Abstract
The GNSS receiver is susceptible to malicious spoofing attack and further estimates a wrong position which is considered as an arbitrary preset site from the spoofer. However, when the target receiver is far away from the spoofer, authentic signals are weak rather than submerged by spoofing signals and some authentic satellite signals are survival due to satellite geometry. In this case, the spoofing attack is incomplete and its effects on the positioning estimation of target receivers become complex. In this study, an improved transmitter-based spoofer is realized employing the software-defined receiver and used to analyze the positioning performance of the target receiver under the complete and incomplete spoofing attack. Simulation results show that the target receiver is possibly controlled by the spoofer under complete spoofing attack and its estimated position is equal to the spoofer preset position. Under incomplete spoofing, the estimated position is between the preset position and the genuine position, but is neither.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Ioannides RT, Pany T, Gibbons G (2016) Known vulnerabilities of global navigation satellite systems, status, and potential mitigation techniques. Proc IEEE 104(6):1174–1194
Motella B, Pini M, Fantino M, Mulassano P, Nicola M, Fortuny-Guasch, J et al (2011) Performance assessment of low cost GPS receivers under civilian spoofing attacks. Satellite Navigation Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals and Signal Processing, IEEE, pp 1–8
Haider Z, Khalid S (2017) Survey on effective GPS spoofing countermeasures. In: Sixth international conference on innovative computing technology, IEEE, pp 573–577
Gao Y, Li H, Lu M, Feng Z (2013) Intermediate spoofing strategies and countermeasures. Tsinghua Science and Technology 18(6):599–605
Bhatti J, Humphreys TE (2017) Hostile control of ships via false GPS signals: demonstration and detection. Navigation 64(1):51–66
Psiaki ML, Humphreys TE (2016) GNSS spoofing and detection. Proc IEEE 104(6):1258–1270
Huang L, Lv ZC, Wang FX (2012) Spoofing pattern research on GNSS receivers. J Astronaut 33(7):884–890
Shepard DP, Bhatti JA, Humphreys TE, Fansler AA (2012) Evaluation of smart grid and civilian UAV vulnerability to GPS spoofing attacks. In: ION GNSS conference, pp 3591–3605
Humphreys TE, Ledvina BM, Psiaki ML, O’Hanlon BW, Kintner PM (2008) Assessing the spoofing threat: development of a portable GPS civilian spoofer. In: International technical meeting of the satellite division of the institute of navigation, pp 2314–2325
Broumandan A, Jafarnia-Jahromi A, Lachapelle G (2015) Spoofing detection, classification and cancelation (SDCC) receiver architecture for a moving GNSS receiver. GPS Solutions 19(3):475–487
Bian S, Hu Y, Ji B (2017) Research status and prospect of GNSS anti-spoofing technology. SCIENTIA SINICA Informationis 47(3):275–287
Chen L, Han S, Meng W, Gong Z (2015) A spoofing mitigation algorithm based on subspace projection for GNSS receiver. In: China satellite navigation conference (CSNC) 2015 proceedings: vol I, pp 727–737. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Huang J, Presti LL, Motella B, Pini M (2016) GNSS spoofing detection: theoretical analysis and performance of the ratio test metric in open sky. ICT Express 2(1):37–40
Kerns AJ, Shepard DP, Bhatti JA, Humphreys TE (2014) Unmanned aircraft capture and control via GPS spoofing. J Field Robot 31(4):617–636
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC, www.nsfc.gov.cn) which supports this work under grant No. 61603181.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this paper
Cite this paper
Qi, Y., Xu, R., Liu, J., Dai, W. (2018). Analysis of Positioning Performance of the GNSS Receiver Under Complete and Incomplete Spoofing. In: Sun, J., Yang, C., Guo, S. (eds) China Satellite Navigation Conference (CSNC) 2018 Proceedings. CSNC 2018. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 498. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0014-1_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0014-1_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-13-0013-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-13-0014-1
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)