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Public Debt, Lobbying and Endogenous Redistribution in an Overlapping-Generations Model

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Contemporary Issues in Applied Economics

Abstract

The recent slowdown of global economy contributed to ignite a sovereign debt crisis that has shaken several economies, and the European Economic and Monetary Union in particular. These events have helped to revamp the interests of scholars on fiscal reconstruction. Decisions concerning the amount, speed and approach (cut in public expenditures vs. tax increase) of containment and reduction of public debt have clear distributive impacts not only within but also across generations (think, for example, of the problem of sustainability of the pension system in aging societies).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Drazen (2000) is an excellent reference for the political economic analysis of economic reforms.

  2. 2.

    This result corresponds to empirical result of Buti and van den Noord (2003). They show that, when election, government expenditure tends to expand in developed country.

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Correspondence to Tsuyoshi Shinozaki .

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Shinozaki, T., Mazza, I., Kunizaki, M. (2019). Public Debt, Lobbying and Endogenous Redistribution in an Overlapping-Generations Model. In: Hosoe, M., Ju, BG., Yakita, A., Hong, K. (eds) Contemporary Issues in Applied Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7036-6_9

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