Abstract
Egalitarianism is roughly the idea that people should be more equal than they are in most societies today. Among different versions of egalitarianism, this chapter focuses on social egalitarianism whose ambition is to eliminate relationships of domination and ensure a democratic distribution of power. John Rawls is a key thinker within this tradition, and he has had deep influence on Thomas Piketty’s understanding of distributive justice. It is argued that both hold an ideal that justifies a capital ceiling and a capital floor. Taxation is one of the most important measures to realize this ideal, and progressive taxation of income, inheritance and wealth is likely to be included in schemes to implement such an understanding of what a just society is. However, an egalitarian society will need several other measures in addition to taxation to be realized. Thus, the distinction between predistribution and redistribution is explored. Drawing on Murphy and Nagel, the chapter goes on to discuss whether pre-tax income and distribution of the tax burden are relevant in a theory of justice. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationship between the state and the individual and whether social egalitarianism is best realized in a property-owning democracy or under liberal socialism.
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Notes
- 1.
The chapter has been presented at the comparative political economy seminar at the University of Bergen. Thank you to the participants for comments and criticism. In addition, I would like to thank Dan Halliday, Bjørn Sandvik, Preben Sørheim and Robert van Brederode for valuable feedback on an earlier version of the manuscript.
- 2.
It should be noted, however, that this definition of egalitarianism is narrow. As Elisabeth Anderson has argued, there are forms of egalitarianisms that has been concerned with other things than distribution of goods. The feminist movement and the LGBT movement are egalitarian, but not primarily concerned with distributive justice (Anderson et al. 2014, 258).
- 3.
There are other distinctions that are relevant, such as the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental egalitarianism and deontic and telic egalitarianism. The development of these concepts is heavily influenced by Derek Parfit’s paper Equality or Priority (Parfit 1997), and there is no doubt that the literature following Parfit’s paper has improved the understanding of egalitarianism. However, these debates have not been connected to matters of taxation. Therefore, I shall not explore them here. For a useful discussion see Hirose (2015).
- 4.
The distinction between the two camps should not be drawn too sharp. For recent attempts to defend versions of luck-egalitarianism that are designed to overcome some of the criticism that was levelled at the first generation of luck-egalitarianism, see Tan (2012) and Lippert-Rasmussen (2015). For recent attempts to define and discuss egalitarianism see Hirose (2015), and Moss (2014). Note also that Dworkin is heavily influenced by Rawls, so the pedigree of egalitarian theory is more complex than simply saying that one develops from Rawls and the other from Dworkin.
- 5.
Much of the early discussion between egalitarians was about what it is that is to be distributed if one cares about equality. This “equality of what debate” has consolidated around three main answers on what it is that should be distributed: welfare, resources and capabilities. This debate is important, and in order to have a full theory of justice, it is necessary to clarify ‘the what’ question. Here, however, I will not enter into this debate. For a useful discussion see Moss (2014, chapter 2).
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
In this chapter I will not discuss global justice and how egalitarians think about justice in an international setting. Globalization is a challenge when it comes to how to tax multinational companies and the wealthiest, but it does not follow that there is no room for the nation state (Saez and Zucman 2019a, 195). As Piketty notes, “governments have considerable freedom to maneuver. They can make progress toward reducing inequality and establishing more just forms of ownership without waiting for international cooperation to be achieved” (Piketty 2020, 991). For an influential political-philosophical discussion of tax competition and tax evasion see Dietsch (2015).
- 9.
For a more detailed discussion of how these two versions of property-owning democracy differ and how they grew out of the same roots see Thomas (148–154).
- 10.
The interpretation of Rawls outlined here is based on Pedersen (2021a).
- 11.
It is important to note that it is not only individuals, but also corporations that can use money to influence politics. Thus, a complete account of the worry that money can influence politics in a problematic way must also take this complication into consideration. Thanks to Dan Halliday for pointing this out.
- 12.
There are different interpretations of Rawls in the secondary literature when it comes to Rawls’ view on these insulation strategies. O’Neill (2012, 82–83) claims that Rawls is in two minds about the insulation strategy. On the one hand O’Neill claims, Rawls holds that these strategies are necessary and sufficient to safeguard the fair value of the political liberties. On the other hand, Rawls formulates himself as if these strategies are necessary, but not sufficient. Thomas (2017, 95) interprets Rawls differently when it comes to the question of necessary and sufficient means to ensure equal opportunity to influence. According to Thomas, Rawls thinks such a set of special arrangements sufficient on their own to ensure political liberties; if they work, the fair value of political liberties does not require additional extensive redistribution as it does on my interpretation.
- 13.
For a discussion, see Brighouse and Swift (2014, 124–125).
- 14.
- 15.
Note that the difference principle does not play a decisive role in this interpretation of Rawls. In my opinion, the difference principle has attracted too much attention when it comes to how Rawls’ overall position should be interpreted.
- 16.
For elaboration on the justifications for a wealth ceiling and a wealth floor see White (2020).
- 17.
- 18.
Beyond this, I will avoid assuming a position on what overall ideal of distribution follows from Justice as Fairness. This is a complicated question, not least because Rawls sticks to the lexical ordering of the principles while also claiming that they are a unified whole. Samuel Freeman claims that the difference principle is the most important principle, but also points out that the liberty principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity affect distribution. From his interpretation, it follows that inequalities due to the difference principle cannot be accepted if they are in conflict with the liberty principle or the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Within the framework of a property-owning democracy, the difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity requires that the worst off are secured opportunities to achieve positions and posts and to control the means of production employed in their work (Freeman 2007, 139–140). Alan Thomas provides an alternative interpretation. Thomas thinks the best interpretations of justice as fairness should disregard the lexical priority and consider the principles as a unified whole. Furthermore, the principles must be institutionalized in the proper background context, namely property-owning democracy (Thomas 2017, 95).
- 19.
Philip Pettit defended this claim in a lecture in Bergen on August 31, 2017. Pettit defends a similar view in Pettit (2012, 123–127).
- 20.
And, as Fleurbaey argues, this principle has been very influential in normative economics (Fleurbaey 2021).
- 21.
For discussions of property-owning democracy, see Freeman (2013), and O’Neill and Williamson (2012a, b, c). For a discussion of the history of this ideal, see Jackson (2012). Thomas (2017) argues that Rawls’ two principles will be best realized under property-owning democracy whereas Edmundson (2017) gives a recent defense of the claim that Rawls is in favor of liberal socialism. We shall return to this discussion in the final section.
- 22.
Property owning democracy must therefore keep economic inequalities within strictly limited bonds. As Ben Jackson has shown, some of the early republican thinkers express similar views. Rousseau, for example, maintained that: “Do you, then, want to give the state stability? Bring the extremes as close together as possible; tolerate neither very rich people nor beggars”, and he subsequently added the famous sentence which states that no citizen should “be so very rich that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is compelled to sell himself” (Rousseau cited in Jackson 2012, 34).
- 23.
Rawls’ take on taxation is complex, and I shall return to this. Rawls explicitly endorses inheritance taxation but does not discuss wealth taxation.
- 24.
Other mechanisms for predistribution involve the educational system, minimum wage, and worker representation on company boards (Piketty 2020, 528–538). I shall return to the distinction between predistribution and redistribution in section V.
- 25.
For a discussion of the Mill scheme see Cappelen and Pedersen (2018).
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
For a recent influential defence of wealth taxation see Saez and Zucman (2019b)
- 29.
If someone chooses to save, it follows that the part of their wealth that is due to this choice is just, and not something that should be taxed. Nevertheless, one may, as Duff has pointed out, justify a wealth tax based on Dworkin’s theory. This may be due to two conditions. First, the rejection of wealth tax presupposes that income and inheritance is taxed prior to being saved. If this is not the case, Dworkin’s position may allow taxation of wealth as the second-best solution. Second, wealth tax may be necessary if a society is class-divided and individuals may reasonably be supposed to have insured against ending up among the worst off in that society. In general, however, Dworkin is against wealth tax (Duff 2016, 27–28). For a luck egalitarian critique of the wealth tax, see Rakowski (2000). For a critique of Rakowski based on the argument that the luck-egalitarian position on wealth tax is not as straight forward as it seems, see Fried (2000).
- 30.
The value added tax (VAT)is the European equivalent to a consumption tax. See Saez and Zucman (2019a, 185–187) for a short history of the tax and a brief explanation of why they are against it.
- 31.
See Halliday 2015 for a discussion on Murphy and Nagel on consumption taxes and for an attempt to show how consumption taxes can be redesigned to overcome the standard egalitarian objection to it.
- 32.
This and the following section are based on Pedersen (2021b).
- 33.
Piketty’s warning against a drift to oligarchy was focused on the U.S., but he also demonstrated that European countries normally regarded as social democratic had failed to contain the increasing inequality.
- 34.
For further discussion of this democratic element of Piketty’s approach see O’Neill (2021b).
- 35.
The following presentation is primarily based on chapter 17 in Capital and Ideology. Note that I will limit myself to the institutional measures that can be undertaken by the nation state. Piketty includes a discussion of global justice with reference to tax competition and tax havens. I will not discuss questions of global justice here.
- 36.
The term “circulation of capital” might not be precise. After all, capital could circulate even if it there are very few people amongst which it circulates. What Piketty has in mind is probably that capital must both be deconcentrated and that it must circulate. In the following I will use the term circulation of capital in this way.
- 37.
- 38.
- 39.
Whether such a change actually will stop people from becoming tax refugees depends on how important it is for them to be able to spend time in the given country. More knowledge is needed here about how potential tax refugees think. Moreover, a suggestion like this presupposes that one can distinguish between ordinary people and tax refugees so that the arrangement does not impact ordinary persons who live abroad, and who have not moved to avoid paying taxes. Barry also argues that tax refugees should not be given the same opportunity to donate money to political parties, own newspapers, etc. (Barry 2005, 193)
- 40.
There are other arguments against the wealth tax that I cannot discuss here. Some argue for example, that the wealth tax is double taxation, others hold that such a tax is hard to implement due to valuation issues. Furthermore, in the US, some will simply say that the wealth tax is unconstitutional and, therefore, not something to be considered. The argument about double taxation is problematic because no tax system can rely only on income taxation, the fact that the wealth tax has been part of the Norwegian system for hundred years shows that valuation problems can be overcome (see Pedersen 2021a, b, chapter 11), and finally, as Saez and Zucman (2019a, b, 22) have argued, the constitutionality of the wealth tax depends “on the make-up of the supreme court”.
- 41.
In his proposal for a capital endowment Piketty draws on Thomas Paine and Anthony Atkinson. In contrast to Atkinson, Piketty includes both a wealth tax and an inheritance tax as ways to finance the endowment, and this allows him to envisage a much larger sum compared to Atkinson whose proposal is based on funding by an inheritance tax only.
- 42.
In this sense, the basic income scheme defended by Piketty is not unconditional.
- 43.
For the discussion of educational justice, see Piketty (2020, 1007–1016).
- 44.
Note that a general floor provided through a cash endowment will also be able to secure everyone the opportunity for participation.
- 45.
See chapter 11: Social Democratic Societies: Incomplete Equality for a detailed analysis of what the social democratic societies have succeeded and failed to achieve. In short, Piketty claims they failed to go far enough in co-management, that they did not bring about educational justice, and that the social democratic countries failed to bring about distributive justice through taxation due to the massive tax competition between countries.
- 46.
For example, Kevin Vallier suggests that “introducing Piketty’s work into a Rawlsian framework strengthens Rawls’ critique of the welfare state and his case for property-owning democracy” (Vallier 2019, 142), and Martin O’Neill holds that “Piketty’s substantive normative view is in its specifics a remarkably Rawlsian one” (O’Neill 2017, 355).
- 47.
As Rawls notes, “the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of person they are” (Rawls 1999, 229). We shall return to the question of social system in the final section.
- 48.
Rawls has been criticized for being exclusively focused on the institutional. G.A. Cohen argued that Rawls’ focus on the basic structure made him ignore the importance of how people relate to each other (Cohen 2008). According to Cohen, a just society requires both just institutions and individuals who relate to each other in an egalitarian way. In my view, Cohen is right to insist that a just society must be based both on just institutions and on how people relate to each other. But this view is shared by Rawls. This argument is indebted to Thomas (2017). For a more detailed exposition, see Pedersen (2021a, b, chapter 4).
- 49.
- 50.
Rawls is not clear on this crucial issue, and his opinion seems to have changed over time (O’Neill 2012, 81–82). Piketty holds that there is surprisingly little coordination and learning between countries when it comes to how politics can be isolated from the influence of money. See Piketty (2020, 1017–1024) for his treatment of this.
- 51.
For a more nuanced recent discussion of the relationship between Rawls and Piketty, see O’Neill (2021b).
- 52.
It should be noted, as Martin O’Neill (2020a, 74–75) has emphasized, that predistributive policies are not necessarily progressive. If a conservative government for example weakens the bargaining power of unions and makes it easier for employers to sack employees, this would reduce the power of labor v. employer, and most likely decompress the pay structure prior to taxation. Such policies would be predistributive in the sense that they would affect distribution of income prior to taxation, but not in a sense that would help an egalitarian agenda.
- 53.
For an overview of different proposals for predistributive policies see O’Neill (2020a, 65).
- 54.
In the Norwegian context there is an ongoing debate of whether the successful recipe of land value taxation on the oil industry can be extended to other natural resources such as wind/hydropower and aquaculture (Brigham and Moses 2021).
- 55.
- 56.
O’Neill calls this the Piketty-Saez-Stancheva effect: “When top marginal rates of income taxation are very high, with a comparatively large gap between gross and net pay at the top end of the distribution, highly paid workers will be less likely to focus on the extrinsic financial rewards of their positions, and focus more on the intrinsic rewards of prestige and authority in large organizations” (O’Neill 2020a, b, 83).
- 57.
This section draws on Pedersen 2021a, chapter 8.
- 58.
For a brief statement on how the approach taken by Murphy and Nagel can be seen as broadly Rawlsian, see O’Neill and Orr (2018).
- 59.
This way of framing the question is inspired by Zelenak (2003).
- 60.
Murphy and Nagel do not themselves employ the distinction between simple and modern markets. However, because it is likely that there may have existed forms of barter between individuals independently of any state, I think this clarification is necessary. That said, the fact that there may historically have been state-independent markets does not affect the normative question with which we are here concerned. It does not justify any claim that we have a right to our pre-tax income.
- 61.
- 62.
Martin O’Neill (2020b) has argued in a similar way that Saez and Zucman’s focus is to narrow on tax issues.
- 63.
For an excellent discussion of the different roles political philosophers can play, see Stemplowska and Swift (2012).
- 64.
We could be facing a shift towards a bigger state in practical politics as well. As Robert Reich has argued, President Clinton’s claim that “The era of big government is over” is currently being challenged by President Biden (Reich 2021).
- 65.
President Kennedy’s moonshot is seen as key example of a mission-oriented policy. It is argued that to enable the green transition, it is necessary to learn from previous examples and to see that for the green shift, “The role of the state is key… since it is the only institution with the power to shape markets and direct economic activity in socially desirable directions” (Mazzucato et al. 2021, 19).
- 66.
An interesting objection put to me by Robert van Brederode is how individuals can be independent when they rely on the state to create opportunities for them. I cannot discuss this in depth here, but one way to respond is that the state must be assumed to be a well-functioning state that is democratically controlled by the individuals. If this is the case, the state should be seen as part of the individual and therefore not something that will dominate them or make them dependent on the state in a problematic way. Although this idea will seem naïve in some contexts, the high level of trust that individuals have towards governments in the Scandinavian countries shows that it is possible to have a big state without jeopardizing individual freedom.
- 67.
Note that Edmundson’s argument is more complex than the simplified version I have presented here.
- 68.
One interesting question following from Piketty’s position is whether circulation of capital is sufficient to abolish economic class hierarchy.
- 69.
However, as Jackson has argued, Meade’s own view was closer to Rawls’ understanding of liberal socialism than to property-owning democracy (Jackson 2012, 46).
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Pedersen, J. (2022). Egalitarianism and Taxation. In: van Brederode, R.F. (eds) Political Philosophy and Taxation. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1092-0_9
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