 9. https://caucasustimes.com/en/circassians-in-iran/.
Jakubowski, Andrzej. 2016. Cultural Rights as Collective Rights: An International Law Perspective. Leiden: BRILL.
John. 2010. Mandaean Faith Lives on in Iranian South, July 30. https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/1303039.html.
Joshua. 2020a. Brahui in Iran, January 28. https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/10959/IR.
———. 2020b. Mussulman Tat in Iran. https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/13896/IR.
Journet, Cardinal Charles. 2011. What Is Dogma? New York and San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
Juneau, Thomas, and Sam Razavi. 2013. Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. New York: Routledge.
Kaya, Zeynep N. 2020. Mapping Kurdistan: Territory, Self-Determination and Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khoury, Philip Shukry, and Joseph Kostiner. 1990. Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
King, David C. 2006. Azerbaijan. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation.
Kirkham, David M. 2013. State Responses to Minority Religions. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Koohi-Kamali, Farideh. 2003. The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kurdistan24. 2016. Iranian Kurdistan: Kurds Condemn Attacks on Yarsan Faith, March 9. https://unpo.org/article/18991.
Lim, Kevjn. 2015. National Security Decision-Making in Iran. Comparative Strategy 34: 149–168.
LoC. 2008, May. Country Profile: Iran. Washington, DC: Library of Congress—Federal Research Division.
Lucas, Ann E. 2019. Music of a Thousand Years: A New History of Persian Musical Traditions. Oakland: University of California Press.
Lumsden, Andrew. 2019. Myth vs. Fact: Iran’s Sunni Muslims, October 17. http://www.us-iran.org/resources/2019/10/16/myth-vs-fact-irans-sunni-muslims.
Maenza, Nadine, and Doug Lamborn. 2020. Iran Must Free Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, August 5. https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/religious-rights/510758-iran-must-free-pastor-youcef-nadarkhani.
Maher, Joanne, Philip McIntyre, Thomas Andres, Priya Shah, and Paul Kelly. 2003. The Europa World Year Book 2003, Volume 1. London: Taylor & Francis.
Mahmood, Javed. 2019. Tehran Backing Militancy in Balochistan, Think-Tank Says, July 10. https://pakistan.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_pf/features/2019/07/10/feature-01.
Manfredi, Stefano. 2020. Arabic and Contact-Induced Change. Berlin: Language Science Press.
McCandless, David, and Fabio Bergamaschi. 2014. Islamic Sects: Major Schools and Notable Branches, October. https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/islamic-sects-schools-branches-movements/.
Meho, Lokman I. 1997. The Kurds and Kurdistan: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography. London: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Miller, Duane Alexander, and Patrick Johnstone. 2015. Believers in Christ from a Muslim Background: A Global Census. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 11: 7–16.
Minahan, James. 2000. One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups. London: Greenwood Press.
———. 2002. Encyclopedia of the Stateless Nations: A-C. London: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Mirvahedi, Seyed Hadi. 2019. The Sociolinguistics of Iran’s Languages at Home and Abroad: The Case of Persian, Azerbaijani and Kurdish. Singapore: Springer.
Moaddel, Mansoor, and Stuart A. Karabenick. 2013. Religious Fundamentalism in the Middle East. Leiden: BRILL.
Mohammidi, Ali. 2013. Iran Encountering Globalization: Problems and Prospects. London and New York: Routledge.
Murinson, Alexander. 2009. Turkey’s Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan. London and New York: Routldge.
Myers, David G. 2007. Social Psychology. New Delhi and New York: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.
Nada, Garrett. 2020. Iran’s Troubled Provinces: Khuzestan, July 20. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jul/29/iran%E2%80%99s-challenges-converge-khuzestan.
Nader, Alireza, David E. Thaler, and S.R. Bohandy. 2011. The Next Supreme Leader: Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation and National Defense Research Institute.
Nadjmabadi, Shahnaz R. 2009. Conceptualizing Iranian Anthropology: Past and Present Perspectives. New York: Berghahn Books.
Najibullah, Farangis. 2010. Tajiks Stopped from Traveling to Iran, Pakistan for Religious Courses, September 8. https://www.rferl.org/a/Tajiks_Stopped_From_Traveling_to_Iran_Pakistan_For_Religious_Courses/2152337.html.
Nanji, Azim. 2003. Nizari. Accessed August 12, 2020. https://www.iis.ac.uk/encyclopaedia-articles/nizari.
NCRI. 2015. Iran Regime Destroys Sunni Mosque in Tehran, July 30. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-regime-destroys-sunni-mosque-in-tehran/.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2009. Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. London and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nurrochmat, Dodik Ridho. 2005. The Impacts of Regional Autonomy: On Political Dynamics, Socio-Economic and Forest Degradation; Case of Jambi—Indonesia. Gottingen: Institute of Forest Policy and Nature Conservation, University of Gottingen.
Oualaalou, David S. 2016. The Ambiguous Foreign Policy of United States towards the Muslim World. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
PEW. 2012. Global Religious Landscape, December 18. http://features.pewforum.org/grl/population-number.php?sort=numberHindu.
Pohl, Reynaldo Galindo. 1993. Commission on Human Rights Report on the Forty-Ninth Session. New York: United Nations.
Potter, Lawrence G. 2014. Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf. London and New York: Oxford University Press and Georgetown University’s Center for International and Regional Studies.
Price, Massoume. 2005. Iran’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook. London: ABC-CLIO.
Qubadzadah, Nasir. 2015. Religious Secularity: A Theological Challenge to the Islamic State. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
Radio-Farda. 2019. UN Adopts Resolution Condemning Iran’s Human Rights Violations, December 19. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/un-adopts-resolution-condemning-iran-human-rights-violations/30333824.html.
Rashidvash, Vahid. 2013. Turkmen Status within Iranian Ethnic Identity (Cultural, Geographical, Political). Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 3: 88–93.
Rezvani, Babak. 2009. The Fereydani Georgian Representation of Identity and Narration of History: A Case of Emic Coherence. Anthropology of the Middle East 4: 52–74.
———. 2015. Conflict and Peace in Central Eurasia: Towards Explanations and Understandings. Boston: BRILL.
RFE. 2006. Iran Says 330 Arrested Over Recent Cartoon Unrest, June 22. https://www.rferl.org/a/1069380.html.
Rubin, Barnett R. 1998. Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building. London and New York: Psychology Press.
Safdar, Muhammad Tayyab, and Joshua Zabin. 2020. What Does the China-Iran Deal Mean for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? August 20. https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/what-does-the-china-iran-deal-mean-for-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/.
Sanasarian, Eliz. 2000. Religious Minorities in Iran. London: Cambridge University Press.
Saroglou, Vassilis. 2014. Religion, Personality, and Social Behavior. New York: Taylor & Francis.
Sekulow, Jordan. 2013. IRAN: Saeed Abedini Sentenced to Eight Years in Prison, January 28. https://www.churchinchains.ie/news-by-country/middle-east/iran/iran-saeed-abedini-sentenced-to-eight-years-in-prison/.
Shaheed, Ahmed, Asma Jahangir, Fernand de Varennes, and Dainius Puras. 2018. Iran Must Ensure Rights of Christian Minority and Fair Trial for the Accused—UN Experts, February 2. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22629&LangID=E.
Shams, Shamil. 2019. Pakistan Blames Iran-based Separatists for Deadly Baluchistan Attack, April 20. https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-blames-iran-based-separatists-for-deadly-baluchistan-attack/a-48416436.
Sharma, Sunil. 2004. The City of Beauties in Indo-Persian Poetic Landscape. Durham: Duke University Press.
Siewierska, Anna. 1998. Constituent Order in the Languages of Europe. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Sims, Williams, and Stark Rodney. 1979. Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 18: 117–133.
Singh, Pashaura, and Louis E. Fenech. 2014. The Oxford Handbook of Sikh Studies. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
Skutsch, Carl. 2005. Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities. London and New York: Routledge.
Souleimanov, Emil Aslan, and Josef Kraus. 2017. Iran’s Azerbaijan Question in Evolution: Identity, Society, and Regional Security. Washington, DC: American Foreign Policy Council.
Stone, Lucian. 2014. Iranian Identity and Cosmopolitanism: Spheres of Belonging. London and New Delhi: Bloomsbury.
Stone, Pooya. 2020. Mullahs Increase Persecution of Sunni Muslims in Iran, May 26. https://www.iranfocus.com/en/life-in-iran/34523-mullahs-increase-persecution-of-sunni-muslims-in-iran/.
Taheri, Ahmad Reza. 2012. The Baloch in Post Islamic Revolution Iran: A Political Study. Tehran: Taheri Entrepreneurship Company of Daneshyaran of Humanities (TECODH).
———. 2014. A Sociopolitical Study of Iranian Baloch Elites (1979–2013). Zahedan: Taheri Entrepreneurship Company of Daneshyaran of Humanities (TECODH).
Tajddin, Mumtaz Ali. 2020. Ismailis in Iran, August 14. http://www.ismaili.net/heritage/node/10475.
Tatchell, Peter. 2007. Iran’s Anti-Arab Racism, October 26. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/oct/26/iransantiarabracism.
UNGA. 1992, December. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. New York: United Nations General Assembly.
———. 2020. UN General Assembly, August 5. https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNGA,,IRN,,,0.html.
UNPO. 2015a. Iranian Kurdistan, November 30. https://unpo.org/members/7882.
———. 2015b. Talysh, July 8. https://unpo.org/members/17338.
———. 2017a. Southern Azerbaijan, January 31. https://unpo.org/members/7884.
———. 2017b. West Balochistan, August 22. https://unpo.org/members/7922.
Virani, Shafique N. 2007. The Ismailis in the Middle Ages: A History of Survival, a Search for Salvation. London and New York: Oxford University Press.
Winzeler, Robert L. 2008. Anthropology and Religion: What We Know, Think, and Question. Lanham and New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
WorldPopulationReview. 2020. Hindu Countries 2020, January. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/hindu-countries.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Asim, M. (2023). Iranian Constitution Under Pro-Center Dogmatic Authoritarianism and Pro-Persian Cosmopolitanism, and Its Impacts on Ethno-sectarian and Ethno-linguistic Minorities. In: Hosseini, S.B. (eds) Ethnic Religious Minorities in Iran. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1633-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1633-5_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-19-1632-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-19-1633-5
eBook Packages: Literature, Cultural and Media StudiesLiterature, Cultural and Media Studies (R0)