Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the possibility of integration and secession between a majority region and a minority region. There is assumed to be a different preference for public policy between two regions, and a government is assumed to have to offer a constant level of public goods. We introduce two forms of governance, i.e., centralized integration and decentralized integration. Then, when small level of public good is necessary, the form of governance is shown to change from centralized integration to secession and to decentralized integration as the size of the minority region becomes large. And when large level of public good is necessary, the form of government is shown to change from centralized integration to decentralized integration as the size of the minority region becomes large.
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Hosoe, M. (2017). Optimal Policy and the Threat of Secession. In: Shibusawa, H., Sakurai, K., Mizunoya, T., Uchida, S. (eds) Socioeconomic Environmental Policies and Evaluations in Regional Science. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 24. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0099-7_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0099-7_25
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