Abstract
This chapter is the introduction to the book and provides an overview of the content of each chapter as a context for a broader discussion on the role of taxation. It comments on certain findings and elaborates on other aspects or philosophical positions, which have received less pronunciation in the chapters. In particular, the author elaborates on social contract theory, libertarianism by evaluating Murphy and Nagel’s (The myth of ownership. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) critique against it, and egalitarianism including an evaluation of the concept of desert and, within that context, taxation of natural endowments. An ideal society is a metaphysical concept. People have different values, which often conflict with one another. In reality, therefore, choices between non-compatible values and alternative policy options need to be made. That is also true for one’s approach to the role of government in society and the function and modalities of taxation. Tax policy should be driven by an underlying political philosophy, otherwise taxation becomes arbitrary and deprived of the moral basis necessary to ensure societal acceptance and compliance.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
For the origins and background of the Arbroath Declaration, see Cowan (2020).
- 2.
This is generally correct. However, as Gribnau and Frecknall-Hughes point out in Chap. 2, n. 10, there does exist some evidence of actual contracts between rulers and subjects, notably the Magna Carta between King John and the barons but this was a contract among the elites and did not encompass the whole populace, and the arrangement of the Pilgrim Fathers when establishing the tiny Plymouth Colony in today’s Massachusetts. These are exceptions, though, and it remains debatable whether any next generation would be bound by a contract signed by their ancestors. It could be argued that the U.S. Constitution is a form of a social contract between the 13 original states after the war of independence from Great Britain.
- 3.
Emigration does not necessarily fully relieve a person from the control of the exited state. The U.S., for example, tax citizens on their worldwide income regardless of residence. Thus, emigration would require also change of citizenship. The U.S. allow renunciation of citizenship for a fee of $2350 (8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(5)) which is basically an exit penalty; and depending on meeting certain income and wealth criteria, so-called ‘covered expatriates’ are due an exit tax (sec. 877 and 877a of the IRC).
- 4.
The first forms of warfare were essentially raiding parties on neighboring tribes for material gain, what we would call looting. That was the practice of the North American plain Indians, for example. When institutionalized, raids and loot were replaced with the payment of annual tribute by conquered or weaker tribes or kingdoms to more powerful ones. This was the case after the Scythians defeated Babylonia (Phillips 1972) and the price to be paid by the kingdoms defeated by Alexander the Great on his journey to India, and of peoples defeated by the Romans. Criminal gangs exercise their power over neighborhoods they control in the same manner by demanding and coercing payment of ‘protection money.’
- 5.
Consent can only be considered a given if one adheres to a Hobbesian absolutism, reasoning that the sovereign authority acts on behalf of the citizens as if they write the laws themselves.
- 6.
See the research by McGee et al. (2012).
- 7.
- 8.
At a restaurant dinner in 1974 that included Arthur Laffer, then professor at the University of Chicago, journalist Jude Wanniski, Donald Rumsfeld, then Whitehouse chief of staff to President Gerald Ford, and his deputy Dick Cheney, according to the story, Arthur Laffer sketched a curve on his napkin illustrating the trade-off between tax rates and tax revenues. Wanniski (1978) named the trade-off “The Laffer Curve.”
- 9.
For a critical note on the idea of Tax Freedom Day, see Buchanan (2014).
- 10.
- 11.
The same notion is found in the Indian Ṛgveda where Prajāpati is the creator-God, equivalent to Allah in the Qurʾān and Elohim/Yahweh in the Torah or Hebrew Bible.
- 12.
Bobroff presents an overview of the New England, Algonquian, Iroquois, Inuit property rights regimes and those of the Five ‘Civilized’ Tribes, tribes of the Southwest, of the West coast, and the Great Plains.
- 13.
Therewith I confirm Locke’s conclusion that property rights pre-date the institution of the state (Epstein 2011, 99).
- 14.
That does not mean that laws are unchangeable, of course. Moral views change and that may trigger a change in laws. But the fact that a law is changed or repealed does not mean that the original law was deprived of a moral basis or societal acceptance.
- 15.
Their position echoes utilitarian Jeremy Bentham’s assertion that natural rights are “nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 1973, 269).
- 16.
Obviously, taxes cannot be levied on property before the concept of property was developed.
- 17.
The personal income tax in the U.S. was enabled by the passage of the 16th Constitutional Amendment on June 2, 1909, ratified February 3, 1913. Sales and turnover taxes were introduced as an emergency measure in times of economic distress and war in the early twentieth century. West Virginia was the first in the U.S. to introduce a gross receipts tax in 1921; in Europe such turnover taxes started in 1916 in Germany, followed by France and Belgium in 1920 and 1921 respectively. Turnover taxes go back in concept to the Spanish Alcabala, first impose in 1342. VAT started its proliferation in Europe in 1948 in France as a single stage manufacturer’s tax. Excise taxes are typically levied on commodities and go back 5000 years (Boesen 2021), but the first excise tax in the U.S. was introduced in 1791 and levied on the manufacture of whiskey.
- 18.
Tolls for passage across bridges and roads were common in medieval Europe. Rome, e.g., under Julius Caesar had a 1% sales tax (centesima rerum venalium), land taxes and a direct tax in the form of a head tax. Ancient Egypt and China had taxation, see Keen and Slemrod (2021, Ch. 2).
- 19.
All three Abrahamic religions have thithing traditions going back to Abraham himself (Gen. 14:20), but likely rooting in the Temple states of Mesopotamia and Syria-Palestine in the second millennium BCE, see Chodorow (2006, n. 2).
- 20.
M.C. Escher, ‘The Waterfall’ (lithograph 1961).
- 21.
- 22.
Modern markets are just a temporary end point in a long historical development, and we cannot reach conclusions on the functioning of markets and the intervening role of the state in isolation, i.e., without considering the historical roots and future direction of markets and the continued changing role of governments in these markets. If the state were to disappear tomorrow, markets would either continue their existence or emerge anew.
- 23.
Libertarians will argue, though, that other solutions than government regulation, such as consensual private ordening, are feasible and more appropriate.
- 24.
Nozick’s view that one could voluntarily enter into slavery (Nozick 1974, 331) is incorrect in that (1) such an alienation is not acceptable under the conception of self-ownership and (2) where an individual certainly could enter into a condition in which he would act in a slave-like manner, this would logically not constitute slavery simply because of the voluntary character of the arrangement (Feser 2000, 227).
- 25.
Solt mentions the emergence of Christianity ending classical civilization, and humanism that concluded the Middle Ages.
- 26.
Election campaign speech delivered in Roanoke, VA on July 13, 2012.
- 27.
To focus on the United States, where Rawls lived and worked, donations by the wealthy have enormous influence, directly or indirectly on the election process. Either through donations directly to favorite candidates or donations to organizations that utilize funds to enhance partisan voter turnout, i.e., of voters that support the preferred cause or candidate. For example, Michael Bloomberg supports candidates and policies aligning with his gun control preferences; Charles and David Koch support libertarian (and Republican) politicians and causes, and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg in 2020 donated hundreds of millions of dollars to one-sidedly increase Democratic party turnout in certain counties, i.e., that more Democratic votes would be casted relative to Republican votes, putting his foot on the scale of electoral outcome (In re of the 2020 election, see Hemingway 2021) .
- 28.
Hayek (1945).
- 29.
Cambridge Dictionary: dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/English/luck; Merriam Webster Dictionary: merriam-webster.com/dictionary/luck
- 30.
Karma is not a single concept and different schools within Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism derive different definitions from the ancient texts. Conceptually it is first discussed in the Upaniṣad and is also discussed in the epic Mahābhārata. For a deeper understanding of the many theories of karma, see, e.g., Karl Potter (2001). Karma is based on the notion of cause and effect – you reap what you sow – which in that sense (and that sense only) is also found in the Christian tradition, see Galatians 6:7.
- 31.
Redistribution of the faculties itself, i.e., in kind, is of course not possible, so the compensation must take place in monetary form.
- 32.
Swift [1726] 1900, 233/4.
- 33.
Zelenek 2006, 1150.
- 34.
- 35.
Source: registerednursern.com/rn-salary/
- 36.
Which is over $53 Million in today’s dollars. Source: hoopshype.com/player/Michael-Jordan/salary.
- 37.
Assuming a 40-year career making an average salary of $73,000 each year, it would take a nurse 89 years and 284 days to earn enough to pay the $6.6 million in taxes owed on the $33 million salary.
- 38.
She claimed an IQ of 163 but other sources mention an IQ of 149. Legacy.com/news/celebrity-deaths/jayne-mansfield-33facts; salon.com/2001/08/06/jayne_mansfield; projects.latimes.com/Hollywood/star-walk/jayne-mansfield; crfashionbook.com/celebrity/g26041893.jayne-mansfield-secret-moments/?slide=23
- 39.
There is no actual social contract every signed historically or contemporarily. It is a theoretical construct based on what free people might agree to if they were in the original position ignorant to their endowments. The original position has no historical basis either and the closest we can come to imagining the state of ignorance is Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden, which is an allegory not history, and even there we see immediately differences in endowment between the happy couple, with Adam showing tardiness and Eve curiosity and initiative; endowments they would not have ignored if called to negotiate a social contract between them.
- 40.
The 2–3% of arable land held privately contributed 25% of total agricultural production in 1970–1980ies. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_the_Soviet_Union
- 41.
For an historic overview of feminist tax scholarship in the U.S., see Infanti and Crawford (2020).
- 42.
Davis refers to the U.S. Tax Code, but this is likely correct for the tax codes of almost all countries.
- 43.
The distinction between formal equality and factual equality has its roots in Karl Marx and can also be found in Rawls’ philosophy.
- 44.
Jizyah is based on Qurʾān 9:29. It was paid by non-Muslims in return for protection and the right to practice their own religion. Certain categories, such as monks, religious functionaries, the elderly, women, the mentally ill, and the poor were exempt as well as those non-Muslims serving in the military. The tax was generally a fixed amount per income group.
- 45.
References
Baiasu, Sorin. 2007. Institutions and the Normativity of Desert. Contemporary Political Theory 6: 175–195.
———. 2021. Distributive Justice and the Epistemological Argument Against Desert. Academia Letters: Article 127. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL127.
Barry, Nicholas. 2006. Defending Luck Egalitarianism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 23: 89–107.
Bentham, Jeremy. 1973. A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights. In Bentham’s Political Thought, ed. Bhikhu Parekh [1791], 257. London: Croon Helm.
Berlin, Isaiah. 1990. The Pursuit of the Ideal. In Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. H. Hardy. London: John Murray.
Bird-Pollan, Jennifer. 2019. Taxing the Brave New World: A Comment on Professor Tessa Davis’s Article ‘Freezing the Future: Elective Egg Freezing and the Future of the Medical Expense Deduction’. Kentucky Law Journal Online 107: 1–6. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440861.
Blok, Aad. 1988. Jan Tinbergen en de Nederlandse Sociaaldemocratische Ideologie. In Distantie en Engagement: J. Tinbergen Autobiographisch, ed. Gerard Alberts and Pieter Weeder, 9–36. Eindhoven: Technische Universiteit Eindhoven.
Bobroff, Kenneth H. 2001. Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership. Vanderbilt Law Review 54 (4): 1559–1623.
Boesen, Ulrik. 2021. Excise Tax Applications and Trends, Fiscal Fact No. 753. Washington, DC: Tax Foundation.
Bonaham, O. Michael. 1953. Moral and Ethical Considerations in Tax Practice. Marquette Law Review 37 (1): 85–91.
Bradford, David F. 1984. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform. Arlington: Tax Analysts.
———. 1986. Untangling the Income Tax. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brooks, Alison S., et al. 2018. Long-Distance Stone Transport and Pigment Use in the Earliest Middle Stone Age. Science 360 (6384): 90–94.
Buchanan, Neil H. 2014. Freedom, Taxes, and Forced Labor: A Strange Brew of Libertarianism and Marxism. Verdict. Available at https://verdict.justia.com/2014/04/28/freedom-taxes-forced-labor.
Bushyhead, D.W., P. N. Blackstone, and George Sanders, Cherokee Delegation to Congress of the United States (Jan. 17, 1881), in SEN. DOCS., 49th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial 2362, vi.
Cappelen, Alexander W., and Bertil Tungodden. 2018. Tax Policy and Fair Inequality. In Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Martin O’Neill and Stephen Orr, 111–123. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carneiro, Robert L. 1970. A Theory of the Origin of the State. Science 169 (3947): 733–738.
Chodorow, Adam. 2006. God’s Income Tax: What Jewish Tithing Practices Can Teach Us About Tax Reform. Available at SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=889960 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.889960.
———. 2007–2008. Biblical Tax Systems and the Case for Progressive Taxation. Journal of Law and Religion 23(1): 51–96.
Couzin, Robert. 2017. A Modern Look at the Roman Imperial ‘Jewish Tax’. Canadian Tax Journal 65 (2): 333–352.
Cowan, Edward J. 2020. The Declaration of Arbroath: ‘For Freedom Alone’. East Linton: Birlinn.
Deino, Alan L., et al. 2018. Chronology of the Acheulean to Middle Stone Age Transition in Eastern Africa. Science 360 (6384): 95–98.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1973. The Original Position. The University of Chicago Law Review 40 (4): 500–533.
———. 2000. The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Epstein, Richard A. 2011. Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fergusson, James. 1970. The Declaration of Arbroath 1320. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Feser, Edward. 2000. Taxation, Forced Labor, and Theft. The Independent Review 5 (2): 219–235.
Freiman, Christopher. 2017. Unequivocal Justice. London: Routledge.
Gordon, David. 2002. Property: Convention or Right? The Mises Review 8 (2).
Gosseries, Alex. 2005. Book Review, the Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Disputatio 1 (19): 271–277.
Graetz, Michael J. 1983. To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It. The Yale Law Journal 93: 259–286.
Gray, John. 1995. Liberalism. 2nd Edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Gunnarsson, Åsa. 2020. Gender Equality and Taxation: International Perspectives. Copenhagen Business School [wp]. CBS Law Research Paper No. 20–29. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract+3688899.
Halliday, Daniel. 2013. Review Essay of Kok-Char Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck. Utilitas 25 (1): 121–132.
Hasen, David. 2007. Liberalism and Ability Taxation. Texas Law Review 85: 1057–1113.
Hayek von, Friedrich A. 1945. The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review 35 (4): 519–530.
Hemingway, Mollie. 2021. Rigged: How the Media, Big Tech, and the Democrats Seized Our Elections. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Leviathan. Or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill [1651], ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hoebel, E. Adamson. 1954. The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Legal Comparative Dynamics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Horwitz, Steven. 2013. Inequality, Mobility, and Being Poor in America. Unpublished Paper, Department of Economics, St. Lawrence University, Presented to Conference on “Equality and Public Policy,” Ohio University, Athens, OH, November 14–16, 2013.
Huemer, Michael. 2017. Is Taxation Theft? Available at https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/is-taxation-theft. Accessed 28 May 2021.
Ibn Khaldūn. 2015. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History [1377]. Trans. Franz Rosenthal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Infanti, Anthony C., and Bridget J. Crawford. 2020. A Taxing Feminism. Forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Feminism and Law in the United States, ed. Deborah L. Brake, Martha Chamallas, and Verna Williams. University of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-24. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659884.
Keen, Michael, and Joel Slemrod. 2021. Rebellion, Rascals, and Revenue: Tax Follies and Wisdom Through the Ages. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Klieforth, Alexander L., and Robert J. Munro. 2004. The Scottish Invention of America, Democracy and Human Rights: The History of Liberty and Freedom from the Ancient Celts to the New Millennium. Lanham: University Press of America.
Knight, Carl. 2009. Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Kordana, Kevin A., and David H. Tabachnick. 2003. Tax and the Philosopher’s Stone. The Virginia Law Review 89: 647–678.
Lister, Andrew. 2017. Markets, Desert, and Reciprocity. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 16: 47–69.
Livingston, Michael A. 1998. Radical Scholars, Conservative Field: Putting ‘Critical Tax Scholarship’ in Perspective. The North Carolina Law Review 76: 1791.
Locke, John. 2008. Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett [1689]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lounissi, Carine. 2016. Thomas Paine’s Reflections on the Social Contract: A Consistent Theory? In New Directions in Thomas Paine Studies, ed. Scott Clearly and Ivy L. Stabell, 175–193. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
McCloskey, Deirdre. 2014. Measured, Unmeasured, Mismeasured, and Unjustified Pessimism: A Review Essay of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics 7 (2): 73–115.
McGee, Robert W., ed. 2012. The Ethics of Tax Evasion: Perspectives in Theory and Practice. New York: Springer.
Merl, Stephan. 2016. Why Did the Attempt Under Stalin to Increase Agricultural Productivity Prove to be such a Fundamental Failure? Cahiers du Monde Russe 57 (1): 191–220.
Moriarity, Jeffrey. 2005. The Epistemological Argument Against Desert. Utilitas 17 (2): 205–221.
Mueller, John. 1999. Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Murphy, Liam, and Thomas Nagel. 2002. The Myth of Ownership. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Musgrave, Richard. 1974. Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 88: 625–632.
Nagan, Winston P., John A.C. Cartner, and Robert J. Munro. 2017. Ideological Contributions of Celtic Freedom and Individualism to Human Rights. In Human Rights and Dynamic Humanism, 92–134. Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.
Oliver, Neil. 2009. A History of Scotland. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Pen, Jan. 1988. Tussen Elite en Egalitarisme. In Distantie en Engagement: J. Tinbergen Autobiographisch, ed. Gerard Alberts and Pieter Weeder, 55–63. Eindhoven: Technische Universiteit Eindhoven.
Phillips, E.D. 1972. The Scythian Domination in Western Asia: Its Record in History, Scripture and Archaeology. World Archaeology 4 (2): 129–138.
Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Potter, Karl. 2001. How Many Karma Theories Are There? Journal of Indian Philosophy 29 (1/2): 231–239.
Potts, Richard, et al. 2018. Environmental Dynamics During the Onset of the Middle Stone Age in Eastern Africa. Science 360 (6384): 86–90.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Roemer, John E. 1993. A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (2): 146–166.
———. 1998. Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [1762] 1963. Du Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique. Paris: Union Général d’Éditions.
Scheffler, Samuel. 2010. Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schoenblum, Jeffrey A. 2003. Myth of Ownership/Myth of Government. The Virginia Tax Review 22: 555–587.
Segall, Shlomi. 2010. Health, Luck, and Justice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Seto, Theodore P. 2016. A Forced Labor Theory of Property and Taxation. Legal Studies Paper No. 2016-04. Los Angeles: Loyola Law School. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract2727378. Also published in Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law. 2017, ed. Monica Bhandari, 193–216. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Adam. [1776] 1981. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Glasgow edition, ed. Campbell, Skinner, and Todd, 2 Vols. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
Snape, John. 2017. The ‘Sinews of the State’: Historical Justifications for Taxes and Tax Laws. In Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law, ed. Monica Bhandari, 9–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Solt, Roger. 2004. The Handbooks of Moral and Political Philosophy Two: Contemporary Political Philosophies. Denton: Paradigm Research.
Sterba, James P. 2004. Book Review: Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, the Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. Ethics 114 (3): 628–631.
Swift, Jonathan. [1726] 1900. Gulliver’s Travels into Several Remote Nations of the World. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co.
Tan, Kok-Chor. 2012. Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tinbergen, Jan. 1970. Belastingen op Bekwaamheid. Intermediair 6: 1–3.
van Brederode, Robert. 2020. Introduction: Why Ethics Matter in Taxation. In Ethics and Taxation, ed. Robert van Brederode, 1–19. Singapore: Springer.
Voigt, Kristin. 2007. The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10: 389–407.
Walker, Francis A. 1888. The Basis of Taxation. Political Science Quarterly 3 (1): 1–16.
Waltman, Jerry. 2002. A Review of The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel. Journal of Lutheran Ethics 2 (12).
Wanniski, Jude. 1978. Taxes, Revenues, and the ‘Laffer Curve’. In A New Look at Taxation: I. The Public Interest, 3–16.
Wolff, Jonathan. 2016. An Introduction to Political Philosophy. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zelenak, Lawrence A. 2006. Taxing Endowment. Duke Law Journal 55: 1145–1181.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
van Brederode, R.F. (2022). Introduction: The Value of a Political Theory for the Proper Application of Taxation. In: van Brederode, R.F. (eds) Political Philosophy and Taxation. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1092-0_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1092-0_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-19-1091-3
Online ISBN: 978-981-19-1092-0
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)