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Applications in Business Collaboration

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Subgame Consistent Cooperation

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C ((TDLC,volume 47))

Abstract

In this Chapter, we present two applications in business collaboration. The first one is on corporate joint venture and the second one is on cartel. The joint venture analysis is from Yeung and Petrosyan (2006a), Yeung (2010) and Chapter 9 of Yeung and Petrosyan (2012a). The Cartel analysis is extracted from Yeung (2005) and Chapter 11 of Yeung and Petrosyan (2012a). Sections 15.1, 15.2 and 15.3 contain the analysis of a corporate joint venture in which gains can be obtained from cost saving cooperation. In section 15.1, a dynamic corporate joint venture under uncertainty is formulated. The expected venture profit maximization, subgame consistent PDP and an illustration are provided. In Sect. 15.2, the Shapley Value Solution for the joint venture is derived. An analysis on joint venture under an infinite horizon is given in Sect. 15.3. Sections 15.4, 15.5 and 15.6 present a cartel analysis which contains dormant firms. Section 15.4 presents a stochastic dynamic dormant-firm cartel. The basic settings, market outcome, optimal cartel output and subgame-consistent cartel profit sharing are investigated. An illustration with explicit functional forms is given in Sect. 15.5. An analysis on infinite horizon cartel is provided in Sect. 15.6. An Appendix of the Chapter is given in Sect. 15.7. Chapter notes are given in Sect. 15.8 and problems in Sect. 15.9.

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© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

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Yeung, D.W.K., Petrosyan, L.A. (2016). Applications in Business Collaboration. In: Subgame Consistent Cooperation. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 47. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8_15

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