Northern Sea Route from the Russian and EU Perspectives

Abstract

International transport corridors (ITCs) are becoming a decisive instrument of geoeconomic and geopolitical dominance. Given the Arctic’s profound mineral resources and relevant security agenda, controlling the region’s main transport artery – the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – becomes vital for any actor concerned. Russia, possessing the largest Arctic coastal line, decisively justifies the right to do so. As of today, shipping via the route is subject to official permission with all related logistics services to be provided by Russia only turning it into a specific and politicized ITC. In fact, such a status-quo is generally accepted by the international shipping society. NSR’s transit potential is severely underutilized, yet it has marked a number of milestones as an ITC. For instance, after 2014 there has been a rise in volumes of transit goods transported, including both cabotage and international transit, as well as a number of permissions granted, including foreign-flagged vessels (with Germany ranked second after China). Thus, there is little evidence of Russia’s deliberate increasing protectionism over the NSR. In fact, Russia’s second-to-none ice-breaker fleet opt for an all-year round navigation, which might be a good springboard for greater international connectivity. However, making the NSR commercially viable is hampered by higher freight rates, outdated and insufficient infrastructure, unstable weather conditions, and bathymetry constraint. When looking at the economic potential of the NSR for the EU, the researchers believe that linking the NSR with the European transport network might bring economic benefits for the Northern member states. However, the lack of a common approach by the EU and geopolitical tensions with Russia stir such cooperation. This may be changed by a more active engagement of the Northern member states.