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Revenue Sharing Contracts of Risk-Averse Retailers Under Different Modes

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LISS2019
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Abstract

The paper studies the revenue sharing contract with risk factors in different dominant modes and establishes two game models under the risk aversion environment. In supplier and retailer different modes, it is found that risk aversion coefficient and benefit sharing ratio can affect the decision-making strategy and performance of supply chain members. In both models, suppliers will set lower wholesale prices for retailers with higher risk aversion coefficient; The larger the retailer’s risk aversion coefficient is, the smaller the retailer’s order quantity is in supplier mode; The profit of the retailer increases with the increase of risk aversion, and the profit of the suppliers increases with the increase of revenue sharing ratio.

This research is supported by the Youth Project of Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant number 71702067) and PhD Research Project of Jiangsu Normal University (Grant number 16XWR011).

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Correspondence to Wenyi Du .

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Liu, X., Du, W., Yuan, X. (2020). Revenue Sharing Contracts of Risk-Averse Retailers Under Different Modes. In: Zhang, J., Dresner, M., Zhang, R., Hua, G., Shang, X. (eds) LISS2019. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5682-1_44

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