Abstract
Ticket price is an important factor affecting market demand and passengers’ purchase behavior. It is one of the main means for airlines to carry out market competition, and directly affects their profits. However, there has always been the problem of over pricing and single price strategy in the air tickets of civil aviation of China. The essence of civil aviation competition in the transportation market is to maximize benefits. One of the most important aspects of increasing their own benefits is to attract more passenger flow within a reasonable price range. Attracting passenger flow is to change passengers’ travel choices through their own marketing strategies, so that passengers are more inclined to their own side when choosing transportation modes. How to attract passengers, we must first determine what factors will affect the choice of passengers, and these factors are directly related to the choice preference of passengers. Therefore, in the process of fare decision-making, we must consider the factors affecting passengers’ travel and passengers’ choice preferences. This paper selects five influencing factors: rapidity, economy, comfort, convenience and safety, and uses analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to determine the weight coefficient of each index. The gravity model is used to predict the passenger flow between the two places. On this basis, the equilibrium game pricing model of civil aviation is established, and the fare strategy is selected with the goal of maximizing the benefit.
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Li, Y. (2022). Research on Civil Aviation Economic Pricing Based on Equilibrium Game. In: Tian, Y., Ma, T., Khan, M.K., Sheng, V.S., Pan, Z. (eds) Big Data and Security. ICBDS 2021. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1563. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0852-1_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-0852-1_39
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