Abstract
The recently inaugurated Oversight Board is expected to increase transparency of content moderation on Facebook and Instagram. Rather than enforcing only corporate policies, however, the Board’s first decisions relied on ‘international standards of freedom of expression’. Using this development as a starting point, we ask how may freedom of expression restrict the dominance of private corporations over the digital sphere. In contrast to the literature that has explored this issue from a primarily court-centric perspective, we reconstruct the role of freedom of expression as a field of constitutional advice and theorize the role of the Oversight Board in this context. We argue that freedom of expression, in addition to being the subject matter of disputes before (supra)national courts and the Board, may be seen as both empowering and restricting community building and belonging in the digital sphere. While this facet of free speech is not new, it is likely to gain increased importance in the interaction between contemporary constitutional democracies and corporations that shape the digital. We place constitutional advice against this background and differentiate the uses it may have in the interaction between public and private power in the digital era.
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Notes
- 1.
Bassini and Pollicino 2014.
- 2.
Celeste 2018, p. 14.
- 3.
Pollicino and Soldatov 2019, p. 14.
- 4.
More on the role of law in informational capitalism in Cohen 2019.
- 5.
De Gregorio 2020, p. 24.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
Sander 2020.
- 10.
Viellechner 2019.
- 11.
- 12.
Suzor et al. 2018.
- 13.
Salinas 2018.
- 14.
Klonick 2020, pp. 2466–2467.
- 15.
Harris 2019.
- 16.
Gilbert 2020.
- 17.
For a persuasive argument on the Board’s positioning in relation to this complexity, see Arun 2021.
- 18.
Lessig 2006, p. 4.
- 19.
See more on technological power in particular in Filippova 2019.
- 20.
The accountability of these actors has attracted particular attention. See e.g. Riordan 2016.
- 21.
Examples include the EU Electronic Commerce Directive that was applied to social networks as providers of services and the German Law on the Improvement of Law Enforcement in Social Networks that imposes liability of social networks for the content they host.
- 22.
Klonick 2020, p. 2449.
- 23.
Douek 2019, p. 19.
- 24.
Johnson 2016, p. 23.
- 25.
Klonick 2020, p. 2437.
- 26.
Thompson 2016, p. 793.
- 27.
Lennon 2015, p. 74.
- 28.
Klonick 2020, p. 2463.
- 29.
Bickert 2019.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
Ibid.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-002-FB-UA.
- 34.
Oversight Board, report of 28 January 2021, 2020-001-FB-UA.
- 35.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-003-FB-UA; Oversight Board, decision of 13 April 2021, 2021-002-FB-UA.
- 36.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-004-IG-UA.
- 37.
Ibid.
- 38.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-005-FB-UA.
- 39.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-006-FB-FBR.
- 40.
Oversight Board, decision of 12 February 2021, 2020-007-FB-FBR.
- 41.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-002-FB-UA.
- 42.
Oversight Board, available at: https://oversightboard.com/news/288225579415246-announcing-the-board-s-next-cases-and-changes-to-our-bylaws/. Accessed on 14 April 2021.
- 43.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-002-FB-UA.
- 44.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-004-IG-UA.
- 45.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-005-FB-UA.
- 46.
Oversight Board, decision of 28 January 2021, 2020-006-FB-FBR.
- 47.
Oversight Board, decision of 12 February 2021, 2020-007-FB-FBR. A meme may be defined as a ‘cultural item in the form of an image or a phrase and spread via the internet altered in a creative or humorous way’ (Dictionary.com, available at: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/meme. Accessed on 14 April 2021).
- 48.
Shapiro 1981, p. 1.
- 49.
- 50.
Morelli and Pollicino 2020, p. 4.
- 51.
Ibid., 5.
- 52.
Gillespie 2018.
- 53.
Morelli and Pollicino 2020, pp. 21–24.
- 54.
Ibid., 22.
- 55.
See more in Van Loo 2016.
- 56.
Klonick 2020, p. 2476.
- 57.
Ibid.
- 58.
Ibid., 2480.
- 59.
Ibid., 2478.
- 60.
Ibid., 2481–2483.
- 61.
Douek 2019, pp. 53–66.
- 62.
Ibid., 68.
- 63.
Ibid., 72.
- 64.
Ibid., 10.
- 65.
Latham-Gambi 2021.
- 66.
Ibid., 10.
- 67.
That platforms may attempt to draw their own comparison with the judiciary was noted in a report on human rights implications of content moderation by social networks (Access Now 2020, pp. 8–9).
- 68.
Latham-Gambi 2021, p. 27.
- 69.
- 70.
Gradoni 2021.
- 71.
Sajó and Uitz 2017, p. 373.
- 72.
- 73.
Barendt 2007, p. 23.
- 74.
- 75.
Suzor et al. 2018, p. 7.
- 76.
Mendes and Oliveira Fernandes 2021, p. 10.
- 77.
- 78.
Mendes and Oliveira Fernandes 2021, p. 13.
- 79.
Goodhart 2013.
- 80.
Balkin 2004, p. 55.
- 81.
Mendes and Oliveira Fernandes 2021, p. 9.
- 82.
Ibid., 17.
- 83.
Ibid., 20.
- 84.
Price 2002, p. 24.
- 85.
- 86.
- 87.
- 88.
- 89.
Jackson 2019.
- 90.
See e.g. Suzor 2010.
- 91.
Dyevre and Jakab 2013, p. 984.
- 92.
We have drawn this distinction from Finn 2001.
- 93.
Dyevre and Jakab 2013, p. 984.
- 94.
According to Häberle's communitarian vision, a broad scope of actors can be the ‘generators of interpretation’ producing meaning of constitutional provisions (Häberle 2002, p. 108).
- 95.
Dyevre and Jakab 2013, p. 984.
- 96.
Mill was famously critical of this, noting that the legislature, while wielding formal legislative power, does not have the capacity to enact a law of a sufficient quality (Mill 1989, pp. 56–57).
- 97.
Viellechner 2019, p. 650.
- 98.
Pollicino and Soldatov 2019, p. 5.
- 99.
For instance, a number of European jurisdictions have established agencies that regulate new technologies and procedures in the field of assisted reproduction, such as preimplantation genetic testing (Miloš 2019, pp. 204–207).
- 100.
Musa and Koprić 2011, p. 46.
- 101.
Pasquale 2010, pp. 106–107.
- 102.
Tushnet 2008, p. 1487.
- 103.
Ginsburg 2017, p. 21.
- 104.
Klonick 2020.
- 105.
Perju 2012, pp. 1306–1308.
- 106.
Tushnet 2008, pp. 1474–1475.
- 107.
Ginsburg 2017, p. 8.
- 108.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
Fiss 1986.
- 112.
Ibid., 1423.
- 113.
Balkin 2018.
- 114.
Heinze 2015.
- 115.
- 116.
Balkin 2004, p. 36.
- 117.
- 118.
Balkin 2004, p. 52.
- 119.
- 120.
Suzor 2010, p. 1852.
- 121.
Ibid., p. 1853.
- 122.
Klonick 2020, p. 2495.
- 123.
Celeste 2018, p. 15.
- 124.
Maroni 2019.
- 125.
Golia 2021.
- 126.
Wagner 2018, p. 228.
- 127.
Ibid., 230.
- 128.
Ibid.
- 129.
For a similar description of the Board, see Sander 2020, p. 1003.
- 130.
Hall 2002, p. 26.
- 131.
Gumperz 2009, p. 66.
- 132.
Jacquemet 2018, p. 3.
- 133.
- 134.
De Gregorio 2020, p. 27.
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This chapter has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka under the project uniri-drustv-18-252 ‘Legal aspects of the digital transformation of society’.
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Miloš, M., Pelić, T. (2022). Constitutional Reasoning There and Back Again: The Facebook Oversight Board as a Source of Transnational Constitutional Advice. In: de Poorter, J., van der Schyff, G., Stremler, M., De Visser, M. (eds) European Yearbook of Constitutional Law 2021. European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, vol 3. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-535-5_9
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